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Abstract 
 
The Western image of Turks is identified with two distinctive stereotypes: 
‘Terrible Turk’ and ‘Lustful Turk.’ These stereotypical images are deeply 
rooted in the history of the Ottoman Empire and its encounters with Christian 
Europe. Because of their fear of being dominated by Islam, European 
Christians defined the Turks as the wicked ‘Other’ against their perfect ‘Self.’ 
Since the beginning of Crusades, the Western image of Turks is associated with 
cruelty, barbarity, murderousness, immorality, and sexual perversion. These 
characteristics still appear in cinematic representations of Turks. In Western 
films such as Lawrence of Arabia and Midnight Express, the portrayals of 
Turks echo the stereotypes of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’ This thesis 
argues that these stereotypes have transformed into a myth and continued to 
exist uniformly in Western contemporary cinema. The thesis attempts to 
ascertain the uniformity and consistency of the cinematic image of Turks and 
determine the associations between this image and the myths of ‘terrible Turk’ 
and ‘lustful Turk.’ 
 
To achieve this goal, this thesis examines the trajectory of the Turkish 
image in Western discourse between the 11
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. The discourse 
analysis focuses on the Western writings, speeches, sermons, and literary texts, 
including the Crusade rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, Early Modern 
English drama, and Orientalist travelogue. To establish the continuity of the 
Turkish stereotypes in Western discourse, the thesis also presents a critical 
analysis of Western contemporary cinema, including both American and 
European films. The methodology of the thesis is based on two main 
theoretical approaches: a) representational practices, which involve the 
concepts of Otherness, stereotypes, myth, narrative, discourse and 
intertextuality; and b) Orientalism. These concepts provide a better 
understanding for the mythical characteristics of the Turkish stereotype. The 
thesis also offers an exploratory look at the social media platforms and their 
possible impact on the Turkish image in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Fall of Constantinople (1453) 
The enraged Turkish soldiers . . . gave no quarter. When they had 
massacred and there was no longer any resistance, they were intent 
on pillage and roamed through the town stealing, disrobing, 
pillaging, killing, raping, taking captive men, women, children, old 
men, young men, monks, priests, people of all sorts and conditions
1
  
  
Othello (1603) 
Are we turn'd Turks, and to ourselves do that 
Which heaven hath forbid the Ottomites? 
For Christian shame, put by this barbarous brawl.
2
 
 
Midnight Express (1978) 
For a nation of pigs, it sure is funny you don’t eat ‘em. Jesus Christ 
forgave the bastards, but I can’t. I hate you! I hate your nation! And 
I hate your people! And I fuck your sons and daughters because 
they’re pigs. You’re a pig, you’re all pigs!3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 An anonymous eyewitness account during the fall of Constantinople, cited in They Saw It Happen 
in Europe 1450-1600 (Routh, C.R.N; 1965). 
2
 From Othello by William Shakespeare, Act 2, Scene 3. 
3
 The courtroom speech from the film, Midnight Express (1978). 
2 
 
The word Turk means a native or inhabitant of Turkey
4
, but more often 
than not, ‘Turk’ carries overtones of other meanings. The name ‘Turk’ is 
associated with cruelty, murder, barbarity, savagery, immorality and lust. These 
qualities are commonly found in Western texts whenever Turks are represented. In 
the chronicles of the First Crusade, Turks were characterized as the “creatures of 
Devil” and a “Godless race.”5 Following the fall of Constantinople to Turks in 
1453, Pope Pius II commonly referred to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II as “cruel 
and bloody butcher.”6 In 1536, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the 
word ‘Turk’ was defined as “anyone behaving as a barbarian or savage.”7 At the 
end of the 16
th
 century, Francis Bacon called the Turks “cruel people.”8 
Seventeenth century historian, Richard Knolles, described the Turks as ‘cruel’, 
‘ruthless’ and ‘voluptuous’ and named them as “the present terror of the world.”9 
In the 18
th
 century, Lord Byron wrote about the Turkish sexual vices and 
characterized the Turks as ‘fond of sodomy.’10 By the 19th century, Turks became 
known by two distinctive stereotypes: Terrible Turk and Lustful Turk. These 
stereotypical images have been so entrenched in Western discourse since the 
Middle Ages that they have become a myth which survived until the 21
st
 century. It 
is the focus of this thesis to examine the trajectory of these images in Western 
discourse and determine how they turn into a myth.  
 
The excerpts at the beginning of this thesis are taken from different genres 
that belong to different time periods. The Western texts of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance offer ample amount of demonizing representations of Turks such as 
the aforementioned eyewitness account regarding the Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople. The ‘cruelty’ and ‘barbarity’ of Turks are also frequently 
characterized in English drama during the Early Modern period. Shakespeare 
                                                 
4
 Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved November, 2015 from: www.oxforddictionaries.com. 
5
 These descriptions will be discussed extensively in Chapter 1 with specific source references. 
6
 See the descriptions of Pope Pius II regarding Mehmed II in Creating East and West by Nancy 
Bisaha (2006; p.148).   
7
 See the definition of ‘Turk’ in 1453: The Holy War for Constantinople and the Clash of Islam and 
the West by Roger Crowley (2005) p.243. 
8
 Cited in the book, Orientalism and Islam by Michael Curtis, (2009), p.33. Taken from Francis 
Bacon’s essay, Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature (1612) in the book, The Essays or Counsels, 
Civil and Moral, of Francis Bacon. 
9
 For detailed descriptions of Richard Knolles, see the book by Michael Curtis, Orientalism and 
Islam (2009), p.46. 
10
 George Gordon Byron in Lord Byron: Selected Letters and Journals, ed. Leslie Marchand 
(London: John Murray, 1973/1982), p.213. 
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describes Turks as ‘cruel’, ‘malignant’ and ‘barbarous’ in his play Othello. These 
negative stereotypical qualities of Turks continue to appear in contemporary 
Western cinema. In the popular film Midnight Express (1978), screenwriter Oliver 
Stone’s lead character refers the Turks as ‘a nation of pigs’. Even in recent films 
like The Usual Suspects (1995) and Dracula Untold (2014), Turkish characters 
embody the same stereotypical qualities such as cruelty, barbarity and 
immorality.
11
 This stereotypical image of Turks has continued to exist since the 
Middle Ages until the 21
st
 century and has become a myth in Western discourse as 
it has been promoted by the modern entertainment media constantly. In this thesis, 
I argue that the Western image of Turks as ‘cruel’ has become a ‘myth’ that is 
uniform, universal and constant, which thus transcends time. Therefore, my 
objective in this thesis is to determine the continuity and consistency of the 
stereotypical representations of Turks in Western discourse.  
 
The main goal of this thesis is to ascertain that the Western writings, 
literature and cinema have created and perpetuated the myth of the Turkish 
‘cruelty’ and ‘lustfulness.’ To achieve this, I will conduct a discourse analysis to 
examine the representations of Turks in Western writings, including Crusade 
rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, literary texts, English drama, and 
Orientalist travelogue. I will also analyze the portrayals of Turks in contemporary 
Western cinema to assess the associations between the cinematic image of Turks 
and their past image in history. The aim of the discourse analysis is to determine 
how the Western images of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ emerged and 
transformed into a myth. In this thesis, I argue that these mythical images are the 
creation of the West which is defined as the Christian Europe for the time period 
between 11
th
 until the end of the 19
th
 century. From thereon, the West also involves 
the United States along with Europe. Beginning from the 20
th
 century, my 
discourse analysis will concentrate on the image of Turks in Western contemporary 
cinema which includes both American and European films. As I primarily focus on 
the Western representation of Turks, my emphasis will be on the stereotypical 
characteristics of Turks while reviewing the selected texts and films. The discourse 
                                                 
11
 The analysis of the portrayals of Turks in these films and others will be presented in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis.  
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analysis will illustrate the associations between the Western image of Turks in 
history and the stereotype of Turks in Western contemporary cinema. 
 
Beginning from the 11
th
 century, Turks posed a threat for Christianity and 
eventually prompted the First Crusade. During the Renaissance, the Ottoman 
Empire represented the Islamic challenge for the Christian powers of Europe. The 
Renaissance image of Turks as ‘barbarians’ and ‘bloodthirsty savages’ can be 
explained by the Christian anxiety and horror in the face of the Ottoman military 
advance into Europe for five centuries. The European image of Turks was 
primarily shaped by the Christian fear of being dominated by Islam. Therefore, the 
oppositional discourse and the propaganda against the Ottoman threat produced the 
stereotypical image of the ‘terrible Turk.’ Later, the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
and the rise of European colonialism altered the balance of power between Europe 
and the Turks. The European positional superiority, which is mentioned in Said’s 
seminal work Orientalism (1978), empowered Western travelers to enrich the 
stereotype of ‘terrible Turk’ with themes such as, despotism, indolence, 
backwardness, ignorance, sensuality and sexual vices. With Orientalist discourse, 
the image of the ‘lustful Turk’ was born. It is only natural to expect that these 
stereotypical images gradually fade or at least, evolve since the abolishment of the 
Ottoman Empire, followed by the establishment of the democratic Turkish 
Republic in 1923. However, these stereotypes continue to exist in the Western 
entertainment media, particularly, in Western contemporary cinema. As a result, 
these myths permeate into the Western popular culture. 
 
According to Barthes (1957) “everything can be a myth provided it is 
conveyed by a discourse” (p.109). He also suggests that myth should have a 
historical foundation and “it is therefore by no means confined to oral speech”, so 
it can be in any form (p.110). According to this premise, any form of media 
including cinema and films can convey myths. The National Book Award winner 
Mary Lee Settle (1992) has pointed out this fact in her book Turkish Reflections. 
Based on her experience of living in Turkey for three years during early 1970s, 
Settle criticizes the demeaning images of Turks propagated by Western filmmakers 
as follows: 
 
5 
 
I came back to a Eurocentric culture where Turkey is still an unknown country, or if it is 
known by those who have never been there and never known Turkish people, it is known 
only for its mistakes and its brutalities. The Turks I saw in Lawrence of Arabia and 
Midnight Express were ogrelike cartoon caricatures compared to the people I had known 
and lived among for three of the happiest years of my life (Settle, 1992, p. xii). 
 
According to Settle (1992), “Turkey has the worst and most ill-drawn public image 
of almost any country” she has known (p. xi). The malignant public image that 
Settle is referring to is a ‘myth’ that is cast on Turks as a nation. 
 
As will be argued in this thesis, Turks were branded by the mythical 
imagery of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ throughout history. Levi-Strauss 
(1955) claims that myth is everlasting as it represents the past and the present, as 
well as the future. Therefore, it is both historical and ahistorical (p.430). In his 
essay, When Myth Becomes History, Levi-Strauss (1979) also probes the question 
‘where the myth ends and where the history starts’ (p.38). Therefore, it is not 
always easy to distinguish the factual history from the myths. The texts of the 
Christian Europeans and later the Western travelers enabled the construction of the 
‘cruel Turk’ image in historical discourse as the events are often presented with the 
narrative of Turks’ inhumanity, cruelty and barbarity. For example, during the 
Greek revolution (1821-1829), Turks were condemned for their brutality and 
oppression regarding their treatment of Greeks (Wheatcroft, 1995; p.165). Until the 
18
th
 century, Greeks had coexisted with the Turks in the Ottoman Empire without 
any major disputes. The Ottoman Turks received very little credit for their long 
and unique tradition of religious tolerance (McCarthy, 1995; p.8). Instead, with the 
Greek nationalist movement, Turks were represented as the cruel oppressors of 
Greeks and accused of committing inhuman acts. The Greek revolution against the 
Ottoman Empire began with the murder of Ottoman government officials and 
continued with an attack on the Turks of Morea in southern Greece (McCarthy, 
1995; p.10). With their slogan, “Not a Turk shall remain in the Morea”12 Greek 
guerrillas and villagers simply murdered every single Turk they found (McCarthy, 
                                                 
12
 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans:Dissolving Images  (1995), p.165. 
6 
 
1995; p.10). However, the massacre of 15,000 Turkish men, women and children 
in Southern Greece in 1821 was ignored by the West.
13
 
 
Likewise, during the infamous ‘Bulgarian atrocities of 1875, the sufferings 
and killings of Christians at the hands of the Ottoman Turks were widely 
publicized both in Europe and in the United States, but the equally atrocious 
murders of Muslims were ignored by the West.
14
 In 1876, when British politician 
William Ewart Gladstone, who served as prime minister four times, wrote his well-
known pamphlet, The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, he vilified 
the Turks by calling them an “anti-human specimen of humanity” not only because 
of their religion but because of their peculiar race:  
  
Let me endeavor very briefly to sketch . . . what the Turkish race was and what it is. It is 
not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the 
peculiar character of a race . . . They were, upon the whole, from the black day when they 
first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, 
a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as their dominion reached, 
civilization disappeared from view. They represented everywhere government by force, as 
opposed to government by law. For the guide of this life they had a relentless fatalism: for 
its reward hereafter, a sensual paradise.
15
 
 
Gladstone’s characterization of Turks is reminiscent of the Western 
discursive narrative of ‘terrible Turk’ or ‘cruel Turk’ that has emerged during the 
Middle Ages, continued through the Renaissance and got reinforced by Orientalist 
writings. Itzkowitz (1996) suggests that the Western perception of Turks is formed 
during the Ottoman times when Turks were characterized as “vicious people driven 
by their religion and culture to acts of murder and wantonness” (p.34). He also 
notes that this preconceived image allowed the West to vilify the Turks, support 
the uprisings of the Ottoman minorities and facilitate their liberation efforts:  
 
                                                 
13
 For details of how the West ignored the slaughter of Turks by the Greeks and other Christian 
groups, see Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans: Dissolving Images (1995), p.164-166 and Justin 
McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 (1995), 
Chapters 1 & 8. 
14
 See Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 
(1995), p.59-108 and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans: Dissolving Images (1995), p.165. 
15
 William Ewart Gladstone from The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (NY: 
Lowell, Adam Wesson & Company, 1876), p.10. 
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To this outcry on behalf of the Bulgarians we need only add those strident voices raised on 
behalf of the Armenians, the Greeks, and even the Arabs . . . The Ottoman Empire was a 
multiethnic, multinational, multireligious, multilingual state. Once nationalism reared its 
head first in the Balkans and then elsewhere within the empire, pressures developed which 
the Ottomans could not contain. In the European part of the empire, ethnic or national 
groups filtered out of Ottoman control, often with the support of one or another European 
power, to become nation states (Itzkowitz, 1996; p.34-35). 
 
For example, when Armenians revolted in 1890s to liberate themselves from the 
Ottoman Empire and used violence to secure an independent Armenia,
16
 the deaths 
of the Armenians as a result of the Ottoman response were considered as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ or ‘genocide.’ The image of Turks as ‘cruel’ has reinforced the genocide 
claims and made the allegations indisputable.  
 
Beginning from the late 1800s, the Ottoman Turks were facing the threat of 
colonial invasion and the nationalist movement, which prompted the minority 
revolts within the Empire. The events that occurred within the Ottoman Empire 
during the nationalist movement and the intrusion of Western imperial powers 
during the First World War will not be included in my discourse analysis. The 
purpose of my thesis is to determine the associations between the mythical 
representations of Turks in history until the late 18
th
 century, along with the 
Orientalist travelogue in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, and the image of Turks in 
modern media. For the purposes of this thesis, I have maintained a focus on the 
representations of Turks before the First World War, as the mythical image of 
Turks had already been formed by then. Furthermore, the geopolitical, 
administrative and sociological conditions of the Ottoman Empire during the First 
World War era are complex and require a detailed historical and political analysis. 
Therefore, I will not focus on the geopolitical state of the Ottoman Empire during 
First World War. Particularly, I will avoid discussing the Armenian genocide issue 
politically or historically.  
 
The exclusion of the political discourse about the Ottoman Empire during 
the First World War and the Armenian genocide may be considered as the 
                                                 
16
 See Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans:Dissolving  Images  (1995), p.165. 
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shortcomings of this thesis. My main concern has been the temporal nature of the 
discourse analysis in this thesis and the abundance of the material to be reviewed. 
Furthermore, by the time the nationalist movement started, the images of ‘terrible 
Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ had already been established by the previous discourses of 
the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Early Modern period, along with the 
Orientalist travelogue. I believe that analyzing the 19
th
 century newspapers will be 
inessential to the main argument of the thesis. Therefore, due to the time 
constraints of this thesis, the political discourse and the Western newspapers of the 
19
th
 century will not be reviewed.  
 
My challenge will be the analysis of the Orientalist travel accounts as they 
may involve themes of Ottoman despotism. The minority revolts within the 
Ottoman Empire were not only the result of Ottoman despotism, but also provoked 
by the Western imperial powers. For that reason, it will be extremely challenging 
to examine these events by conducting simply a discourse analysis, as there were 
other geopolitical reasons that need to be studied more closely. Therefore, I will try 
to keep the plots for the nationalist revolts separate from the representations of the 
Turks. In my opinion, the period when the Ottoman Empire became the ‘Eastern 
question’ during the First World War needs a more comprehensive examination, 
both historically and politically, rather than a discourse analysis. Consequently, the 
image of Turks as the “Eastern question”, which was discussed in Western 
newspapers and political texts, has been excluded from my discourse analysis.  
 
My rationale for omitting the political discourse during this period is also 
personal. As I am more interested in the correlation between the modern media 
representations and the past discursive formations, I have chosen to investigate the 
image of Turks in Western contemporary cinema. I will also look into the possible 
effects of social media on the Western image of Turks. Also, considering my 
Turkish native roots, I have avoided examining the nationalist movements within 
the Ottoman Empire to remain impartial. I have deliberately evaded discussing the 
Armenian genocide, which is a significant part of the minority revolts during that 
time period, as I consider this issue ‘sensitive’ and prefer to leave it to historians. 
In this thesis, I aim to examine the Western image of Turks in history and assess 
the associations between this image and the depictions of Turks in Western 
9 
 
cinema. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine how the Western image of 
Turks became a myth. Therefore, I believe that the analysis of the Western 
discourse until the end of the 19
th
 century Orientalist travel is adequate enough to 
determine the uniformity and consistency of the stereotypical image of Turks. 
 
 The consistency of the stereotypical Turkish image in Western discourse is 
primarily related to Eurocentric and ethnocentric representations of the East. 
According to Edward Said (1978) these representations constructed an imaginary 
‘Orient’ and produced a ‘regime of truth’ which he calls Orientalism. In his book, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington 
(1996) also admits that the dichotomy of East and West is a myth created by the 
West (p.33). Therefore, the construction of East vs. West allows the categorization 
of societies as ‘Western’ and ‘Non-Western.’ For Stuart Hall (1992), ‘Western’ 
means the type of society “that is developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, 
secular, and modern” (p.277). The West marks the ‘difference’ from the rest and 
provides a standard for comparison (Hall, 1992). However, the Western perception 
is also biased because of the sense of superiority that the West has due to its 
colonial power. Hence, the historical discourse is constructed based on this 
preconceived distinction between the Western superiority and Eastern inferiority. 
Accordingly, the events in history are characterized differently depending on 
which part of the world it occurs, East or West.  
 
There are some significant events in history that are represented differently 
due to the geographic location they took place. For example, the US atomic bomb 
that was used in Japan to end World War II is regarded as simply a ‘weapon of 
war’ or a ‘method of self-defense’ against the Japanese attacks. The number of 
people that were killed as a direct result of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki is estimated to be more than 250,000.
17
 Additionally, thousands more 
died later due to illnesses or genetic disorders caused by the long-lasting effects of 
the radiation as a consequence of the atomic bomb. In Western discourse, the 
people who lost their lives because of the atomic bomb are usually referred as 
                                                 
17
 See Mark Selden’s introduction, “The United States, Japan, and the Atomic Bomb” detailing the 
events that led to the atomic bomb and its aftermath in The Atomic Bomb: Voices from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (2015), p.xi-xxxvi. 
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‘wartime casualties.’ The necessity of dropping the atomic bomb was later justified 
by both Harry Truman and Winston Churchill as “a means of saving lives.”18 They 
claimed that nearly a million American and British lives would have been lost if 
the atomic bomb had not been used.
19
 Later, this claim was disputed by scholars 
and considered as an exaggeration.
20
 Nevertheless, the atomic bomb has neither 
altered the image of the West nor created long-standing stereotypes. On the other 
hand, the Western constructs of ‘terrible Turk’, ‘cruel Turk’ or ‘unspeakable Turk’ 
indicate a preconception that Ottoman Turks are, indisputably, capable of inhuman 
acts. I do not, in any way, suggest that Ottoman Turks are innocent, or incapable of 
murder, cruelty and rape. It needs to be emphasized that this thesis does not intend 
to refute the wrongdoings of the Ottoman Turks. It only aims to probe the origins 
of the long-standing stereotypical image of Turks.  
 
It is also critical to underline that Turks are not the only Muslims who are 
demonized and stereotyped in Western discourse. Besides Turks, Western 
discourse offers ample amount of demeaning images and misrepresentations of 
Arabs. However, there are some nuances between the representations of Arabs and 
Turks, particularly in entertainment media. These nuances will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, as well as throughout the thesis, while examining the Western image of 
Turks in history, literature and media. In this thesis, the main goal is to find out the 
Western perception of Turks in history and its associations with the modern day 
media representations. My analysis of the representations of Turks in Western 
discourse will provide an understanding of how the long-standing stereotypes of 
the ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ emerged and endured.  
 
When Turks are portrayed in entertainment media, these stereotypical 
attributes often resurface. Particularly in Western contemporary cinema, the 
depictions of Turks perpetuate these stereotypical images even further. As Levi-
Strauss suggests ‘myth’ is everlasting, so is the myth of ‘Turk’ as cruel, 
murderous, immoral, violent and lustful. This thesis aims to examine the 
                                                 
18
 See Mark Selden’s introduction, “The United States, Japan, and the Atomic Bomb” detailing the 
events that led to the atomic bomb and its aftermath in The Atomic Bomb: Voices from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (2015), p.xi-xxxvi. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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emergence and trajectory of this myth. The main purpose of this study is to find 
out whether the Turkish image in Western discourse is uniform and consistent, or 
not. Therefore, in the following chapters I will conduct a discourse analysis to 
achieve this goal. In my discourse analysis, I will examine the representations of 
Turks in Western discourse from the 11
th
 until the 21
st
 century. My main focus will 
be the Crusade rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, history books, Early 
Modern English drama, Orientalist travel accounts and Western contemporary 
cinema, including both American and European films. I have selected the texts 
based on their popularity and significance during each period under study. Some of 
these texts have continued to remain pivotal even in the 21
st
 century, such as the 
English drama plays. I have also considered the impact of these texts in shaping the 
Western image of Turks. My criteria for the selection of the films are popularity, as 
well as critical acclaim. There may be some films in my analysis that have neither, 
but they are still analyzed due to their extreme stereotypical portrayals of Turks.   
 
In Chapter 1, which is titled as Methodology, I will lay out the 
methodological approach that will be utilized throughout this thesis. My thesis 
offers a discourse analysis in which I examine the representations of Turks in a 
selected group of Western historical and literary texts, as well as in selected films 
from both American and European cinema. My discourse analysis is temporal and 
covers an extensive time span starting from the 11
th
 century until the 21
st
 century. 
Therefore, I use various theoretical concepts depending on the time periods and 
genres under study. The theoretical framework that will be applied to this thesis 
can be classified in two main groups: representational practices and Orientalism. 
The category of representational practices involves various topics that are relevant 
to the main argument of the thesis. These topics are: Otherness, stereotypes, myth, 
narrative, and discourse. While looking into what ‘discourse’ is, I will also 
introduce the concepts of ‘intertextuality’ and ‘historical discourse.’ The second 
major methodological approach will be Edward Said’s Orientalism which is 
relevant to the Western perception of Turks. In this section, I will briefly present 
what Orientalism means and how it will applied to this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 is titled as The Image of Turks between the 11
th
 and 16
th
 
Centuries. This chapter will focus on the Western historiography regarding the 
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image of Turks during the time period under study. Beginning from the Middle 
Ages, European Christians had countless encounters with the Turks first during the 
Crusades as a major military force for the Islamic religion and later, during the 
Renaissance as the Ottoman Empire, the biggest Muslim empire looming large in 
Europe. To examine the Western perception of Turks during these encounters, I 
will review prominent texts from the Crusade rhetoric such as the chronicles and 
speeches. From the Renaissance, I will examine the humanist discourse including 
writings, sermons and speeches along with well-known history books and essays 
from the same period. The chronicles, religious sermons, Crusade rhetoric, 
humanist and history texts are selected based on their significance in shaping the 
perception of European Christians towards the Turks. They indicate how European 
Christians viewed the Turks based on the historical circumstances and the 
challenges within Europe. Also, the rivalry between Islam and Christianity during 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance will be reviewed to provide a better 
understanding of the ‘Otherness’ of Turks as well as Muslims. The aim of this 
chapter is to determine how Turks were viewed and described in the Western 
history texts, speeches and chronicles of this period. The emphasis will be on the 
history of the Ottoman Empire and the image of Ottoman Turks. Specifically, I 
will present a brief history of the Ottoman military advance into Europe and the 
reaction of European Christians to the growing Turkish threat. I will investigate not 
only how Turks were perceived as the Muslim ‘Other’ but also how they were 
represented as a Turkish race. The stereotypical features of Turks in Western texts 
and speeches during the time period will be analyzed. I will also attempt to 
determine how these stereotypical qualities are associated with images of ‘terrible 
Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’  
 
Chapter 3 is titled as 16
th
 and 17
th
 Century Literary Representations of 
Turks.  In this chapter, I will look into the European image of Turks during the 16
th
 
and 17
th
 centuries. This chapter will focus on Western academic writings and 
literary texts during this period including treatises, history books, essays and 
English drama. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the continuity of the 
stereotypical qualities of the Turks in these texts. In particular, I will examine the 
image of Turks in popular English plays such as Othello by Shakespeare, 
Tamburlaine by Marlowe, A Christian Turned Turk by Daborne, and Selimus by 
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Greene.  I will analyze the portrayals of Turks in these plays, particularly those of 
the Ottoman Sultans, and outline the stereotypical characteristics of Turks. The 
main aspects of Turkish portraits in these plays such as, cruelty, imperial fratricide, 
along with the concept of ‘Turning Turk’ will be discussed. I will seek to find out 
the associations between the dramatic portrayals of Turks and the Turkish image 
represented by the discourses during the Crusades and Renaissance. My intention 
is to apply the principles of Edward Said’s Orientalism while analyzing the 
Turkish image presented in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century English drama. Although the 
period under study is a pre-colonial era, I will attempt to examine the dramatic 
portrayals of Turks in terms of Orientalist representations. My objective is to argue 
that Orientalism is a trans-historical discourse as it is manifested with the image of 
Turks in Early Modern English drama. 
 
Chapter 4, which is titled as The Western Image of Turks during 18
th
 and 
19 Centuries, will focus on the European perception of Turks in Orientalist 
discourse. In this chapter, I will look into the representations of Turks in Western 
travel accounts, as well as other Orientalist writings within the same time period. 
This chapter aims to find out how the European colonial aspirations and the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire altered the European perception of Turks. My discourse 
analysis of the Orientalist travelogue and texts will illustrate the most common 
themes that were used to characterize Turks, such as despotism, indolence, 
ignorance, harem, sodomy, sensuality and lust. These themes will be discussed 
further and compared to the previous image of Turks, particularly when the 
Ottoman Empire was at its peak. I will analyze the representations of Turks in 
Western travel accounts within the context of European positional superiority as 
suggested by Edward Said’s Orientalism. This chapter is an attempt to determine to 
what extent the image of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ existed in the Orientalist 
representations. The discourse analysis of the Orientalist texts will also show the 
similarities and differences of the European image of Turks compared to that of the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, as well as to the Turkish portraits in English drama. 
 
Chapter 5 is titled as The Image of Turks in Western Contemporary 
Cinema. In this chapter, I will examine the representation of Turks in 
contemporary cinema to find out the associations between the cinematic image of 
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Turks and the European images of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’ The first 
section of this chapter will focus on the Turkish portrayals in Hollywood films. I 
will analyze a selected number of films, while having a closer look at the two of 
the most popular films: Lawrence of Arabia (1962) and Midnight Express (1978). 
These films deserve special attention because they are both critically acclaimed 
and commercially successful films, which enabled them to reach a larger audience 
worldwide. The analysis of Turks in Lawrence of Arabia will be two dimensional. 
First, I will assess the Orientalist approach in Lawrence of Arabia in general. 
Second, the portrayals of Turks in particular will be examined with regards to the 
Orientalist themes in the film. I will also discuss Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. 
Lawrence’s book that inspired the film and address the Orientalist characteristic of 
the book. In the analysis of Midnight Express, I will analyze the depictions of the 
Turkish portraits and also discuss Billy Hayes’s memoir that the film is based on. 
As Midnight Express is one of the most popular films that underscores the Turkish 
‘cruelty’, I will also document the reaction to the film, as well as its implications 
for modern Turks and Turkey. In the second section, I will examine the Turkish 
portrayals in a selected number of films from European cinema. Although 
European films do not usually become as popular as their American counterparts 
due to smaller marketing budgets or fewer promotional resources, it is still 
essential to look into these films as European cinema also reflects the Western 
perception of Turks. In my analyses of both American and European films, I will 
focus on the female and male sexuality of the Turkish portrayals. The features of 
despotism, crime, murder, cruelty, sodomy, sexual aggression, and homosexuality 
that are attributed to the Turks in these films will also be discussed further. These 
qualities will be compared to the stereotypical images of Turks in the prior 
Western discourses, such as Crusade rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, 
Early Modern English drama and Orientalist writings. I will attempt to assess 
whether the cinematic image of Turks reinforced the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ and 
‘lustful Turk.’   
 
Chapter 6, the last chapter of the thesis, is titled as Western Perception of 
Turks in the New Millennium. The purpose of this chapter is not to support the 
main argument of this thesis and therefore, the chapter will not focus on the myth 
of ‘terrible Turk’ or ‘lustful Turk.’ It is rather an exploratory chapter, which is 
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based on the assumption that the emergence and popularity of the social media will 
transform traditional media and thus, influence media images and perceptions. In 
this chapter, I will focus on the media image of Turks, particularly the image of 
Turks with regards to social media. This chapter aims to present a glimpse of the 
possible impact of social media on the prospective image of Turks. First, I will 
address the role of social media in real-time events, by focusing on the Arab Spring 
that began in 2010. The content and coverage of social media platforms during the 
protests and demonstrations of Arab Spring will be investigated. I will discuss the 
significance of social media platforms in terms of news coverage during the Arab 
Spring and their impact on the traditional news media. As a case study, I will select 
the Gezi Park Protests that occurred in the summer of 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey, 
which bear some similarities to the Arab Spring. I will analyze the role of the 
social media during the Gezi Park resistance and seek to assess its impact during 
the protests. To provide a better understanding, I will conduct a comparative 
analysis in which I examine the Western representation of Turks before and after 
the Gezi Park protests. The comparative analysis will be based on the news 
coverage of the selected prominent newspapers form both the US and European 
media, such as The New York Times (US), The Wall Street Journal (US), The 
Guardian (UK) and Financial Times (UK).  Due to the language barrier and the 
time constraints, I was unable to choose any newspaper from other European 
countries, except for the French newspaper, Le Monde. I will attempt to analyze 
the representation of Turks in this newspaper too and try to evaluate the French 
perception. This chapter will be an exploratory attempt to address the possible 
impact of social media on the future image of Turks. As a new topic, there is 
limited amount of empirical research about the effect of social media. Therefore, it 
is not plausible to determine the actual impact of social media on the perception of 
Turks. However, I believe that this chapter will still make a contribution to the 
academic discussion on the social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube. It will also provide a valuable assessment of the impact of social media 
on the traditional news media. This chapter will demonstrate the significance of the 
convergence of the social media with the traditional news media and introduce the 
possible implications of this convergence in the future. There is still more research 
to be done regarding the topic of social media. Therefore, this chapter poses more 
questions for future researchers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical concepts that will be 
used in this thesis to examine and analyze the representations of Turks in Western 
discourse. As indicated in the introduction, the focus of my discourse analysis will 
be the Western perception of Turks in history beginning from the Middle Ages 
until the 21
st
 century. First, I will examine the Western representations of Turks 
beginning from the Crusades until the end of the 19
th
 century by conducting a 
discourse analysis. This discourse analysis involves historiography, humanist 
writings, essays, speeches, literary texts, and drama that are most influential and 
popular during the period under study. For the discourse analysis, the selected 
literature includes Crusade rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, Early 
Modern English drama and Orientalist travelogue. Second, I will attempt to 
determine the associations between the Western image of Turks in history and the 
representations of Turks in Western contemporary cinema, as well as new media. 
To achieve this, I will continue my discourse analysis by reviewing the popular 
films from both contemporary American and European cinema. I will also examine 
the impact of social media on Western perception of Turks by reviewing a selected 
number of current newspaper articles. Therefore, the breadth and depth of the 
literature and the extensive nature of the discourse analysis require multiple 
theoretical concepts to be applied. For that reason, my analysis will be based on 
various theoretical approaches depending on the epochs and genres. Overall, the 
theoretical concepts used can be categorized under two main titles: 
representational practices and Orientalism. The category of representational 
practices involves multiple concepts originated from social constructionist theory, 
linguistics, and semiotics. These are: Otherness, stereotypes, myth, narrative, 
discourse, and intertextuality. Orientalism is based on Edward Said’s critique of 
the Orientalist discourse about the Middle East. Moving forward, I will 
demonstrate how these concepts can be applied to the analysis of Turkish image in 
Western discourse.   
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Representational Practices 
 
Otherness  
Throughout history, the encounters between Muslims and Christians have 
been turbulent. Beginning from medieval times, European Christians viewed 
Muslims as rivals and stigmatized them as the ‘Other’ and vice versa. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this chapter will focus on the Christian perception of the 
Muslims and examine the ‘Otherness’ of Turks in particular. As the biggest Islamic 
military power, Turks were the leading enemy for Christian Europe from the 13
th
 
until the 18
th
 centuries, and thus, they were often perceived as the wicked ‘Other’ 
by the West. To better understand how Western perception of the Muslim ‘Other’ 
affects the way Turks were characterized, the concept of ‘Otherness’ needs to be 
probed. What exactly does ‘Other’ or ‘Otherness’ mean? Our perception of a 
person depends on what that other person represents to us, or in other words, what 
the other person means to us. As suggested by Stuart Hall (1997a), “Things don’t 
mean: we construct meaning, using representational systems – concepts and signs” 
(p.25). According to social constructionist theory, the things around us acquire 
meaning with our language system, in which we use signs or concepts to represent 
those things and thus ‘construct their meaning.’ The pioneer of the constructionist 
approach in language and representation, Ferdinand de Saussure, claims that 
meaning is ‘differentiation’ (Hall, 1997a; p.30). In other words, the meaning of an 
element is constructed by its differences from the other. These differences, whether 
they are racial, geographic, ethnic, economic or ideological, enable the affirmation 
of one’s own meaning, or simply, one’s own sense of self. Thus, stigmatization of 
the ‘other’ generates a classification of us and them, which helps define and secure 
one’s own positive identity. Simply put, the ‘Other’ helps affirm and preserve 
one’s own ‘Self.’  
 
Until European colonialism of the 18
th
 century, the rivalry between Islam 
and Christianity continued with countless military encounters, such as the Arab 
conquest of Spain, the Reconquista, the Crusades, the fall of Constantinople to 
Ottoman Turks, and the sieges of Vienna by the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic 
‘Other’ threatened Christian Europe for almost a thousand years. During that 
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period, the contention between the two religions resulted in antagonism and 
misperceptions deeply embedded on each side. Faced with the threat of Arab 
conquests, and later the Ottoman military advance, European Christians became 
compelled to establish their own ‘Self’ identity in the form of a perfect Cristian 
versus a wicked Muslim ‘Other.’ Frassetto and Blanks (1999) explain how 
constructing Muslims as the ‘Other’ helped define the Western identity and 
worldview:  
 
 the European view of the “other,” like the European view of the “self,” has since classical 
times revolved around an ever-changing historical set of circumstances. . . . By the 
eleventh century, when Western writers were finally beginning to form a notion of what it 
meant to be European, they found themselves confronted by a powerful and threatening 
Islam, which they by and large were neither able nor willing to understand. To be sure, 
there were other important elements that went into the construction of the Western 
identity: Europe was also the product of internal colonization and cultural assimilation. 
Yet the encounter with the Muslim “other” was elemental to the shaping of the Western 
worldview. This was especially true during those centuries that began with the Crusades 
and ended with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire (Frassetto & Blanks, 1999, 
p.1). 
 
Islam posed a threat for Christian Europe not only with its military aggression but 
also with its superior civilization. During the Middle Ages, Muslims were far 
ahead of their Christian rivals, offering fascinating advances in architecture, law, 
literature, philosophy, and in most cultural areas (Frassetto & Blanks, 1999). As 
Frassetto & Blanks (1999) suggest, it was not only from a military position, but 
also from the position of cultural weakness that Christian Europe developed 
negative images of Islam, some of which survive to the present day: 
 
Thus the Western need to construct an image of the Muslim, of the “Other,” was a twofold 
process that came to dominate the premodern discourse concerning Islam. On the one 
hand, it created an image of the Saracen, Moor, and Turk that was wholly alien and wholly 
evil. . . . On the other hand, the creation of such a blatantly false stereotype enabled 
Western Christians to define themselves. Indeed, the Muslim became, in a sense, a 
photographic negative of the self-perception of an ideal Christian self-image, one that 
portrayed Europeans as brave, virtuous believers in the one true God and the one true faith. 
By debasing the image of their rivals, Western Christians were enhancing their own self-
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images and trying to build self-confidence in the face of a more powerful and more 
culturally sophisticated enemy (Frassetto & Blanks, 1999; p.3). 
 
For the West, the alterity of Muslims stems from the ethnic, cultural and 
most importantly, the religious difference. However, difference may be dangerous 
as it may be negative as well as positive.  If the cultural, racial or ethnic differences 
become a reason to denigrate the ‘other’ as a basis for self-affirmation, then the 
concepts of ‘us’ and ‘them’ may turn into ‘us vs. them’ and it may cause hostility 
towards the ‘other.’ Hall (1997b) emphasizes the consequences when 
differentiation of the ‘Other’ turns into animosity: 
 
difference is ambivalent. It can be both positive and negative. It is both necessary for the 
production of meaning, the formation of language and culture, for social identities and a 
subjective sense of the self . . . at the same time it is threatening, a site of danger, of 
negative feelings, of splitting, hostility and aggression towards the ‘Other’ (Hall, 1997b, 
p.238). 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, European Christians perceived Muslims as the 
enemy of Christianity and viewed them as the evil ‘Other’, who was ready to 
destroy the Christian faith and annihilate Western civilization. The animosity 
between the two religions was heightened during both the age of Crusades and 
Renaissance. During this period, European Christians united in opposition to 
Muslims and had relentless military battles against both Seljuk Turks and Ottoman 
Turks, as well as Arabs, whom they called Saracens at the time. In 1453, when 
Ottoman Turks captured Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, 
they became the sole Muslim enemy of Western Christendom. The word Muslim, 
Saracen, Moor, or Turk were no longer used interchangeably (Levin, 2007; Tolan, 
2002). From thereon, all the negative qualities once associated with Muslims, and 
many more, were attributed to Turks.  
 
In The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha (1994) discusses the construction 
of ‘otherness’ in colonial discourse. In the chapter The Other Question Bhabha 
suggests that construction of ‘otherness’ relies on the concept of ‘fixity’, which he 
describes as “the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference” (p.94). According to 
Bhabha, fixity results in “rigidity and an unchanging order” as well as “disorder, 
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degeneracy and daemonic repetition” and its discursive strategy is stereotyping 
(p.94). Once an ethnic group is victimized through stereotyping and becomes the 
‘Other’, it is almost impossible to suggest that this ethnic group can change or 
differentiate. This is what Bhabha means by ‘rigidity’ and ‘unchanging order.’ 
Repetition of the stereotype ensures that it becomes a cliché and cannot be 
questioned. The concept of ‘fixity’ also manifests itself in Crusade rhetoric in the 
form of authoritative, degenerate and repetitive descriptions that are demonizing 
Muslims. The Crusade rhetoric represented Saracens, as well as Turks, as impious, 
corrupt and idolatrous pagans. The propaganda sermons by the Crusaders 
portrayed both Saracens and Turks as violent, wicked and cruel non-believers who 
captured, enslaved and tortured Christians (Housley, 2007; p.200 and Daniel, 
1989; p.39-97). The fall of Constantinople, the last bastion of Western 
Christendom in the East, terrified Europeans and awakened the memories of the 
Crusades (Crowley, 2005). After Constantinople’s conquest by the Turks, the fear 
of Ottoman aggression caused European Christians to propagate the Crusade 
imagery in their writings and speeches when characterizing Turks. As a result, the 
Crusade depictions of Turks as infidel, immoral and evil endured in Renaissance 
humanist discourse too. This stereotypical image of Turks, which contrasts the 
perceived image of an ideal Christian, was further enhanced by Renaissance 
humanists as ‘barbarians’ or ‘rapists’, as will be demonstrated in selected humanist 
speeches and writings in Chapter 2. Hence, the stereotype of ‘terrible Turk’ was 
born and became something that has been used frequently in the Western 
discourse.  
 
In his book A Short History of Structural Linguistics, Matthews (2003) 
refers to Saussure’s description of meaning. He suggests that ‘meaning’ is a matter 
of difference and “in the language system there are only differences” (p.19). 
Therefore, the marking of ‘difference’ is essential to the production of meaning 
and creating binary opposition is the simplest way for ‘marking of difference’ 
(Hall, 1997a, p.31). European Christians characterized Muslims in binary 
opposites, such as pious/infidel, devout/idolatrous, good/evil, merciful/cruel and 
civilized/barbarous, and defined their perfect self-image against the polar opposite 
of an ‘evil’ Muslim. Housley (2007) paraphrases Svetlana Loutchitskaja’s 
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explanation of how binary opposites served the construction of Muslim ‘otherness’ 
in Crusade rhetoric. 
 
Svetlana Loutchitskaja has recently emphasized the extent to which early crusading 
sources set up an imposing range of good/evil opposites: devotio/perfidia, milites 
Christi/inimici Christi, and fideles/infideles or increduli. Arguably Saracen polytheism fit 
this pattern in two ways, both by acting as the “other” to Christian monotheism and by 
providing a wicked “other” for the cult of the saints (as cited by Housley, 2007; p. 197-
198). 
 
Turks were also characterized in binary opposites and viewed as the wicked 
‘Other’ during the Crusades and Renaissance. However, biblical binary 
descriptions of Turks are more common in Crusade rhetoric than in Renaissance 
humanist discourse. Humanists usually characterized Turks as ‘barbarians’ and 
‘bloodthirsty savages’ rather than using biblical binary oppositions. The underlying 
reason for this might have been their realization of Ottoman Turks as a superior 
military power. In a sense, describing the Ottomans in binary terms, such as 
good/evil and pious/infidel, would have also exposed the Christian military 
weakness against the Turks as in weak/powerful. For that reason, they often used 
stereotypes instead to alienate Ottoman Turks as the ‘Other’. Renaissance humanist 
discourse also initiated the stereotype of ‘Terrible Turk’, which eventually turned 
into a myth in the following decades. The myth of ‘Terrible Turk’ will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 2 and 3 consecutively.    
 
Nevertheless, defining Muslims in binary terms served the purpose of 
Crusades well as it helped unifying the Christians against a common enemy. Stuart 
Hall (1997b) suggests that binary opposites such as acceptable/unacceptable 
produce stereotypes and thus, serve the purpose of ‘exclusion’ of the ‘Other’ 
(p.258). By defining Muslims with polar opposites, European Christians 
constructed them as the ‘enemies of faith’, which in return galvanized Europe for 
the Crusade movement against Islam. On the one hand, perceiving Islam as a 
‘sham’ and regarding Muslims as ‘idolaters’ helped Christians enhance their self-
image. The stereotypical image of the Muslims and Turks as the wicked ‘Other’ 
facilitated their exclusion, and therefore, helped justify the Crusades. On the other 
hand, stigmatizing Turks as the wicked ‘Other’ and stereotyping them as 
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‘barbarians’, ‘terrible Turk’ or ‘cruel Turk’ during the Renaissance enabled 
Christian Europe to unite and battle against the Ottoman Empire on many 
occasions. To better understand how ‘otherness’ generates stereotypes, a closer 
look at stereotypes as a ‘representational practice’ is needed. 
 
Stereotypes 
In this thesis, the concept of stereotypes is applied as a representational 
practice which signifies racial or cultural differentiation. Before moving on to 
discuss stereotypes in representation, the meaning of stereotype needs to be 
addressed. Other than representation, stereotypes can be defined in either ‘cultural’ 
or ‘psychoanalytical’ sense.  In its current cultural sense, the word stereotype was 
first used by Walter Lippmann in his book Public Opinion. Lippmann (1922) 
referred to “the picture in our heads” to explain the way we perceive the world 
around us (p.9-34). He used the word stereotype to describe how we label other 
people, of whom we have limited or no acquaintance, by using preconceptions 
already formed in our minds. Lippmann explained it as follows: 
 
The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the 
repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most 
things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made 
us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception (Lippmann, 1922; p.88).  
 
The psychoanalytical definition of stereotypes was put forward by Gilman (1985) 
who described them as “a crude set of mental representations of the world” (p.17). 
Stereotypes perpetuate a needed sense of difference between the ‘self’ and the 
‘object,’ which becomes the ‘Other’ (p.18). According to Gilman, the main reason 
for creating stereotypes is the anxiety individuals feel towards the world around 
them, which generates the need for the ‘Self’ to control the ‘Other.’  
 
The deep structure of the stereotype reappears in the adult as a response to anxiety, an 
anxiety having its roots in the potential disintegration of the mental representations the 
individual has created and internalized. . . . The objects exist, we interact with them, they 
respond to (or ignore) our demands upon them. But when we relate to them, we relate to 
them through the filter of our mental representation of the world. This representation 
centers around our sense of control. . . . When, however, the sense of order and control 
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undergoes stress, when doubt is cast on the self’s ability to control the internalized world 
that it has created for itself, an anxiety appears… We project that anxiety onto the Other, 
externalizing our loss of control. The Other is thus stereotyped, labeled with a set of signs 
paralleling (or mirroring) our loss of control. The Other is invested with all of the qualities 
of the “bad” or the “good” (Gilman, 1985; p.19-20).   
 
Keeping in mind Lippmann’s cultural and Gilman’s psychoanalytical 
viewpoints, the concept of stereotype will be used as a representational practice 
henceforth, which indicates ‘racial’ or ‘cultural differentiation.’ According to 
Stuart Hall (1997b), “stereotyping is a signifying practice that is central to the 
representation of racial difference” (p.257). To paraphrase, stereotyping is a 
representational practice that is often used for highlighting the cultural, ethnic, and 
racial difference. Although Hall’s main concern is racial stereotyping in colonial 
discourse, he also looks at how stereotypes are generated by marking the 
‘differences’ and fixing them permanently. 
 
Stereotypes get hold of the few ‘simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped and widely 
recognized’ characteristics about a person, reduce everything about the person to those 
traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change or development to 
eternity. . . . stereotyping reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes difference [author’s 
italics] (Hall, 1997b; p.258). 
 
Citing colonial discourse, Hall (1997b) underscores the naturalization of 
‘difference’ in stereotyping. As a racialized regime of representation, colonial 
discourse reduces the cultures of black people to nature, or simply naturalizes the 
difference. If the differences between black and white people are ‘cultural’, then 
they are open to modification and change, but if they are ‘natural’, then they are 
permanent and fixed. Therefore, naturalization is a representational strategy 
designed to fix ‘difference’, and thus secure it forever (p.245). Similar to colonial 
discourse, in Crusade rhetoric too, European Christians characterized both 
Muslims and Turks as ‘bloodthirsty savages’ and believed that taking pleasure in 
‘murdering’ Christians was in their nature. Later, European humanists described 
Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarians’ and portrayed them as natural born killers, pillagers, 
wanton rapists, and enemies of civilization.  Some of these so-called ‘natural’ 
characteristics, such as being ‘murderers’ or ‘rapists’, have become fixed and have 
continued to emerge in early modern English drama, as well as modern day media 
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representations, such as the Turkish portrayals in popular films. From the 
portrayals of Turks in Shakespeare’s Othello and Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, to the 
ones in films like Lawrence of Arabia (1962) and Midnight Express (1978), the 
negative characteristics of Turks are presented as natural and archetypal. The 
symbolic associations between the historical representations of Turks and their 
image in Early Modern English drama and Western contemporary cinema will be 
examined further in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively. In these chapters, both the 
stereotypical image of Turks from the selected English plays and Western films 
will be compared and contrasted with the mythical Turkish image.  
 
Marking the ‘difference’ with stereotypical representations turns the ‘other’ 
into a misfit and enables his/her exclusion. The stigmatization of religious 
‘difference’ between Muslims and European Christians produced stereotypical 
features such as immorality, infidelity, savagery, barbarity and brutality and 
allowed the dismissal of Islam as a ‘sham’. As Bhabha (1994) puts it, stereotyping 
is not just a simplification, but “a false representation of a given reality” (p.107). 
When the ‘other’ is represented with stereotypical characteristics, whether they are 
physical, behavioral or moral, his/her exclusion becomes easier. ‘Hall explains 
how ‘splitting’ results in ‘exclusion’ as follows:  
 
stereotyping deploys a strategy of ‘splitting.’ It divides the normal and the acceptable from 
the abnormal and the unacceptable. It then excludes or expels everything which does not 
fit, which is different (Hall, 1997b; p.258). 
 
Hall’s description of exclusion through splitting in stereotyping may also be 
referred as ‘binary opposition.’ Human beings perceive the world in binary mode, 
which means that things are divided into two that are opposite to each other. By 
splitting, individuals categorize their world as ‘acceptable/unacceptable’ or 
‘normal/abnormal’ and therefore, they include the ‘acceptable/normal’ whereas 
they exclude the ‘unacceptable/abnormal.’ Hall elaborates on the exclusion of the 
stereotype as follows: 
 
Stereotyping . . . sets up a symbolic frontier between the ‘normal’ and the ‘deviant’, the 
‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’, the ‘acceptable’ and the ‘unacceptable’, what ‘belongs’ 
and what does not or is ‘Other’, between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, Us and Them. It 
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facilitates the ‘binding’ or bonding together of all of Us who are ‘normal’ into one 
‘imagined community’; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them – ‘the Others’ – who 
are in some way different – ‘beyond the pale’ (Hall, 1997b; p.258). 
 
According to Hall’s premise, marking ‘difference’ allows individuals to form 
symbolic boundaries because it helps them “close ranks, shore up culture and to 
stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure, abnormal” (Hall 1997b; 
p.237). Therefore, symbolic boundaries are central to all culture, as they “keep the 
categories pure, giving cultures their unique meaning and identity” (Hall 1997b; 
p.236). When faced with a rival religion, European Christians were intimidated and 
thus, they struggled to establish boundaries between the Islamic culture and their 
own. Stereotyping the Muslims as ‘evil’ helped them create the ideal Christian 
image, which is reflected in good/evil and acceptable/ unacceptable binary 
opposites. By representing Muslims in binary terms, European Christians excluded 
them as ‘beyond the pale’ and achieved a pure identity which enabled them to 
unite as a whole in fighting against Islam during the Crusades and onwards.  
 
The role of stereotypes in forming a unity is also discussed by Richard 
Dyer (1993), who suggests that “the effectiveness of stereotypes resides in the way 
they invoke a consensus” (p.14). Stereotypes are not simply false images or 
distorted representations that are created to discriminate the ‘Other.’ The 
stereotype often represents a general agreement about a social group, which cannot 
be reached by all members of the society independently, simultaneously and in 
isolation, but rather comes from the stereotype itself (Dyer, 1993). The disposition 
of power among or within the social groups affects the general acceptance and 
agreement about stereotypes. Dyer points out the relationship between stereotypes 
and the disposition of power in society as follows: 
 
The consensus invoked by stereotypes is more apparent than real; rather, stereotypes 
express particular definitions of reality, with concomitant evaluations, which in turn relate 
to the disposition of power within society. Who proposes the stereotype, who has the 
power to enforce it, is the crux of the matter (Dyer, 1993; p.14). 
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For example, analyzing the colonial discourse, Hall argues that ethnocentrism is a 
form of power over the ‘Other’ and inevitably, produces stereotypes. He explains 
the relationship of power and stereotyping as follows: 
 
Power . . . in broader cultural and symbolic terms, including the power to represent 
someone or something in a certain way – within a certain ‘regime of representation.’ It 
includes the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices. Stereotyping is 
a key element in this exercise (Hall, 1997b; p.259) 
 
To demonstrate how ethnocentrism and power over the ‘Other’ can create ‘a 
regime of representation’, Hall cites Edward Said’s Orientalism, which will be 
discussed further in this chapter. According to Hall, it is essential to recognize that 
Orientalism represents a discourse generated by the Western colonial power and 
political domination. As a colonial discourse, Orientalism is based on 
ethnocentrism and depends on the notion that the West has power and control over 
the knowledge about the East. It is argued by Edward Said that Orientalist 
discourse has constructed the ‘Other’ with stereotypical and embellished imagery 
of the Orient, and thus, created the Western ‘Self.’ The otherness of the East is 
reinforced with the binary opposites. As a result of this Self/Other dichotomy and 
binary opposition, Orientalism has returned vulgar stereotypes that are culturally 
inferior, backward and corrupt, such as the stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs. The 
stereotype of Turks may also be included in the same category, as it is generated 
by the same representational practice through the Orientalist viewpoint. The 
stereotypical image of Turks, as the ‘terrible Turk’, exists not only in 
historiography, Christian theological texts, Renaissance humanist discourse, and 
Early Modern English drama, but also in Western contemporary cinema. The 
stereotypical image of Turks became trans-historical and the myth of ‘terrible 
Turk’ has continued to exist even in the modern day media images. To better 
understand the long-lasting stereotype of Turks, it is critical, first, to answer the 
questions what myth is and how it is related to narrative and historical discourse. 
  
Myth, Narrative and Historical Discourse 
After the fall of Constantinople to Turks and onwards, the stereotype of 
‘terrible Turk’, which was characterized as someone who ate children alive, rapidly 
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became universal in the West (Wheatcroft, 1995; p,25). The phrases terrible Turk 
or cruel Turk epitomized Turks’ negative qualities based on the perceptions of 
Christians had about them and became a myth in Western discourse. In 
Mythologies, Roland Barthes (1957) suggests that “myth is a type of speech” 
which is chosen by history and cannot evolve from the nature of things (p.109-
110). In other words, myth cannot be defined by its object or material as it must 
have a historical foundation. Levi-Strauss (1955) also defined myth as “a part of 
human speech”, that does not lose its mythical value and remains “everlasting” 
(p.430). For both Barthes and Levi-Strauss, myth cannot simply be treated as 
language because it represents something more than that. Likewise, the phrases 
‘terrible Turk’ or ‘cruel Turk’ do not signify just the ‘cruelty’ of a single Turk, but 
rather embody a whole set of negative characteristics that all Turks possess in the 
minds of European Christians, such as savagery, barbarity, violence, 
murderousness, brutality, infidelity, wickedness, immorality, corruptness, and 
sexual perversion. What ‘Turk’ signified for European Christians will be examined 
closely in the following chapters. Particularly, chapters 2, 3 and 4 will demonstrate 
that these negative qualities had been identified with Turks since the Middle Ages. 
The stereotypical representation of Turks in Western discourse has been repeated 
for so long and so often that, the phrase ‘terrible Turk’ became a myth that has 
continued even to the 21
st
 century. 
 
Barthes (1957) claims that “everything can be a myth provided it is 
conveyed by a discourse” (p.109). He also suggests that myth should have a 
historical foundation and “it is therefore by no means confined to oral speech”, so 
can be in any form. 
 
It can consist of modes of writing or of representations; not only written discourse, but also 
photography, cinema, reporting, sport, shows, publicity, all these can serve as a support to 
mythical speech. . . . We shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean 
any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph will be a kind of 
speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; even objects will become speech, if 
they mean something (Barthes, 1957; p.110-111). 
 
Based on Barthes’s assertion of how myth is conveyed through discourse, the 
popular entertainment media, particularly contemporary cinema, may be 
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considered among the primary agents of myth. For example, the portrayals of 
Turks in the contemporary movies, such as Lawrence of Arabia (1962), Midnight 
Express (1978), and Usual Suspects (1995) are predominantly cruel, violent, 
corrupt, immoral, or degenerate. Needless to say, when portraying Muslims, 
stereotyping has often been the norm in Western cinema. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, orientalizing Muslims, particularly the Arabs, as ‘Other’ in films has 
been a common practice in Western cinema. However, Turkish portrayals in 
Western films have been distinctively uniform and constant, which set them apart 
from Arab characters that are nuanced and multifaceted at times. The uniformity 
and consistency of the Turkish stereotype in films originate from the trans-
historical image of Turks that is being examined in this thesis. Chapter 5 will 
assess how the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ has become everlasting and universal, by 
looking into both American and European cinema and attempt to identify the 
associations between the past image of Turks in Western discourse and their 
current image in the entertainment media.  
  
To answer the question how the Turkish image became a myth in Western 
discourse and popular culture, it is crucial to understand the basis and significance 
of myth in language. According to Saussure’s structuralist model, language is a 
social phenomenon because its source does not lie in nature or in the individual 
subject, but rather lies in society, in the shared culture, and in the language system 
(Hall, 1997a; p.32-33). Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole refer to 
the two characteristics of language. Langue is the social part of language which 
belongs to a revertible time, and parole, is the individual act of communication that 
is non-revertible (Hall, 1997a; Levi-Strauss, 1955). Myth on the other hand, 
signifies the third level in language. Levi-Strauss describes myth as the “third time 
referent”, a combination of the first two, which is ‘everlasting’: 
 
We have just distinguished langue and parole by the different time referents which they 
use. Keeping this in mind, we may notice that myth uses a third referent which combines 
the properties of the first two. On the one hand, a myth always refers to events alleged to 
have taken place in time: before the world was created, or during its first stages – anyway 
long ago. But what gives the myth an operative value is that the specific pattern is 
everlasting; it explains the present and the past as well as the future (Levi-Strauss, 1955; 
p.430). 
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Therefore, myth represents a third time dimension, where the linguistic value of 
myth becomes distinct by being both historical and ahistorical. As a myth, the term 
‘terrible Turk’ has preserved its signification in history and its mythical value, 
which has lasted to the 21
st
 century. The preservation of this mythical value 
throughout history is best explained by Levi-Strauss’s words: 
        
the mythical value of the myth remains preserved, even through the worst translation. 
Whatever our ignorance of the language and the culture of the people where it originated, a 
myth is still felt as a myth by any reader throughout the world. Its substance does not lie in 
its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in the story which it tells (Levi-Strauss, 1955; 
p.430). 
 
Likewise, Barthes (1975) points out that narrative has the same quality of a 
myth and does not lose its essence when translated. He suggests that unlike a lyric 
poem, “narrative is reducible without fundamental damage” (p.269). According to 
Barthes, there is narrative in myth, as well as in fables, legend, tales, epics, 
tragedy, drama, comedy, movies, paintings, and even in history (p.237). Narrative 
can be interpreted at any time and by anyone, even from the opposite cultural 
backgrounds. Therefore, it is ‘trans-historical’ and ‘transcultural.’ Barthes explains 
it as follows: 
 
narrative starts with the very history of mankind; there is not, there has never been 
anywhere, any people without narrative; all classes, all human groups, have their stories . . 
. narrative remains largely unconcerned with good or bad literature. Like life itself, it is 
there, international, trans-historical, transcultural (Barthes, 1975; p.237). 
 
In narrative, the storytelling always presents the question of ‘reality’ vs 
‘imaginary’. White (1990) claims that when the distinction between real and 
imaginary events is imposed on the storyteller, storytelling becomes a problem. He 
goes on to suggest that ‘mythic narrative’ is not concerned with this distinction, as 
the storyteller is not obligated for keeping the ‘real’ separated from the 
‘imaginary’:  
 
What we wish to call mythic narrative is under no obligation to keep the two orders of 
events, real and imaginary, distinct from one another. Narrative becomes a problem when 
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we wish to give to real events the form of story. It is because real events do not offer 
themselves as stories that their narrativization is so difficult (White, 1990; p.3).  
 
Therefore, narrative creates a challenge when it is about a real event versus an 
imaginary one. In that case, the nonnarrative representation or manner of speaking, 
such as in physical sciences, seems more appropriate than narrativization. It is also 
appropriate for historians to report the history of the world in nonnarrative form. 
However, as White (1990) suggests, history is told in both chronological order of 
real events and by narrativization, instead of nonnarrative form (p.5). The 
European Christian speeches and writings that followed the fall of Constantinople 
offer a great example for the narrativization of history. The people who managed 
to escape from the assault of the Ottoman Turks during the siege told horror stories 
about the Turkish atrocities, adding their own narrative to them. Although, the 
chroniclers who witnessed the events tried to give an accurate account of what 
happened, the embellished stories of the inhuman Turkish cruelties spread still by 
the refugees and envoys from the Christian outposts imperiled by the Ottoman 
victory (see Chapter 2).  Even the Venetian Senate exaggerated the number of 
inhabitants killed during the attack to create a more dramatic effect (as cited in 
Chapter 2). 
   
 In his 1967 essay, The Discourse of History, Barthes challenges the 
distinction between ‘fictional discourse’ and ‘historical discourse’ and criticizes 
the historiography that favored a narrative representation of past events and 
processes (White, 1990; p.35): 
 
Does the narration of past events, which, in our culture from the time of the Greeks 
onwards, has generally been subject to the sanction of historical “science”, bound to the 
unbending standard of the “real”, and justified by principles of “rational” exposition – does 
this form of narration really differ, in some specific trait, in some indubitably distinctive 
feature, from imaginary narration, as we find it in the epic, the novel, and the drama? 
(Barthes, 1967; p.7). 
 
When posing his question, Barthes uses the words science, real, and rational 
within quotation marks to attack the professed objectivity of traditional 
historiography. What he finds paradoxical is that “narrative structure which was 
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originally developed within cauldron of fiction (in myths and the first epics) 
becomes at once the sign and proof of reality” (Barthes, 1967; p.18).  White (1990) 
suggests that it is unrealistic to expect the real events to be represented as they 
were, because historical discourse was developed late in human history and was 
difficult to sustain in times of cultural breakdown, like in the Early Middle Ages 
(p.3). Thus, in traditional historiography, narrative becomes a problem, when the 
real events are told in the form of story. 
 
 However, for Levi-Strauss (1966) it was not narrative, but history itself was 
the problem. In his essay, When Myth Becomes History, Levi-Strauss (1979) 
probes the question ‘where the myth ends and where the history starts’ (p.38). He 
suggests that the stories in traditional historiography are so repetitive that the same 
type of event can be used several times to account for different happenings (p.40). 
He remarks: 
 
What we discover by reading these books is that the opposition – the simple opposition 
between mythology and history which we are accustomed to make – is not at all a clear-cut 
one, and that there is an intermediary level. Mythology is static, we find the same mythical 
elements combined over and over again, but they are in a closed system . . . in 
contradiction with history, which is . . . an open system (Levi-Strauss, 1979; p.40). 
 
In his book, The Savage Mind, Levi-Strauss (1966) recognizes history as a 
diachronic representation of events, but views it as a method of analysis “with no 
distinct object corresponding to it” (p. 262). He criticizes the historical knowledge 
provided by the historical method as “ahistorical” (p. 254). His remarks are as 
follows: 
 
It offers not a concrete image of history but an abstract schema of men making history of 
such a kind that it can manifest itself in the trend of their lives as a synchronic totality. Its 
position in relation to history is therefore the same as that of primitives to the eternal past . 
. . history plays exactly the part of a myth (Levi-Strauss, 1966; p.254). 
  
For Levi-Strauss, traditional, “narrative” historiography is nothing but the myth of 
modern, industrial, and imperialistic Western societies (White, 1990). Levi-Strauss 
continues as follows: 
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historical facts are no more given than any other. It is the historian, or the agent of history, 
who constitutes them by abstraction and as though under the threat of an infinite regress 
(Levi-Strauss, 1966; p.257).  
 
What is true of the constitution of historical facts is no less so of their selection. . . .  
History is therefore never history, but history-for. It is partial in the sense of being biased 
even when it claims not to be, for it inevitably remains partial – that is, incomplete – and 
this is itself a form of partiality (Levi-Strauss, 1966; p.257). 
 
By the same token, Barthes suggests that historical representations, even when they 
are less mythological, are based on referents that are ‘constituted’ rather than 
‘found’ (White, 1990; p.35). Among other disciplines pretending to the status of 
scientificity, Barthes believes that the historical studies remain a victim of what he 
calls ‘the fallacy of referentiality’ (White, 1990; p.36). Simply, the historians refer 
to early writings, speeches and chronicles and cite preceding academic research 
and texts. This is also called intertextuality.  
 
Discourse and Intertextuality 
Intertextuality basically means each text exists in relation to other texts. 
The term was coined by Julia Kristeva in the 1960s and indicates the insertion of 
history into a text and of the text into history (Fairclough, 1993). Fairclough 
paraphrases Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality as follows: 
 
By ‘the insertion of history into a text’, she means that the text absorbs in and is built out 
of texts from the past (texts being the major artifacts that constitute history). By ‘the 
insertion of the text into history’, she means that the text responds to, re-accentuates, and 
reworks past texts, and in so doing helps to make history and contributes to wider 
processes of change, as well as anticipating and trying to shape subsequent texts 
(Fairclough, 1993/2009; p.102). 
 
In Western historical discourse, the early sources provide a narrative in which 
Turks, as well as Muslims, were characterized negatively and stigmatized as the 
‘Other.’ Keeping in mind Kristeva’s assertion, the subsequent texts, regardless of 
genres, are also influenced and shaped by previous historical discourse. 
Intertextuality is a crucial concept not only in historical discourse, but in other 
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discourses as well. As suggested by Hall (1992), discourses are not closed systems 
as discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own 
network of meanings. To underscore the impact of discourses, Hall examines the 
concepts of the ‘West’ versus the ‘East’ as an example. He suggests that the ‘West’ 
is not a geographical construct but rather a historical construct. He explains it as 
follows:   
 
Our ideas of East and West have never been free of myth and fantasy, and even to this day 
they are not primarily ideas about place and geography. . . . the discourse of ‘Europe’ drew 
on the earlier discourse of ‘Christendom’, altering or translating its meaning. Traces of 
past discourses remain embedded in more recent discourses of ‘the West’ (Hall, 1992; 
p.276 & 292). 
 
Here, the term discourse is not being used as a linguistic concept that stands for a 
coherent writing or speech. It is rather employed as a system of representation, a 
concept put forward by the French social theorist, Michel Foucault. By discourse 
Foucault means “a group of statements which provide a language for talking 
about”, or simply, a way of representing “a particular kind of knowledge about a 
topic” (Hall, 1992; p.291). Foucault argues that discourse is not one statement, but 
rather consists of several statements that fit together and work together because 
any one statement implies a relation to all the others. He calls this pattern a 
discursive formation. Stuart Hall clarifies Foucault’s notion of discursive 
formation and explains how knowledge is produced through discourse: 
 
When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes 
it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the 
topic can be constructed. . . . Discourse is about the production of knowledge through 
language. But it is itself produced by a practice: ‘discursive practice’ – the practice of 
producing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a 
discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social practices (Hall, 1992; 
p. 291). 
 
Based on Foucault’s aforementioned premise, one may argue that the negative 
representations of Turks in Western discourse created a ‘discursive practice’ that 
constructed the negative image of the ‘Turk.’ The early encounters and rivalry of 
the European Christendom with Islam, and Europe’s battle with Ottoman 
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aggression generated a discursive practice that often demonized Turks. As will be 
discussed in this thesis, the vilification of Turks in Western writings, texts and 
speeches continued until the end of the 19
th
 century. Therefore, one may conclude 
that the image of ‘terrible Turk’ stemmed from this discursive practice and is 
solidified over time. Consequently, the negative qualities of the Turks became 
common knowledge.  
 
 Foucault scrutinized the production of knowledge and meaning through 
discourse, and he was more inclined to analyze the whole discursive formation to 
which a text or a practice belongs (Hall, 1997a; p.47). He was mainly concerned 
with the power/knowledge relationship and examined how knowledge could serve 
for the interest of a particular group or class (Hall, 1997a; p.47-51). Hall sheds 
light on Foucault’s stance on power/knowledge: 
 
Foucault argues that statements about the social, political or moral world are rarely ever 
simply true or false; and ‘the facts’ do not enable us to decide definitively about their truth 
or falsehood, partly because ‘facts’ can be construed in different ways. The very language 
we use to describe the so-called facts interferes in this process of finally deciding what is 
true, and what false. . . . Indeed, it gives considerable weight to questions of power since it 
is power, rather than the facts about reality, which make things ‘true’ (Hall, 1992; p.292-
293). 
 
The demeaning narrative about the Turks in European Christian writings during the 
Crusade and Renaissance, as well as in the Early Modern English drama, produced 
an archive of knowledge. This knowledge helped the European Christians to unify 
and rally against the Ottoman Turks during countless battles in history. In other 
words, European Christians used this knowledge to construct an opposition by 
alterizing the Turks. On the other hand, Foucault’s viewpoint does not indicate that 
discourse simply mirrors the interests of a particular class, because he believes that 
the same discourse can be used by groups with different, even contradictory, class 
interests. However, Foucault maintains that discourse is not ideologically ‘neutral’ 
or ‘innocent’ (Hall, 1992; p.292-294). He claims that knowledge remains ‘true’ 
only within the time period, setting, and context of the discursive formation, which 
he refers as a regime of truth (Hall, 1997a; p.49). One of the best examples for 
Foucault’s ‘regime of truth’ concept is provided by Edward Said’s thesis of 
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Orientalism. In the following section, I will discuss Said’s Orientalism and 
attempt to apply it as one of the theoretical methods for this thesis.   
 
Orientalism 
 
The concept of Orientalism was put forward by Edward Said, who remains 
one of the most important critics of Western discourse on the Middle East. In his 
groundbreaking book, Orientalism, Said (1978) argues that the dichotomy of ‘East’ 
and ‘West’ is simply generated by a ‘regime of truth’ which he calls Orientalism. 
He defines Orientalists and Orientalism as follows: 
 
Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the 
person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist – either in its specific or 
its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism (Said, 1978; 
p.2). 
 
Inspired by Michel Foucault’s aforementioned standpoint on the concept of 
discourse/power/knowledge, Said questions the works of Orientalists. He 
scrutinizes the distinction between ‘East’ and ‘West’ and accuses Orientalists of 
fostering misperceptions about the East by inventing a fictitious ‘Orient.’ He 
criticizes the scholarship of Oriental studies for being biased and for 
misrepresenting the East, particularly the Middle East. The key component of his 
argument is European colonialism, as well as subsequent American political 
domination, which he viewed as the reasons for the dichotomy of Western 
superiority versus Eastern inferiority in Orientalism. For Said, Orientalist discourse 
involves misconceptions, misrepresentations and a mistreatment of the Orient 
based on a conviction of Western superiority to justify Western imperialism. 
According to Said, the West has controlled and dominated the East with the 
authoritative and academic, yet imaginative and mythical knowledge produced by 
the scholarship of Oriental Studies of the Western academic institutions. He 
describes the institutionalized Orientalism as follows:  
 
Taking the late eighteenth century as very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can 
be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient –dealing 
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with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, 
settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Said, 1978; p.3). 
 
Said (1978) views Orientalism as a discursive formation generated by the 
Western colonial powers after the 18
th
 century to rationalize the domination of the 
Middle East. According to Said (1978), the academic discipline of Oriental Studies 
produced distorted imagery and subjective knowledge about the Middle East (p.2). 
The stereotypical representations and biased characterization of Muslims in 
Orientalist texts have been accepted and utilized as academic knowledge. In these 
texts, both Muslims and Arabs are often characterized as savage, primitive and 
backward people who are unable to sustain themselves and maintain their lands. 
For the Western colonial powers, the authoritative nature of these Orientalist 
writings justified the control of these lands, which are imaginatively described as 
the Orient. Consequently, Orientalist discourse offers the justification to demonize 
and exclude Arabs, and exploit their lands. Said (1978) argues that the ethnocentric 
knowledge provided by the Orientalist discourse has facilitated European political 
and colonial domination, and later the American imperialism, over the Middle 
East. Surely, there are scholars who have disputed Said’s thesis of Orientalism. 
One of his leading opponents is Bernard Lewis (1994) who finds Said’s argument 
too simplistic, confusing and idiosyncratic. Lewis suggests:  
 
One of the most puzzling features of Mr. Said’s Orientalism is precisely the idiosyncratic 
way, at once high-handed and inventive, in which he treats the facts on which it purports to 
be based. In his perception, the Orientalist was the agent and instrument of the imperialist, 
and his interest in knowledge was a source of power. . . . To sustain this interpretation, Mr. 
Said presents a revisionist view of the growth of Arabic studies in Britain and France, the 
growth of British and French power in the Arab lands, and the connection between the two 
(Lewis, 1994; p.109).  
 
However, in this thesis, the concept of Orientalism will not be treated as an 
instrument of imperialism, but rather applied as a ‘style of thought’ which is also 
one of Said’s definitions. Besides the academic discipline that emerged in the late 
18
th
 century, Said (1978) also defines Orientalism as a generic term that signifies 
the Western attitude towards the East since the Medieval times. Broadly, he 
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describes Orientalism as “a style of thought” that is based on the preconceived 
distinction between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ (p.3). As previously mentioned 
in this chapter, European Christians perceived Muslims as the ‘Other’ and viewed 
them as the enemy. Since the Middle Ages, European Christians demonized and 
stigmatized Muslims in their writings so that they could feel superior versus what 
they perceived as an inferior religion (see Chapter 2 for a broader discussion). The 
marginalization of Muslims created a preconceived distinction between the West 
and the East. Said considers this distinction as ‘a style of thought’ that breeds 
Orientalism. Orientalist discourse has shaped the imagination of the Western world 
about the Orient since the Middle Ages. Therefore, Orientalism is a trans-historical 
discourse that includes not only academic texts, but also the writings of a wide 
array of Western authors, novelists, travel writers, poets, economists, and 
philosophers. Said elaborates on what Orientalism means as a ‘style of thought’ as 
follows: 
 
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction 
made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident.” Thus a very large of 
writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, 
and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as 
the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social description, and political 
accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,” destiny and so on. This 
Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx 
[author’s italics] (Said, 1978; p.3). 
 
Said argues that the simplistic and distorted image of the East has been fostered in 
the minds of Westerners for centuries by writers like Aeschylus, Dante, Ariosto, 
Marlowe, Shakespeare, Milton, Tasso, Cervantes, Hugo, Flaubert, and Nerval, who 
have helped create myths about the Orient. What these writers and many others 
have done is that they have based their poems, novels, social descriptions, political 
accounts and cultural representations on a preconceived distinction between the 
East and the West. Simply put, their knowledge, beliefs and perceptions about the 
East reflect a Western construct, which they call the ‘Orient.’ 
 
Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself is not 
just there either. . . . men make their own history, what they can know is what they have 
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made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say 
nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as ‘Orient’ and 
‘Occident’ are man-made. Therefore, as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that 
has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, vocabulary that have given it reality and 
presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent 
reflect each other (Said, 1978; p.5). 
 
Said (1978) particularly criticizes the biased and fictitious representations 
of the Middle East in Orientalism as they have led to prejudices about Islam and 
Muslims (p.6). In essence, he has been critical of the Western attitude towards 
Muslims, particularly towards Arabs, and suggests that the friction between 
Christians and Muslims has been constructed mainly through the Western 
discourse, which involves a wide array of Orientalist literature:  
 
The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient. Islam became an image… 
whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the 
medieval Christian. . . . This rigorous Christian picture of Islam was intensified in 
innumerable ways, including – during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance – a large 
variety of poetry, learned controversy, and popular superstition (Said, 1978; p.60-61). 
 
As discussed previously, European Christians had perceived the Muslims as the 
‘Other’ since the Middle Ages. The knowledge produced by the Western discourse, 
including the Crusade rhetoric, chronicles, sermons, humanist discourse, and the 
literary texts of both the Renaissance and the Early Modern period, has enabled the 
West to construct a cultural opposite as ‘the East’ and thus, the West constructed 
its superior ‘Self.’ The distinction between the West and the East, particularly the 
Middle East, has been fostered by the Western writings for centuries. As discussed 
before, Foucault’s notion of discursive formation indicates that the Western 
discourse has supplied a biased archival knowledge which has promoted the 
misrepresentations about the Middle East and Islamic cultures. Also, the Western 
writers have continued to cite and refer to the works of this archive. Therefore, due 
to intertextuality, the distorted imagery of Muslims and the Middle East has lasted 
even to the 21
st
 century. Said (1978) argues the same point regarding Orientalist 
writings, as they constantly refer to each other showing that Orientalism is actually 
‘an archive of information’: 
39 
 
 
collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism. The unity of 
the large ensemble of texts . . . frequently refer to each other: Orientalism is after all a 
system for citing works and authors (Said, 1978; p.23). 
 
In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of 
its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and 
unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the 
behavior of Orientals; the supplied Orientals with mentality, a geneaology, an atmosphere; 
most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a 
phenomenon possessing regular characteristics (Said, 1978; p.42). 
 
Edward Said (1978) accuses Orientalism of creating binary opposites such 
as inferior/superior, backward/civilized, and weak/strong to characterize the East 
(Orient) versus the West (Occident). He stated that the difference between East and 
West is not as ‘radical’ as it is suggested by the Orientalist viewpoint. However, 
the cultural distinction conceived by Orientalism generated hostility, rejection and 
even aggression. As a result, the exclusion of the Muslims as the ‘Other’ has 
created the division between the West and the Islamic cultures and thus, 
constructed the concept of ‘Us vs. Them.’ Said explains it as follows:  
 
Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient’s weakness – as seen 
by the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to 
any view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state 
of tension produced by what is believed to be a radical difference. For that is the main 
intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human reality, as indeed human 
reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, 
societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the 
consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility 
expressed by the division, say, of men onto “us” (Westerners) and “they” (Orientals) (Said, 
1978; p.45). 
 
According to Said (1978), “Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic 
European attitude towards Islam” (p.74). He claims that the term ‘Orient’ in 
Orientalist discourse signifies more than a geographic territory in the Near or Far 
East. It rather stands for the Islamic East, which may be viewed as ‘militant’: 
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When the term Orient was not simply a synonym for the Asiatic East as a whole, or taken 
as generally denoting the distant and exotic, it was most rigorously understood as applying 
to the Islamic Orient. This ‘militant’ Orient came to stand for what Henri Baudet has 
called “the Asiatic tidal wave.” Certainly this was the case in Europe through the middle of 
the eighteenth century (Said, 1978; p.75). 
 
Said considers Ottoman Turks as a significant part of the so-called ‘militant’ 
Orient and as one of the main reasons for Islam to symbolize fear, violence and 
destruction for Europe and European Christendom. His remarks are as follows: 
 
Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of 
hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was lasting trauma. Until the end of the seventeenth 
century the “Ottoman peril” lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of 
Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated 
that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into 
the fabric of life (Said, 1978; p.59-60).   
 
Said’s reference of “demonic, hordes of hated barbarians” corresponds to the 
representations of the Ottoman Turks in Western discourse. As will be examined in 
the following chapters, Turks were often characterized as cruel, violent barbarians, 
which yielded the stereotypical imagery of the ‘terrible Turk’ or the ‘cruel Turk.’ 
The military advance of the Ottoman Turks into Europe, which lasted more than 
four centuries, terrified European Christians. The perception of Islam as ‘militant’ 
was intensified due to the military victories of the Ottoman Empire at its peak 
during the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries. Ottoman Turks were most superior against 
Europe during those years, while they continued to pose a threat until the end of 
the 17
th
 century as the Ottoman Empire was the biggest Islamic Empire that lasted 
more than six hundred years. For that reason, the myths and representations that 
are presented by the Orientalists about the Orient are mostly inspired by the social, 
cultural and organizational structures, as well as the rulers, of the Ottoman Empire. 
Orientalist discourse and its representations of Turks will be examined in Chapter 
4 of this thesis.   
 
However, as the Ottoman Empire was one of the biggest political and 
military forces during the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, extending its territories from 
Eastern Europe to the Middle East and North Africa, the dichotomy of Western 
41 
 
superiority against the inferior East was highly unlikely. The presumed positional 
superiority of the Christian Europe as the ‘colonizer’ over the lands in the Middle 
East, Mediterranean, and the Balkans did not exist due to the military power and 
domination of the Ottoman Empire. When examining the Western discourse 
between the 15
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, it is not plausible to apply the ethnocentric 
approach that is based on the concept of ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’ in Orientalism. 
On the other hand, Said’s generic definition of Orientalism as a ‘style of thought’ 
is essential to this thesis. Therefore, when analyzing the representations of 
Ottoman Turks in Western discourse, Orientalism will be applied accordingly. 
Orientalism is not only a European colonial fantasy of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, 
but also a system of knowledge and practice since antiquity. Said views 
Orientalism as a trans-historical discourse that has been available since Medieval 
times. He maintains that Orientalists have systematically provided a distorted body 
of knowledge about the Middle East, which has infiltrated into Western 
consciousness and general culture. It is this aspect of Orientalism that I will utilize 
in the thesis: 
 
Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body 
of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable 
material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge 
about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western 
consciousness, just as that same investment multiplies – indeed, made truly productive – 
the statements proliferating out from Orientalism onto the general culture (Said, 1978; 
p.6). 
 
Orientalism as a ‘style of thought’ is critically relevant to this thesis as it indicates 
not only a colonial discourse but also a trans-historical discourse. My discourse 
analysis is temporal, as I will examine the image of the Turks starting from the 
Middle Ages until the 21
st
 century. Therefore, Orientalism will be applied as a 
trans-historical discourse to my argument in this thesis. Orientalism is enriched 
with a broad selection of texts, dramas, novels, and poems, representing the 
characters, myths, imagery, and fantasies about the Orient. This repertoire also 
offers a variety of representations about the Turks due to their long-term military 
encounters with Christian Europe. Said underscores the trans-historical quality of 
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Orientalism and explains how ancient Western texts provide a source for the 
Orientalist discourse after the 18
th
 century. His remarks are as follows:  
 
In the depths of this Oriental stage stands a prodigious cultural repertoire whose individual 
items evoke a fabulously rich world: the Sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, Sodom and 
Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, Babylon, the Genii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester 
John, Mahomet, and dozens more; settings, in some cases names only, half-imagined, half-
known; monsters, devils, heroes; terrors, pleasures, desires.  The European imagination 
was nourished extensively from this repertoire: between the Middle Ages and the 18
th
 
century such major authors as Aristo, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, 
and the authors of the Chanson de Roland and the Poema del Cid drew on the Orient’s 
riches for their productions, in ways that sharpened the outlines of imagery, ideas, and 
figures populating it (Said, 1978; p.63). 
 
In addition to the temporal aspect, Orientalism is also crucial to this thesis 
because it involves most of the elements cited in the representational practices 
discussed earlier, such as otherness, stereotypes, myth, narrative and 
intertextuality. The misrepresentations and distorted imagery of Islamic cultures 
and the Middle East in Orientalist writings originate from the stigmatization of 
Muslims by European Christians for centuries. These images have produced 
stereotypes, myths and narratives that have been widely accepted and commonly 
used. Therefore, Orientalism has returned vulgar stereotypes that are culturally 
inferior, backward and corrupt, such as the stereotypes of Muslims, Arabs and 
Turks. The myths, stereotypes, and imagery offered by Orientalism permeate into 
the general knowledge and continue to have an effect on current Western discourse 
including literary texts, contemporary cinema, popular media, and even the 
children’s books and cartoons in the 21st century. Said (1997) elaborates this point 
in his book, Covering Islam: 
 
there was the longstanding attitude to Islam, the Arabs, and the Orient in general that I 
have been calling Orientalism. For whether one looked at . . . critically acclaimed fiction . . 
. or at grade-school history textbooks, comic strips, television serials, films, and cartoons, 
the iconography of Islam was uniform, was uniformly ubiquitous, and drew its material 
from the same time-honored view of Islam: hence the frequent caricatures of Muslims as 
oil suppliers, as terrorists, and more recently, as bloodthirsty mobs (Said, 1997, p.6). 
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While the Western representations of Turks are symbolically associated with 
Muslims, their stereotypical image in the popular media may also be related to the 
repertoire of writings merely about Turks. According to Foucault (1972), texts 
always draw upon and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts. 
Due to intertextuality, the media stereotype of Turks may be a product of a 
mythologized Turkish image throughout history. Therefore, the past discourse of 
Turks being the ‘terrible’ or ‘cruel’ Turk is embedded in the most recent image of 
the Turks as the ‘villain’ in the western cinema. Said (1978) makes a similar 
observation about the stereotypes of Muslims in the modern mass media: 
 
One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of 
stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films and all the media’s 
resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the 
Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of 
the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of the “the mysterious 
Orient” (Said, 1978, p.26). 
 
Raymond Williams defines culture as the texts and practices whose 
principal function is to signify, to produce or to be the occasion for the production 
of meaning, which is also synonymous with signifying (representational) practices 
(Storey, 2009; p.2). According to Williams, culture refers to “the works and 
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” (p.2). The signifying 
(representational) practices and artistic activity he refers to is the collection of 
poetry, novel, ballet, opera, fine art, pop music, and films. Said (1978) points out 
how Orientalist artistic activity and representational practices create myths about 
the Orient. He argues that that the simplistic and embellished image of the East has 
been fostered in the minds of Westerners for centuries by Western writers who 
helped create myths about the Orient. What these writers have done is that they 
have based their poems, novels, social descriptions, political accounts and cultural 
representations on an essential distinction between the East and the West. When 
distortions, misrepresentations and exaggerations reach the masses through cultural 
texts, artistic activity or popular culture, they convey the myths too. The Orientalist 
viewpoint continues to influence the depictions of Turks and Muslims in the 
entertainment media, particularly cinema. However, the stereotypical image of the 
Turk represents more than a villain in films. The ‘terrible Turk’ embodies the 
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history, narrative and myth behind the image. In this thesis, I will investigate the 
emergence, transformation and trajectory of this myth and its associations with the 
current image of Turks and modern Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE IMAGE OF TURKS BETWEEN THE 11
th
 AND 16
th
 CENTURIES: 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Representation of Turks during the Crusades 
 
The encounters between Christians and the Turks began when the Seljuk 
Turks conquered Anatolia (a.k.a Asia Minor) in the 11
th
 century and continued 
until the Western imperialism’s endeavor to take over the Ottoman Empire in the 
19
th
 century. Turks threatened Western Christendom for more than six centuries 
since the beginning of the first Crusade. European Christians perceived Turks as 
‘cruel’ and ‘wicked’ and characterized them as such in their writings and speeches, 
particularly during the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries when the Ottoman Empire was at the 
peak of its power. To answer the question why Turks were perceived as the wicked 
‘Other’ and stereotyped by the West as ‘cruel’, I will present a review of the 
Crusade history and examine the representations of Turks in Crusade rhetoric 
simultaneously. 
 
The Seljuk Turks and the First Crusade 
Negative representations of Turks in Western discourse go back as early as 
the 11
th
 century when the attacks on Western Christendom by the Seljuk Turks 
prompted the military campaign for the First Crusade. Before examining the image 
of Turks in the Crusade rhetoric, first, a closer look at the Seljuk Turks and how 
they were involved in the Crusades is needed. The Seljuk Turks were a nomadic 
people from Central Asia who had converted to Islam and flourished as Muslim 
military mercenaries (Payne, 1990; p.25). From the 11
th
 century onwards, Turks 
provided the majority of Muslim rulers and soldiers, and were considered the 
leaders of Islamic military expansion towards the Western Christendom (Coles, 
1968; p14). In 1071, Seljuk Turks defeated Byzantine forces at the Battle of 
Manzikert and poured into the undefended provinces of Anatolia occupying Nicea, 
less than a hundred miles from Constantinople (Payne, 1990; Madden, 2006). 
Christendom was shaken by the Turkish invasions as Anatolia was lost to the 
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Turks and the Byzantine Empire had lost the sources of its great wealth (Payne, 
1990). Since the Eastern Mediterranean was taken over by the Arabs in the seventh 
century, Christians had been permitted to visit the Holy Land. That changed when 
Seljuk Turks swept into the region conquering Persia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine 
and capturing Jerusalem (Payne, 1990; Madden 2006). After their conquest of 
Jerusalem, many of the Turks were amazed to find Christian churches and 
monasteries flourishing in Muslim lands. Therefore, they destroyed the churches, 
murdered the clergy and seized the pilgrims (Madden, 2006). Christians could no 
longer be assured that they could travel to Jerusalem without being arrested or sold 
into slavery or ill-treated in other ways (Payne, 1990). When the Turks impeded 
the Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus, 
asked Pope Urban II for help in the early 1090s.  
 
On November 27
th
 of 1095, at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II gave 
a speech to initiate the first Crusade against the Seljuk Turks (Madden, 2006; p.8 
and Payne, 1990; p.33). Pope Urban’s speech incited a vast amount of Western 
texts that offered demeaning images of Turks for a long time. As Bisaha (2006) 
demonstrates in her book, Creating East and West, this speech is considered as the 
cornerstone of crusade preaching and propaganda. Although there is no existing 
original account of Pope Urban’s speech, there are several versions,21 all of which 
are written by the chroniclers of the time. According to these chroniclers, Pope 
Urban’s speech described the dire sufferings, enslavement, pillage, cruelty, rape, 
torture, evisceration, slaughter and beheadings
22
 that Christians were subjected to 
by the Turks. Among these chroniclers, Robert the Monk’s account of Pope 
Urban’s speech has been the most recognized (Sweetenham, 2006; p.42). In his 
account, Robert the Monk referred the Turks as “a race from the kingdom of 
                                                 
21
 There are five accounts of Pope Urban’s speech. Four of them written by the chroniclers who are 
considered credible and one of them is the Gesta version which is ‘anonymous.’ See August C. 
Krey’s The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton University 
Press, 1921) and Dana C. Munro’s “The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095” The American 
Historical Review 11(2), 231-242. 
22
 See the five accounts of Pope Urban’s Speech. Source: Medieval Sourcebook. Retrieved from: 
Center of Medieval Studies at Fordham University, The Jesuit University of New York, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html. 
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Persians”23 because they had conquered Persia and characterized them as a “cursed 
race, alienated from God”24 who profaned God’s sanctuaries. The speech describes 
the Turks as a Godless race and details the violent acts they committed during the 
attacks: 
 
From the confines of Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople a horrible tale has gone 
forth and very frequently has been brought to our ears, namely, that a race from the 
kingdom of the Persians, an accursed race, a race utterly alienated from God, a generation 
forsooth which has not directed its heart and has not entrusted its spirit to God, has 
invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them by the sword, pillage and 
fire; it has led away a part of the captives into its own country, and a part it has destroyed 
by cruel tortures; it has either entirely destroyed the churches of God or appropriated them 
for the rites of its own religion.
25
  
 
The speech goes on to provide the most vivid depictions of Turks’ brutality, such 
as their torture, rape and murder of Christians. Pope Urban II characterizes Turks 
as Godless murderers who take pleasure in killing innocent Christians. His 
depictions fit into Stuart Hall’s (1997b) concept of ‘naturalization of difference’, 
when the racial difference presented as ‘natural’ and ‘fixed.’ Turks are 
characterized as natural born killers who enjoy torture, violence and murder.  
 
They [Turks] destroy the altars, after having defiled them with their uncleanness. They 
circumcise the Christians, and the blood of the circumcision they either spread upon the 
altars or pour into the vases of the baptismal font. When they wish to torture people by a 
base death, they perforate their navels, and dragging forth the extremity of the intestines, 
bind it to a stake; then with flogging they lead the victim around until the viscera having 
gushed forth the victim falls prostrate upon the ground. Others they bind to a post and 
pierce with arrows. Others they compel to extend their necks and then, attacking them with 
                                                 
23
 From Robert the Monk’s account of the speech. Source: Medieval Sourcebook. Retrieved from: 
Center of Medieval Studies at Fordham University, The Jesuit University of New York, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html.  
24
 From Robert the Monk’s account of the speech. Source: Medieval Sourcebook. Retrieved from: 
Center of Medieval Studies at Fordham University, The Jesuit University of New York, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html. 
25
 From Robert the Monk’s account of the speech. Source: Medieval Sourcebook. Retrieved from: 
Center of Medieval Studies at Fordham University, The Jesuit University of New York, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html. 
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naked swords, attempt to cut through the neck with a single blow. What shall I say of the 
abominable rape of the women? To speak of it is worse than to be silent.
26
  
 
Although the images of evisceration, circumcision, and rape appear to have been 
exaggerated, Pope Urban’s speech filled crusaders with expectations of finding 
bloodthirsty, godless savages who enjoyed torturing and killing defenseless 
Christians and desecrating their shrines (Bisaha 2006; p.15).  
 
The deliberately embellished portrayal of Turks served as wartime 
propaganda in order to galvanize and mobilize Christians to destroy the Muslim 
enemy. As John Tolan (2002) explains in his book Saracens, for Christians “the 
goal is to inspire hatred for the ‘oppressors’ and (as wartime propagandists have 
long known) there is little better way to do so than to accuse the enemy of murder 
and rape” (p.93). As suggested by Stuart Hall (1997b), when the ethnic or religious 
difference becomes a reason for denigrating and demonizing the ‘Other’, it may 
create hostility against the ‘Other.’ Many historians view the characterization of 
Turkish assaults on Christian pilgrims as inflated. For example, in The Crusades, 
British historian Jonathan Riley-Smith (2005) suggests that Pope Urban painted a 
lurid picture of life under Muslim rule and exaggerated the threat posed to 
Constantinople by the Turks because their advance had already dwindled in 1092 
(p.7). He also claims that the chroniclers’ versions of the speech may be distorted 
and may not be trusted, because they were written after the crusaders’ liberation of 
Jerusalem in July 1099 (Riley-Smith, 1993; p.15).  
 
The chroniclers wrote their versions of Urban’s speech several years after 
the actual speech took place, either from memory or with the help of eyewitness 
accounts. Among the four credible chroniclers, only Robert the Monk claimed to 
have been present at the meeting where Pope Urban II gave his speech (Runciman, 
2005). In The First Crusade, Runciman (2005) claims, “each wrote his chronicle a 
few years later and colored his account in the light of subsequent events” (p.42). 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, narrative becomes a problem in historical 
discourse and it is unrealistic to expect the real events to be represented as they 
                                                 
26
 From Robert the Monk’s account of the speech. Source: Medieval Sourcebook. Retrieved from: 
Center of Medieval Studies at Fordham University, The Jesuit University of New York, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html. 
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were, particularly in the Middle Ages (White, 1990; p.3). White explains this as 
follows:  
 
The historian’s dissertation was an interpretation of what he took to be the true story, while 
his narration was a representation of what he took to be the real story. A given historical 
discourse might be factually accurate and as veracious in its narrative aspect as the 
evidence permitted and still be assessed as mistaken, invalid, or inadequate in its 
dissertative aspect. The facts might be truthfully set forth, and the interpretation of them 
misguided [or vice versa] (White, 1990; p.28). 
 
Hence, it is highly likely that the chroniclers might have written the Pope’s speech 
with their own narrative afterwards and embellished it with the spirit of Crusading 
propaganda. Therefore, the exaggerated depictions of Turks (Muslims) 
slaughtering, torturing and raping Christians might have served as a justification 
for the Crusades. As Munro (1931) puts it, “at first, the tales of atrocities were 
fully credited and undoubtedly had a great influence in inciting many to take the 
Cross” (p.331). 
 
It has also been suggested that Robert the Monk’s version of Pope Urban’s 
speech echoed the letter of Byzantine Emperor Alexius to the Count of Flanders in 
1093, written even before the Council of Clermont (see Munro, 1931; 
Sweetenham, 2006). Both accounts encourage the Christians to come to the East to 
save Jerusalem from the Turks and there are many similarities in the descriptions 
of the assaults on Christians by the Turks. In his letter, Alexius described the 
atrocities that the Turks were alleged to commit against the Christians: 
 
The enemy has the habit of circumcising young Christians and Christian babies above 
baptismal font. In derision of the Christ they let the blood flow into the font. Then they are 
forced to urinate in the font. . . . Those who refuse to do so are tortured and put to death. 
They carry off noble matrons and their daughters and abuse them like animals. . . . Then, 
too, the Turks shamelessly commit the sin of sodomy on our men of all ages and all ranks . 
. . and, O misery, something that has never been seen or heard before, on bishops (Payne, 
1990; p.28). 
 
Munro (1931) suggests that the letter by Alexius was used as an excitatorium to 
arouse the Christians to take the Cross against the infidels (p.331).  He goes on to 
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explain: “It was a more brutal age than ours, and the atrocities which are alleged to 
have been committed were highly spiced to suit the spirit of the time” (p.331). 
During the Crusades, the purpose of sermons and speeches by prominent Christian 
leaders was to portray Muslims as the ‘enemy of Christianity’ and motivate 
Christians to fight against this ultimate enemy. Simply, Crusade rhetoric was the 
war propaganda of the time. Therefore, the exaggerated representations of Turks in 
the Crusade texts served the purpose of Christian propaganda in unifying the 
European Christians against a common enemy: Muslims.  
 
The demonization of Turks in Crusade rhetoric appears as a part of the 
strategy to stigmatize Muslims. It was not only the Turks but also other Muslim 
groups were vilified constantly. Previous literature regarding the relationship 
between the East and the West shows that the West constructed Muslims as the 
‘Other’ and viewed Islam as a threat to Western civilization (e.g. Daniel, 1960; 
Said, 1978; Southern, 1962). During the Middle Ages, Christian Europe achieved 
its cultural and religious unity through the Crusades by constructing the Muslims 
as the wicked ‘Other.’ For the same purpose, Turks were described as pagans, 
infidels, murderers, rapists and sodomites and constructed as the ‘enemy’ along 
with Saracens. These attributes originate from the biblical themes as non-
Christians were all considered as non-believers, infidels and pagans at the time. 
Furthermore, violence, murder, sodomy and rape were also associated with 
Muslims to create an ideal Christian image as the polar opposite of the Muslim 
‘Other.’ To discern the image of Turks in Western discourse, a closer look at the 
Western perception of Muslims before the Crusades is needed. 
 
Muslims as the “Other” during the Middle Ages  
In Western Views of Islam, Richard W. Southern (1962) noted that “the 
existence of Islam was the most far-reaching problem in the medieval 
Christendom” (p.3). Before the First Crusade, Western authors knew virtually 
nothing about Islam as a religion and considered Muslims as a large number of 
enemies threatening Christendom from every direction (Southern, 1962; p.14). To 
explain the unknown, they turned to the Bible as the only intellectual tool of the 
early Middle Ages (p.15). Christians viewed Islam through a filter of the Bible and 
they defined Muslims with already existing Christian categories. In Saracens, 
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Tolan (2002) demonstrates how Muslims were characterized in Christian writings 
during the Middle Ages. According to Tolan (2002), Christian authors portrayed 
Muslims “as a divinely sent punishment, as pagan idolaters, as Christian heretics, 
as followers of Satan, or as devotees of Antichrist” (p.4). When alluding to 
Muslims, Medieval Christians often used ethnic terms such as ‘Arab,’ ‘Saracen,’ or 
‘Ishmaelite’ but they did not use the terms ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ (Tolan, 2002). 
Likewise, the chroniclers of the First Crusade commonly referred to their Muslim 
adversaries as ‘Saracens’ and associated them with ‘paganism’ (Housley, 2007; 
Tolan, 1999 & 2002). The perception of Saracen as “idolatrous pagan” or 
“polytheist” has its origins from the early Middle Ages. As Tolan (2002) suggests 
“for many Western Europeans throughout the Middle Ages, Saracens were pagans, 
pagans were Saracens: the two words become interchangeable” (p.128). Tolan 
(1999) explains how Crusade chroniclers placed the crusading movement in the 
context of the ancient struggle between Christianity and paganism. 
 
Earlier writers described Muslims as pagans, at times basing their descriptions on biblical 
or Roman descriptions of pre-Muslim Arabs. Only at the turn of the twelfth century, 
however, is this supposed “paganism” described in vivid detail, its fictive contours clearly 
delineated. The epic descriptions of battles against the Saracens demanded a vivid and 
colorful enemy, one against whom war was justified and victory was glorious. Fighting 
against pagans, crusaders could claim to be wreaking vengeance for the pagans’ 
crucifixion of Christ and their usurpation of His city; when they fell in battle, they could 
claim the mantle of martyrdom. The fight against paganism had a long history, one in 
which Christianity was sure to emerge victorious (Tolan, 1999; p.98). 
 
Therefore, the Christian stigmatization of Muslims as ‘idolatrous pagans’ served as 
a tool for crusading propaganda and helped mobilize Christians to fight against 
Muslims, who wanted to destroy Christianity. 
 
In both learned and popular Christian writings, the image of the ‘Saracen’ 
appeared as a “polytheist, heretic, or enemy of the faith” or as “idolaters who 
practiced perverse rites and blasphemed the Christian God” and in some cases, as 
“Anti-Christ” (Tolan 1999; p.84). For example, in the Chanson de Roland, the 
most popular of the surviving chansons de geste from the Middle Ages, Saracens 
manifest numerous negative traits other than being merely ‘non-Christians’ and 
‘idolaters’, such as being involved in trickery, treachery and cowardly acts, and 
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fighting for the wrong reasons like land, wealth and women (Moran Cruz, 1999; 
p.56). This potent image of the ‘Saracens’ formed the foundation for Pope Urban 
and other crusade preachers to galvanize Christians for crusading against 
‘idolatrous pagans’ (Housley, 2007; p.198). The characterization of Muslims in 
general, and Turks in particular, in these propaganda sermons bolstered the 
negative image of Muslims as greedy, violent, repulsive, wicked and cruel people 
who captured, enslaved, and tortured Christians (Housley, 2007; Daniel, 1989). 
Some of these notions were taking shape before the crusades, but the call for the 
First Crusade seems to have had the greatest impact on their formation (Bisaha, 
2006 p.14-15). In particular, the inflated language and the disturbing imagery used 
in Pope Urban’s speech influenced the European Christian attitude towards 
Muslims and Islam significantly, as it instigated the whole crusading movement. 
While the reported accounts of Pope Urban’s speech may differ in their 
expressions, there is a remarkable agreement on the main subjects that he discussed 
(Munro, 1906). Basically, Islam was presented as a sham religion, founded upon 
violence and unrestrained lust and the only way to deal with such people was to 
annihilate them (Bisaha, 2006; p.15). Because the Christian fear of Islam was 
reinforced by the clergy with distortions and misrepresentations, Crusading sources 
almost never feature Islam as a genuine religion (Housley, 2007). 
 
Perceptions of Muslim polytheism and antagonism toward Christians were 
not the only factors in the crusading movement. Bisaha (2006) suggests that 
European Christians had goals of their own to possess the Holy Land, a place that 
belonged to them in their view, and Islam was perceived as an obstacle to expand 
the Christian faith, influence, territory, and wealth. Due to the growing sense of 
cultural and religious unity in the West during the High Middle Ages, Western 
Christians defined themselves by presenting Muslims in opposite and inaccurate 
terms (Bisaha, 2006). By fostering a contrasting image of Muslims and also 
demeaning Islam, Europeans helped create their own self-image as a perceived 
ideal Christian society. Norman Daniel (1989) elaborates this issue as follows: 
  
Christian misconception of Islam was fitted into the main body of knowledge and opinion 
in which European society found expression, in such a way as to typify the enemy as the 
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converse of the ideal Christian society – not of course actual Christian society (Daniel, 
1989; p.54). 
 
European Christians often depicted Muslims in binary opposites to construct their 
own ‘Self’ as a superior society, while delineating the Muslims as the ‘Other.’ For 
example, Christianity was the religion of love, truth and chastity whereas Islam 
was founded on violence, deception and lust (Daniel, 1989). In the aforementioned 
letter by the Byzantine Emperor Alexius, these negative qualities are used to 
describe the acts committed by the Turks against the Christians. In the letter, the 
narrative of Turks, raping and sodomizing innocent Christian females and males of 
all ages, as well as bishops, was strongly emphasized. Narratives like these, 
harbored in the Crusade rhetoric, fostered the notion that lust, perversion, sexual 
aggression and sodomy are fixations only Muslims and Turks enjoy. Originated 
from the Crusade rhetoric, the ‘lustful’ characteristic of Turks has continued to 
exist in Western discourse, particularly in 18
th
 century Orientalist texts and 
travelogues. Orientalist depictions of Turks as sensual, lewd, debauch, licentious, 
and sodomite generated a stereotype that is known as the ‘Lustful Turk.’ The 
representations of Turkish sexuality and the Western perception of Turks as 
‘lustful’ in the Orientalist discourse will be examined in Chapter 4.  
 
The Turk as the “Devil” in Crusade Propaganda 
Degrading the image of Muslims helped Western Christians enhance their 
own self-images as compassionate and decent people who were righteous believers 
in one true God and one true faith (Blanks & Frassetto, 1999). In contrast, Muslims 
were perceived as the pagan enemy who was “a deformed mirror image of the 
righteous crusader, devoted to the Devil rather than God” (Tolan, 1999; p.110). As 
Muslims, Turks were depicted as the ‘enemies of faith’, ‘Antichrist’ and in some 
cases, as ‘idolaters committed to Devil’. After the crusaders took back Jerusalem, 
Raymond d’Aguilers, a chronicler of the First Crusade, describes the damage and 
insult caused by the Turks in the city, and accuses Turks of re-enacting the passion 
of torturing Christ and of ridiculing Christianity (Tolan, 1999; p.106). Riley-Smith 
(1993) emphasizes how European Christians perceived the Turks as the “servants 
of the Devil” despite their admiration towards them as skillful warriors: 
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if only the Turks had adhered to the Christian faith, it would not have been possible to find 
stronger or braver or more skillful warriors. But this was exceptional. The norm was 
invective. The Muslims were said to be barbarians depraved in their morals and deficient 
in their faith. . . . They were enemies of God, Christ and Christianity; so they were 
servants of the Devil and their places of worship were devilish (Riley-Smith, 1993; p.111). 
 
Carol Sweetenham (2006) documents how Western Christians considered Turks as 
“diabolical” and “sons of Devil” by summarizing Robert the Monk’s perception of 
Turks in his chronicles of the First Crusade, Historia Iherosolimitana: 
 
If God’s will is that the Crusaders should be victorious, the Turks by definition are the 
creatures of the devil, destined to be defeated as a race alien to God. So the Turks are 
represented as a mirror image of the Crusaders, with Mahommed as a less powerful 
version of Jesus and the Caliph as the Pope. Robert is quite clear that the Turks are, by 
definition as the enemies of the Crusaders, literally diabolical: the diabolical legion and 
sons of the Devil. In a piece of heavy symbolism they slaughter a priest in the middle of 
Mass. In contrast to the certainties of God’s power, they rely on divination, spells and 
astrology (Sweetenham, 2006; p.56). 
 
Contrary to the image of Turks as the creatures of the ‘devil’, Christians viewed 
themselves as “servants, champions or warriors of God or Christ” (Riley-Smith, 
1993; p.111). European Christians continued to define Turks in terms of binary 
opposites, such as good vs. evil or pious vs.infidel, and characterized them in 
biblical terms such as anti-Christ, enemy of Christianity, infidel, pagan idolater, 
evil or Devil. The European Christian perception of Turks continued to remain 
negative until the Dynasty of the Seljuk Turks ended. The Turkish image even 
became worse after the Ottoman Turks began their reign and imperiled the 
Christian Europe with their military advance for centuries. Before looking into the 
Turkish image after the 13
th
 century, it is essential to address the rise of the 
Ottoman Turks and their advance into Europe.  
   
The Rise of the Ottoman Turks 
In 1243, Mongols defeated the Seljuk Turks causing the Seljuk rule to 
decline and then shatter into an array of petty emirates (Madden 2006). From the 
ashes of this chaos, a new Turkish dynasty called the ‘Ottomans’ emerged, and the 
Ottoman Empire was founded (Madden, 2006; Lewis, 2001). Osman, the ruler of 
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the Ottoman Turks, extended his authority over a significant part of north-western 
Asia Minor (Anatolia), as far as the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Black 
Sea, until his death in 1326 (Riley-Smith, 2005; p.270). In time, with a disciplined 
army and effective governance, the Ottoman state began to expand rapidly. Turks 
took Nicea in 1331, conquered the lands across the Bosphorus from Constantinople 
in 1338 and occupied Gallipoli in 1354. By 1360, Ottoman rule stretched from 
western Thrace to Ankara. With the leadership of Sultan Murad I, Ottoman Turks 
took most of Bulgaria and Serbian Macedonia as a result of the intense military 
campaigns into Europe. The Turks achieved the dominance of Balkans with the 
battle of Kosovo in 1389, during which Sultan Murad I was assassinated (Riley-
Smith, 2005; p.270).  
 
The battle of Kosovo was an Ottoman victory, but, in the immediate 
aftermath of the battle, the Serbs and Bosnians believed that they had broken 
Ottoman power because Sultan Murad was killed. The Chancellor of Florance, 
Coluccio Salutati, defined the outcome of the battle as a divinely granted, glorious 
victory against Sultan Murad I and identified him as the ‘Anti-Christ’ (Bisaha, 
2006; p.22). His following response shows that humanists still found the Crusading 
rhetoric and propaganda appealing and continued to use it against Turks: 
 
arrogantly mad and madly arrogant Mohammed-worshipper, Murad, who had taken the 
empire of the Phrygians or Turks by force and planned to destroy Christianity and the 
name of our dear Savior from the face of the earth, and – if he could – to erase it from the 
book of the living (Bisaha, 2006; p.22). 
 
While forming an offensive alliance against the Ottoman Turks, Venetians and 
Genoese also referred to Sultan Murad I as the “son of unrighteousness and evil, 
and enemy of the Holly Cross” and accused him of “attempting so grievously to 
attack the Christian race” (Kinross, 1979; p.55). Although Western Christians 
described Sultan Murad I as the enemy of Christianity, he was a ruler of 
outstanding political wisdom and religious tolerance. According to Kinross (1979), 
Sultan Murad I achieved ruling the conquered Christian territories under Islam 
with little social and economic disruption. Kinross (1979) explains Sultan Murad’s 
success as follows:    
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In his estimate of the character of his subjects and enemies, whether Greek or Slav, Murad 
showed keen psychological discernment. Strictly Muslim as he was in his religious beliefs, 
he nonetheless handled the ‘infidel’ Christians of his new empire with a tolerance striking 
in its contrast with the attitude of their own fellow Christians of the Latin persuasion. He 
countenanced Christians and, apart from the Janissaries, enforced no conversions to Islam. 
The Orthodox Patriarch himself testified in a letter to the Pope in 1385 that the Sultan left 
to his Church complete liberty of action (Kinross, 1979; p.59). 
 
Despite the Ottomans’ pragmatic governance, Christian misrepresentations of 
Sultan Murad and Turks indicate that European Christians had a lack of interest in 
learning about Ottoman Turks. Instead, they preferred to depict the Turks in stark 
Crusading terms as an absolute enemy of all Christians rather than rulers who 
were, in some ways, no worse than the Balkan Christian elite had been (Bisaha, 
2006; p.23). Simply put, they continued to use the Crusade propaganda rhetoric 
and define the Turks as the wicked ‘Other.’  
 
Crusade of Nicopolis  
Sultan Murad’s son Beyazid (a.k.a Bayezid) sustained the military 
campaigns to expand the borders of the Ottoman Empire. He continued to conquer 
the Balkans by taking the rest of Bulgaria and invading the Peloponnese (Riley 
Smith, 2005; p.270). Beyazid’s military success and the threat he posed against 
Hungary alarmed Christian Western Europe, and thus, revived the old crusading 
spirit. Madden (2006) describes the circumstances in which Western Christians 
found themselves and the urgency for another crusade: 
 
The rise of the Ottoman Turks and their successful campaigns to the West drastically 
changed the stakes in the crusading movement. It was no longer faraway Palestine that was 
in danger but Western Europe itself. Crusaders had always seen themselves as fighting a 
defensive war, defending the Christians in the East, Jerusalem, or the faith. Now they were 
called on to defend themselves. Henceforth, crusades were no longer wars to expand 
Christendom but desperate attempts to slow the advance of Islam. Crusading had become a 
matter of simple survival (Madden, 2006; p.195). 
 
In 1396, King Sigismund of Hungary gathered an enthusiastic army of 
Christian warriors and marched to Nicopolis, an Ottoman fortress on the Bulgarian 
57 
 
side of the Danube. Sultan Beyazid crushed the crusading army and thousands of 
knights and their leaders were slaughtered on the battlefield (Shaw, 1976; p.33). 
The stunning victory of the Ottoman Turks against the Crusade of Nicopolis was 
devastating and agonizing for Western Europe. As a result of this victory, Hungary 
lay virtually defenseless before the Ottoman armies and beyond that, the German 
Empire was in peril. For the first time, Europeans began to consider seriously what 
life would be like under Turkish occupation and prophecies circulated that all of 
Europe would be conquered by the Turks. For Western Europeans, the failed 
Crusade of Nicopolis represented a tremendous psychological blow to the 
crusading ideal, as the Turks proved superior to Hungarians as well as to French 
and Burgundian knights (Bisaha, 2006). It also attested the unity and vigor of the 
Ottoman Turks at a time when European Christians were experiencing a long and 
frustrating papal schism (Bisaha, 2006). 
 
Because Ottoman military and social organization were perceived superior, 
the reactions from the humanists were different than their previous crusading 
polemic. For example, unlike his previous language, Salutati praised the Turks this 
time as highly trained warriors with incredible skills, strength, and perseverance. 
He expressed his admiration for the Ottoman military system as follows: 
 
It is astonishing how the leaders cultivate their men in the art of war; ten or twelve year-
old boys are seized for military service. Through hunting and labors they inure and harden 
them, and through running, leaping and this daily training and experience they become 
vigorous. . . . They are so well trained that they live contentedly with only one set of 
clothing and on bread alone. Remarkably tolerant of cold and heat, they endure rain and 
snow without complaint (Bisaha, 2006; p.56).  
 
Salutati’s statement regarding the seizure of young boys for military service is a 
reference to the Ottoman practice of devshirme, during which young boys were 
recruited from the subject Christian territories. These boys were converted to 
Islam, educated about the faith, taught the language, and trained to be soldiers by 
the Ottomans. On the completion of their education and training, they joined an 
elite fighting force called the janissaries (Bisaha, 2006; Kinross, 1979). 
Remarkably, Salutati did not criticize the enforced conversion of Christian boys to 
Islam by the Ottoman Turks. According to Bisaha (2006), Salutati applauded the 
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success of Turks despite the compulsory nature of the practice and judged them by 
the outcome rather than the methods of their system, regardless of its exploitation 
of Christians.  
 
Salutati’s admiration for the Ottoman military organization caused him to 
fear the Ottoman might more. He described the Turks as “a fierce and determined 
people whose advance represents a grave threat to Europe” (Bisaha, 2006; p.56). 
He articulated his apprehension towards Turks as follows: 
 
The Turks are an extremely ferocious race of men with great expectations. Do not ignore 
what I mention here. They trust and believe that they will erase the name of Christ 
throughout the world and they say that it is in their fates to devastate Italy until they reach 
the city divided by a river, which they interpret as Rome, and they will consume 
everything by fire and sword (Bisaha, 2006; p.56). 
 
These two somewhat inconsistent positions indicate that humanists, like Salutati, 
began viewing the Ottoman Turks as more advanced and powerful than the 
Europeans, while still portraying them as the ‘savage enemy’ that intends to 
destroy Western Christendom.  
 
Nevertheless, Salutati’s praise of the Ottoman Turks did not resonate much 
with the humanists of the early 15
th
 century. Although Western Europeans 
acknowledged the Ottoman Turks as a highly developed civilization due to their 
advanced agricultural, military, and political organization, they were still 
antagonized by the Turks’ perceived ‘savagery’. Therefore, humanist perceptions 
of the Turks tended to be harsh, as they equated Turks’ savagery with the 
‘barbarism’ of the ancient Goths who ravaged Rome (Bisaha, 2006). However, the 
term barbarian was not fully applied to Turks until after 1444, when the Ottoman 
Turks had a major victory against the crusading army in Varna.    
 
Crusade of Varna 
After the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in 1402, it took Ottoman Turks 
some time to end their destructive civil war and overcome their disarray. In 1421, 
Sultan Murad II took control of the resurgence, solidified his power over the 
Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Turks re-emerged as a threat to Europe once 
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again. Murad II began a massive attack against Constantinople, as he was 
determined to crush the Byzantine Empire once and for all (Madden, 2006). The 
Byzantine emperor had no other choice but to ask for military assistance from the 
West. Because the Great Schism finally ended in Europe, a single pope could 
gather the forces of the West to come to the rescue of Byzantium (Madden, 2006). 
After the call of Pope Eugenius IV for a Crusade against the Ottoman Turks in 
1443, the states in Eastern Europe, where the Turkish threat was most dire, 
responded with a major crusading army. In 1444, the Crusade against the Ottoman 
Turks ended in humiliating defeat in Varna, when Murad II trounced the Crusade 
army.  
 
After the Crusade of Varna, humanists began using the term ‘barbarian’ 
when referring to the Turks. For example, Venetian humanist and statesman 
Bernardo Giustiniani used the term in 1452, when he urged Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick III to lead Christians in Crusade against the “barbarians” (as cited in 
Bisaha, 2006; p.60).  While European humanists started to associate Turks with 
‘barbarism’, they viewed themselves as “the true heirs of antique civilization” and 
cast the Turks in the role of barbarians resembling “the counterpart of old foes of 
Greece and Rome” (Schwoebel, 1965; p.164). As Housley (2007) emphasizes, 
“The Turk was vilified not just as the enemy of faith but also as the barbarian at the 
gate” (p.205). Nevertheless, these early uses of the term “barbarian” did not reach 
the level of a discourse on the Turks until the Fall of Constantinople, which 
brought the end of the Byzantine Empire and became a catastrophic event for the 
Western Christendom. After the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire 
became the biggest menace for Christians lurking alongside Europe. As the last 
Christian bastion in the East was captured by the Ottoman Turks, European 
Christians began focusing on the Turks as their biggest enemy. The European 
characterization of Turks transformed into a more individualized image. They were 
first portrayed as the ‘barbarians’ and later, came to be known as the ‘terrible 
Turk.’  
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The Renaissance Image of the Turks 
 
The Fall of Constantinople 
The Ottoman victory against the Crusade of Varna paved the way for the 
final onslaught on the Byzantine Empire. The new Ottoman sultan, Mehmed II, 
was determined to make Constantinople his capital. On May 29, 1453, Ottoman 
Turks captured Constantinople after a two-months siege. Sultan Mehmed II 
allowed his soldiers three days of pillage and the Turks poured into the city, 
looting, enslaving and slaughtering the Christians on their way.  The siege and the 
pillage of the city by the Turks had been well documented by many chroniclers at 
the time, such as Nicolo Barbaro, Kritovoulos, Chalcondyles, Sphrantzes, and 
Michael Doukas, some of whom had witnessed the plunder and the killings 
firsthand (as cited in Babinger, 1992; Kinross, 1979; Runciman, 1990; Wheatcroft, 
1995). The characterizations of Turks in these chronicles were not much different 
to those in the Crusade chronicles. For example, in his detailed account of the siege 
of Constantinople, Nicolo Barbaro refers to the Turks as “pagans” and “enemies of 
Christian faith” when describing the Turkish attack: 
 
The wretched people in the city felt themselves to have been taken already, and decided to 
sound the tocsin through the whole city, and sounded it at all the posts on the walls, all 
crying at the top of their voices, “Mercy! Mercy! God send help from Heaven to this 
Empire of Constantine, so that a pagan people may not rule over the Empire!" All through 
the city all the women were on their knees, and all the men too, praying most earnestly and 
devotedly to our omnipotent God and His Mother Madonna Saint Mary, with all the 
sainted men and women of the celestial hierarchy, to grant us victory over this pagan race, 
these wicked Turks, enemies of the Christian faith.
27
  
 
Turks were also described as ‘bloodthirsty savages’ and ‘rapists’, almost identical 
to the characterizations in the Crusade rhetoric. In his chronicle, Kritovoulos wrote 
in detail about the killings and sufferings of the Christians, as well as the sack of 
the city by the Turks: 
 
                                                 
27
 Nicolo Barbaro, Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453, trans. John Melville-Jones (New 
York, 1969). 
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When they [Turks] had had enough of murder, and the City was reduced to slavery, some 
of the troops turned to the mansions of the mighty, by bands and companies and divisions, 
for plunder and spoil. Others went to the robbing of churches, and others dispersed to the 
simple homes of the common people, stealing, robbing, plundering, killing, insulting, 
taking and enslaving men, women, and children, old and young, priests, monks - in short, 
every age and class.  Other women, sleeping in their beds, had to endure nightmares.  Men 
with swords, their hands bloodstained with murder, breathing outrage, speaking out 
murder indiscriminate, flushed with all the worst things . . . like wild and ferocious beasts, 
leaped into the houses, driving them out mercilessly, dragging, rending, forcing, hauling 
them disgracefully into the public highways, insulting them and doing every evil thing.
28
  
 
Allegations of the Turks’ cruelty focused not only on slaughter, but also on sexual 
violence. In his book, The Ottomans, Wheatcroft (1995) recounts the sexual 
assaults, as well as the enslavement and killings that Christians were subjected to 
by the Turks: 
 
The Turks battered down the doors, and enslaved those at prayer. The very young and very 
old were killed on the spot, because they had no value in the slave market.  Men were 
roped together, and many of the younger women were knotted in groups of two or three by 
their long hair, or with their girdles.  Byzantine eyewitnesses told how young girls and 
boys were raped on altar tables, and the great church echoed with their screams (as cited in 
Wheatcroft, 1995, p. 22).   
 
In his book 1453, Crowley (2005) suggests that the fall of Constantinople 
awakened deep memories of the Crusades for Europeans. The descriptions of 
killings, violence, rape, torture and destruction by the Turks are similar to the 
imagery reported in the accounts of the Crusades. According to Hankins (1995), 
traditional crusading literature drew upon a rich treasure of negative stereotypes 
regarding Islam and Muslims (p.119). As discussed previously, Ottoman Turks 
were characterized negatively and demonized as the Islamic enemy in Crusade 
rhetoric, which has similarities with the earlier image of the Saracens. However, 
after the fall of Constantinople, Turks were no longer associated with Saracens. 
The word Turk replaced the word Saracen as the generic term for a Muslim and 
                                                 
28
 Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, trans. Charles T. Riggs (Princeton University 
Press, 1954). 
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became synonymous with the ‘Muslim enemy’ who sought to destroy Western 
Christendom (Crowley, 2005). 
 
The fall of Constantinople was a catastrophic event for Western 
Christendom as the city had been the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire for 
centuries. When Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople, Europeans responded 
with shock, outrage, and fear.  The horror stories about the slaughter, rape, and 
enslavement of Christians were spread to the whole Europe. Circulating Western 
accounts depicting the sack of the city as one of the bloodiest and most inhumane 
acts of history fed already existent anxiety. The Venetian Senate exaggerated tales 
of casualties by reporting that all inhabitants over the age of six had been 
slaughtered (Bisaha, 2006; Schwoebel, 1969). Extensive research by Schwoebel 
(1969) in The Shadow of the Crescent illustrates the embellished tales of not only 
slaughter, but also rape and sexual violence the people of Constantinople had to 
suffer. Schwoebel (1969) suggests that the terrifying accounts of Ottoman 
atrocities spread by the refugees and envoys from the Christian outposts, gravely 
imperiled by the Turkish victory, further played upon the fears of Western 
Christians. According to Schwoebel (1969), “Western chroniclers repeated the 
tales of Turkish atrocities with meticulous pains, tirelessly described the inhuman 
cruelties practiced by the Turks and attributed every conceivable crime to the 
enemies of the faith” (p.12). European humanists cultivated an evil image of the 
Turks in European imagination by retelling embellished tales of not only slaughter 
and enslavement, but also rape and sexual violence that the people of 
Constantinople had to suffer (Bisaha, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, in many accounts, the leader of the Turks, Sultan Mehmed II, 
was portrayed as ‘sinful’, ‘murderous,’ and ‘vile’. For example, chronicler 
Chastellain called Mehmed II “the cruel enemy of God, a new Mohammed, 
violator of the Cross and the church, despiser of God’s law, and prince of the army 
of Satan” (as cited in Schwoebel, 1969; p.12).  In his letter asking for assistance, 
the Grandmaster of Rhodes, Jean de Lastic, also characterized the leader of the 
Turks, Sultan Mehmed II, as a ‘bloodthirsty savage’: 
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The Grand Turk . . . was a wild beast who practiced every manner of cruelty and impiety 
upon Christians; and daily his savagery waxed greater. His thirst for human blood was 
insatiable and so uncontrollable that he had personally joined in the carnage. He allowed 
human bodies, naked and decapitated, to be left in the streets to be eaten by dogs 
(Schwoebel, 1969, p.8).   
 
Upon receiving the news of Constantinople’s fall, the humanist diplomat and 
future Pope, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II), brought high drama to 
tales of the siege in some of the most eloquent and emotional laments to be 
composed (Bisaha, 2006). Aenas paints a lurid image of Turks and their leader as 
wanton ‘rapists’: 
 
What utter slaughter in the imperial city would I relate, virgins having been prostituted, 
boys made to submit as women, nuns raped, and all sort of monks and women treated 
wickedly? . . . Those who were present say that the foul leader of the Turks, or to speak 
more aptly, the most repulsive beast, raped on the high altar of Hagia Sophia, before 
everyone’s eyes, the most noble, royal maiden, and her young brother, and then ordered 
them killed (Bisaha 2006; p.63). 
 
It is possible that Mehmed II took captives of both sexes into his seraglio, and 
those who were unwilling to accept his advances might face severe penalties. 
However, the accounts that describe the Sultan beheading the Greek Emperor and 
killing the members of the noble family after personally violating them are not 
conceivable (see Babinger, 1992; Runciman, 1990; Schwoebel, 1969). Bisaha 
(2006) calls the story about the Sultan publicly violating scions of the royal family 
on the high altar of Hagia Sophia “apocryphal” because the Greek emperor was 
unmarried and childless (p. 63). The stories about Sultan Mehmed’s sexual 
aggression became myths that were used repeatedly in Western writings, which 
later involved other Ottoman Sultans too. The sexual aggression of the Ottoman 
Sultans became a recurring theme used by the Western writers, particularly of the 
Early Modern English drama. The representations of Turkish sexuality continued 
to exist in Orientalist travel accounts in different forms such as homosexuality and 
sodomy, as well as sexual aggression. These images even resurface in Western 
contemporary cinema, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Sultan Mehmed II became known as the “Conqueror” after his triumphant 
conquest of Byzantium. European Christians were terribly intimidated by the 
Sultan because he was determined to advance into Europe and conquer new 
territories. Ottoman Turks were threatening European borders as no Muslim 
Empire had done for several centuries. European Christians were terrified that 
Ottoman Turks would conquer the world for Islam and bring the end of Western 
civilization. Turks appeared virtually unstoppable to the West and the Turkish 
advance generated a great concern in Europe. Right after the fall of 
Constantinople, the European response of shock, outrage and fear disappeared and 
European Christians hastened to organize a crusade against the Turks. The papacy 
as well as many scholars and humanists started crusading propaganda. However, as 
Hankins (1995) suggests, tapping the religious militancy of Christendom was not 
sufficient to launch a war against the Turks and overcome the Turkish threat. The 
new conditions required the Crusade against the Turks to be placed in a new 
ideological context with effective diplomacy and rhetoric. This is where European 
humanists came in and assumed the role of war-advocates against the Turks, by 
exploiting the untapped sources of fear, hatred, and military enthusiasm (Hankins, 
1995). Therefore, they engaged in a zealous propaganda and used crusading 
rhetoric to revive the spirit of a Crusade against the Turks (Bisaha, 1999; Bisaha, 
2006; Babinger, 1992; Schwoebel, 1969).  
 
The inspiration for Renaissance humanists to promote a Crusade against the 
Turks came not from the medieval times only, but rather from classical literature 
(Bisaha, 1999 & 2006; Hankins, 1995). While humanists described the Turks with 
the medieval Muslim stereotypes such as cruel, perverted, deceitful, filthy, and 
tools of the Devil, they also added new demeaning attributes using classical genres. 
Hankins (1995) suggests that humanists preferred to cultivate the classical Latin 
and ancient Roman genres rather than writing crusading sermons with a clerical 
viewpoint. The loss of Byzantium meant many different things to humanists. It 
represented the end of a great and glorious empire, a major blow to Christendom, 
and the loss of a rich heritage of art, architecture, and scholarship (Bisaha 1999). 
Many humanists equated the siege to the 5
th
 sack of Rome (Bisaha, 1999 & 2006). 
Bisaha (1999) indicates that “a new secular vision of the Turks and crusade began 
to compete with, and, in some places, replace the rhetoric of Holy war” (p.186). 
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With this new vision, Europeans began defining the Turks not only as “enemies of 
the faith” but also as the new barbarians. 
 
The Turk as ‘Barbarian’ in Humanist Discourse 
With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, European humanists compared the 
Turks to the rampaging Goths, Vandals, and Lombards who were blamed for the 
destruction of ancient Rome (Bisaha, 1999; p.188). The news about the sack of the 
city by the Turks devastated European humanists, as they were horrified that all the 
glory of Greece was extinguished by the Turks. For example, Florentine humanist 
Leonardo Bruni wrote about the barbarian invasion of Rome during the 4
th
 and 5
th
 
centuries by the Goths and Vandals, who sacked and looted the city and destroyed 
most of the books (Bisaha, 2006). By invoking the images of barbarians and lost 
texts, Bruni compared ancient Rome and its barbaric adversaries to contemporary 
Greece and its new-style ‘barbarians’, the Turks (Bisaha, 2006). Venetian humanist 
Quirini described the destruction of Greek books and architecture during the sack 
of Constantinople, while characterizing the Turks as the savage enemies of Greek 
learning, art and culture. He also associated the Turks’ animosity towards Greek 
civilization by portraying them as ‘barbarians’ who lived a slanderous way of life: 
 
Thus in our miserable time an ancient, noble and rich city, once the capital of the Roman 
Empire, mistress of all the Orient, has been captured by most savage barbarians, sacked for 
three days, and has come into wretched servitude, the worst of all evils. . . . Add to this the 
fact that all these wicked deeds were done by most savage barbarians, for not only has a 
royal city been captured, temples devastated and holy places polluted, but an entire race 
has been overcome the name of Greece is blotted out. Over a hundred and twenty thousand 
volumes were destroyed, as I learn from Cardinal Isidore of Kiev. Thus both the language 
and literature of the Greeks discovered, increased and perfected with so much time, labor 
and effort, has perished, alas! . . . That literature has perished which illuminated all the 
globe, which gave us the laws of salvation, holy philosophy and the other good arts by 
which human life is embellished. . . . A rude and barbarous race, living according to no 
fixed laws or customs, but unfettered, nomadic, willful this race, filled with treachery and 
fraud, shamefully and ignominiously tramples underfoot a Christian people (Hankins, 
1995; p.122). 
 
Quirini’s remarks indicate that the Turks are perceived as an inferior race that is 
cruel, barbarous, vulgar, and corrupt. These qualities are viewed as the natural 
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characteristics of the Turkish race and thus, ‘naturalization of racial difference’ 
makes it easier to stereotype Turks as the ‘barbarians’ and exclude them altogether 
as the ‘enemy’ (see Hall, 1997b). 
 
Among the most influential voices, Greek humanist Cardinal Bessarion 
wrote persistently for demanding Christian unity and promoting a crusade against 
the Turks. A collection of his orations and writings, titled Orationes and Principes 
Christianos Contra Turcos (Orations and Letters to Christian Princes Against the 
Turks), was printed in 1471 and created a lot of interest reaching a surprising 
number of readers (Hankins, 1995; Bisaha 2006). Cardinal Bessarion was one of 
the first who defined the Turks in classical terms by using the discourse of 
‘barbarism’ (Bisaha, 2006; Schwoebel, 1969). After Constantinople had fallen, he 
wrote the following letter to the Doge of Venice and lamented the loss of Western 
culture, while referring the Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarians’: 
 
Wretched me! I cannot write this without the most profound sorrow. A city 
[Constantinople] which was flourishing, with such a great empire, so many illustrious 
men, such very famous and ancient families, so prosperous, the head of all Greece, the 
splendour and glory of the East, the school of the best arts, the refuge of all good things, 
has been captured, despoiled, ravaged, and completely sacked by the most inhuman 
barbarians and the most savage enemies of the Christian faith, by the fiercest of wild 
beasts. The public treasure has been consumed, private wealth has been destroyed, the 
temples have been stripped of gold, silver, jewels, the relics of the saints and other most 
precious ornaments.
29
  
 
The way Cardinal Bessarion characterizes Turks as ‘barbarians’ underscores their 
‘otherness’ as the ‘enemy’ of Western civilization and of Christianity. Turks are 
not only ‘bloodthirsty murderers’ as described in Crusade rhetoric, but also the 
‘barbarians’ who want to destroy the Western civilization and annihilate Christian 
faith.    
      
Aeneas Silvius (Pope Pius II), on the other hand, grieved about the plunder 
of Constantinople and the destruction of books. He famously expressed his dismay 
                                                 
29
 From the letter of Cardinal Bessarion to the Doge of Venice, July 13, 1453 in Portable 
Renaissance Reader (Ross & McLauglin, Eds., 1977), p. 71. 
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as: “How many names of great authors have now perished?” (Schwoebel, 1969; 
p.9). He called the ravaged Greek civilization “a second death of Homer and Plato” 
(Runciman, 1990; Schwoebel, 1969). His lament for the fall of Constantinople is 
well known and is expressed as follows: 
 
O famous Greece, behold now thy end! Who does not grieve for you? There remained up 
to this day in Constantinople a remembrance of your ancient wisdom, and no Latin was 
considered adequately learned unless he spent time studying in Constantinople, as though 
it were the home of letters. . . . It was from thence we received Plato, from thence that the 
works of Aristotle, Demosthenes, Xenophon, Thucydides, Basil, Dionysius, Origen and 
many others were made manifest to the Latin peoples in our time, and we had hoped to 
receive many more in the future. But now that the Turks have won and possess all that 
Greek power once held, I believe Greek letters are finished. . . . It will all now be very 
different under the rule of the Turks, the most savage of men, the enemies of good customs 
and good letters (Hankins, 1995; p.122). 
 
Devastated by the loss of Byzantium, Aeneas Silvius was more passionate about 
the Turks than many of his contemporaries and devoted much of his clerical career, 
as Bishop of Siena and Trieste and especially as Pope Pius II (1458-64), to 
promoting crusade (Bisaha, 2006). He wrote several letters mourning the death of 
Greek culture by the Turks and the return of barbarism, which received wide 
distribution in several printed editions (Bisaha, 2006; Hankins, 1995).   
 
Humanism’s fascination to associate the Turks with ‘barbarism’ 
represented a major shift in the European perception of Islam in general and Turks 
in particular. In earlier crusading texts, the term ‘barbarian’ had been used to 
signify ‘racial difference’ rather than hostility toward civilized values and culture 
(Housley, 2007; p.205). Housley (2007) suggests that this new feature of the term 
‘barbarian’ contained a “distinctive racial element” rather than signifying merely a 
religious identity and thus, making the demonization of Turks different from the 
Saracens (p.205). Housley explains it further as follows: 
 
earlier denigration of the ‘Saracen’ was based on religious identity; conversion would end 
the conflict. The Turk was an enemy of faith, but he was also a barbarian; this quality was 
perceived as genetic, its roots residing in the Turks’ origins as steppe dwellers, the 
Scythians (Housley, 2007; p.206). 
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The Turks’ barbarism is described as a genetic quality which fits into Stuart Hall’s 
(1997b) concept of ‘naturalization.’ When the negative qualities of the ‘Other’ are 
characterized as genetic or ‘natural’, it becomes easier to alienate that race or 
ethnic group based on their alterity. Ethnic and racial connotations of the word 
‘barbarian’ is evident in the works of Aeneas Silvius and Francesco Filelfo, who 
sought to trace the origins of the Turkish people back to ancient times. Francesco 
Filelfo spoke about the Turks in derogatory terms, insulting them as Sycthian 
descendants, and portraying them as uncivilized, inhuman and filthy: 
 
Who does not know that the Turks are fugitive slaves and shepherds of Sycthians, who 
descended from the prisons of the vast and inhospitable Caucasus Mountains into Persia 
and Media to practice banditry. They made their homes in no set place, except the bogs 
and the frightening hiding places of woods (Bisaha, 2006; p.77). 
 
The more humble the men who inflict it, the more humiliating is the indignity— if, indeed, 
the Turks should be called men and not some sort of completely unrestrained and savage 
beasts, since they have nothing of humanity in themselves beyond a human form, and that 
deformed and depraved on account of the disgusting filthiness of their shameful habits 
(Meserve, 2008; p.67). 
 
In his Cosmographia, Aeneas Silvius attempted to prove that Turks were 
descendants of Sycthians, and described them in starker terms as “a fierce and 
ignominious people, fornicators, engaging in all manner of lewdness and 
frequenters of brothels, who ate detestable things: the flesh of mares, wolves, 
vultures, and what is even more horrifying, aborted human fetuses” (Bisaha, 2006; 
p.76). Embellished descriptions of the flesh eaten by the Scythians and their wild 
sexual habits helped to complete the image of both the Turks and their ancestors as 
perverse and immoral, as well as backward (Bisaha 1999; p.194). 
 
In the years after 1453, the word barbarian became synonymous with Turk 
(Bisaha, 1999). Schwoebel (1965) suggests that “as barbari the Turks were 
regarded as cruel, of savage habits, and the enemies of culture, of which the 
Italians were the self-appointed protectors” (p.164). Bisaha (1999) states that 
“despite the achievements of the Ottoman military, the prestige of the Sultan’s 
court, and the efficiency of the Ottoman Empire, European humanists chose to 
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paint the Turks as an uncivilized, arbitrary race of nomads” (p.193). Therefore, as a 
nomadic people, Turks were barbarians and they were warlike, violent, unstable, 
and untrustworthy (Hankins, 1995). For European humanists, the destruction of 
books and works of art was not the only act of barbarity committed by the Turks in 
Constantinople. As discussed earlier, reports of unrestrained slaughter, rape, 
violence and enslavement also horrified humanists. For example, Cardinal 
Bessarion vividly depicted the atrocities Turks committed against the Christians in 
his aforementioned letter to the Doge of Venice. As a reminder, his remarks are as 
follows: 
 
Men have been butchered like cattle, women abducted, virgins ravished, and children 
snatched from the arms of their parents. If any survived so great a slaughter, they have 
been enslaved in chains so that they might be ransomed for a price, or subjected to every 
kind of torture, or reduced to the most humiliating servitude.
30
  
 
As suggested by Bisaha (1999), Turks probably behaved no worse than most 
captors of their time, Christian or Muslim. However, like most Westerners, 
humanists too believed even the most sensationalized reports of violence and 
savagery that came their way. For example, philosopher and physician Niccolò 
Tignosi taunted the name ‘Turk’ by saying “they are not teucri [Turks] but rather 
truces [butchers]” (Bisaha, 1999; p.192). In The Ottoman State, Karpat (1974) 
claims that after the loss of Constantinople to Ottoman Turks, “the ensuing fear 
that the Turks would attack the West and destroy Christianity was the most 
powerful stimulus conditioning the formation of the Western image about Turks” 
(p.3). For that reason, the image of Turks in Western discourse became 
synonymous with ‘barbarity and cruelty’ during the age of Renaissance. The 
stereotypes of the Cruel Turk and the Terrible Turk were already forming in 
European imaginations. As the Ottoman military advance continued to threaten 
Christian Europe, these stereotypes became more frequent and inherent in Western 
discourse. Looking closer at the trajectory of the Ottoman peril after the Fall of 
Constantinople will provide a better understanding of how these stereotypes 
become entrenched.  
                                                 
30
 From the letter of Cardinal Bessarion to the Doge of Venice, July 13, 1453 in Portable 
Renaissance Reader, (Ross & McLauglin, Eds., 1977), p. 71. 
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The Ottoman Peril 
Following his conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed continued his 
advance into Europe and marched to Serbia in 1456, but Ottomans were defeated 
by the armed forces of Serbs, Hungarians and the European Crusaders and failed to 
capture the city of Belgrade. Still, Mehmed succeeded to invade the rest of Serbia 
by 1459 and thus, marked the beginning of the Turkish rule in Serbia which lasted 
for nearly five centuries. In 1458, Sultan Mehmed subjugated Greece and 
established the Ottoman rule over the whole Greek peninsula by 1460. Mehmed 
also conquered the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463 and subjugated Albania in 1478. In 
1480, Sultan Mehmed invaded Italy and captured Otranto. He intended to capture 
Rome to fulfill his dream of reuniting the Roman Empire, and ruling over both 
East and West as one sovereignty. However, Sultan Mehmed failed to materialize 
his dream and withdrew his forces from Italy. After an unsuccessful attack on 
Rhodes, Mehmed died due to a chronic illness in 1481.  
 
Almost two centuries after Mehmed’s death, Venetian historian and 
diplomat, Giovanni Sagredo, wrote: “It was fortunate for Christendom and for Italy 
that death checked the fierce and indomitable barbarian” (Babinger, 1992; p.408). 
Kinross (1979) asserts the relief that the Western Christendom had from Mehmed’s 
death and states that “the West could breathe again, freed from fear of the East, and 
to remain free from its threats for forty years to come” (p.157). After Mehmed the 
Conqueror’s death, his two sons could not follow their father’s footsteps as they 
were engaged in a fierce battle for the throne. Once Bayezid II (a.k.a Beyazid) took 
over the throne, he continued to increase the size of the Ottoman fleet and forced 
Lepanto to surrender, while capturing Modon, Koron, and Navarino at the same 
time (Clot, 2012). Also, Ottoman Turks were advancing by land and devastating 
the Venetian possessions. At the end of 1502, Venetians became compelled to sign 
a humiliating peace treaty marking the Ottoman Empire as a major power in the 
Mediterranean.  
 
Sultan Selim, who was the grandson of Mehmed the Conqueror, forcefully 
took over the throne and ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1512 to 1520. Unlike his 
predecessors, Sultan Selim did not advance into Europe, but significantly expanded 
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the Ottoman sovereignty eastward into Asia and the Middle East (Kinross, 1979; 
p.166-167). In 1514, Selim marched into Iran and defeated Shah Ismail, the leader 
of the Safavid Empire, at the Battle of Chaldiran (Kinross, 1979; p.167). Then he 
turned his armed forces on to the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, defeating Mamluks 
both at the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 and at the Battle of Ridanieh in 1517 
(Kinross, 1979; p.170). With Selim’s victories Ottomans annexed the entire 
Mamluk Sultanate, from Syria to Palestine, and from the Arabian Peninsula to 
Egypt itself. Selim’s dominance over the Mamluk Sultanate provided Ottomans 
with the control of the Muslim holy cities, Mecca and Medina, and Sultan Selim 
claimed the title of Caliph, the head of Islam (Kinross, 1979; p.170). Thereafter, all 
succeeding Ottoman Sultans were considered as the head of the Islamic religion 
and accordingly, Turkish military advance was viewed as a quest to spread Islam.  
 
During his brief reign, Sultan Selim came to be known as “the Grim” for 
his cold-bloodedness and cruelty. Selim not only had his two brothers strangled, 
but also over-extended the fratricidal principle and had his five orphan nephews 
killed (Kinross, 1979). Stories of Selim’s impulsive brutalities and his scant regard 
for human life became infamous. One of Selim’s earliest public actions was to kill 
a provincial governor with his own sword, who had asked for a revenue increase. 
The lives and careers of his Grand Vezirs were inclined to be brief, as Selim had 
seven of them beheaded, along with numerous other officials and generals 
(Kinross, 1979). The phrase “Mayest thou be Selim’s Vezir” came to be used in 
Turkish parlance as implying the curse “Strike you dead!” (Kinross, 1979; p.171). 
Selim’s cruelty, fratricidal actions and merciless character probably inspired many 
English playwrights during the Early Modern period, as their depictions of 
Ottoman Sultans often possessed similar stereotypical qualities. As a great warrior, 
Selim balanced his imperial conquests in Islamic Asia with those of his 
predecessors in Christian Europe. Until his death in 1520, Selim doubled the extent 
of the Ottoman Empire in less than a decade, covering lands from the banks of 
Danube to those of Nile, and from the coasts of the Adriatic to those of the Indian 
Ocean (Kinross, 1979). Sultan Selim left a well-organized and much extended 
empire to his son, Suleiman. Nevertheless, the world was yet to see the zenith of 
the Ottoman Empire until Suleiman inherited the throne and became the new 
Sultan in 1520. 
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The ‘Grand Turk’ 
 The sixteenth century was the age of three powerful monarchs in Europe; 
Charles V of the Habsburg empire, Francis I of the House of Valois in France, and 
Henry VIII of the Tudors in England. Sultan Suleiman became the fourth monarch, 
who would soon be an integral element in the Christian balance of power while 
accomplishing many glories in the Islamic East. When Suleiman succeeded to the 
Ottoman throne, the rulers of Western Europe were terrified with the prospect of a 
more powerful and fearful version of his father. They perceived the Grand Turk, 
“Signor Turco” to the Venetians, as the “powerful and formidable enemy” of 
Christendom (Kinross, p.197). At the court of King Henry VIII, Cardinal Wolsey 
said to Venetian ambassador: “This Sultan Suleiman is twenty-five years old and 
has good judgment; it is to be feared he will act like his father” (Kinross, 1979; 
p.197). Also, in a letter to his ambassador, the Doge of Venice wrote: “The Sultan 
is young, very powerful, and extremely hostile to the Christian race” (Kinross, 
1979; p.197). The sixteenth century was to see the greatest of all Ottoman Sultans, 
Suleiman I, known to the world at large as “Suleiman the Magnificent,” and to his 
own people as “Suleiman the Lawgiver.”  
 
Sultan Suleiman’s first objective was to conquer Belgrade, the gateway to 
the countries around the Danube, and to avenge the defeat of Mehmed II. In 1521, 
Suleiman took Belgrade and massacred most of the Hungarians. After the fall of 
Belgrade, one of the major strongholds of Eastern Europe and ‘gateway to 
Hungary’, Christian powers were filled with fear and anxiety for the future (Clot, 
2012). Thirty years later, Ghiselin de Busbecq, Austrian ambassador to Istanbul, 
wrote about the Ottoman victory in Belgrade as follows: 
 
These events should have taught the Christian princes to strengthen their fortifications and 
fortresses if they did not wish to perish. The Turkish armies are like powerful rivers 
swelled by rain which cause infinite destruction when they find ways of undermining the 
dikes which hold them back and rush into the breach . . . Thus the Turks, when they have 
broken though the barriers which contain them, unleash waves of devastation beyond 
comprehension (Clot, 2012; p.39). 
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Sultan Suleiman captured the island of Rhodes in 1523 and expelled the Knights of 
St. John (a.k.a Knights Hospitallers). In 1526, Suleiman resumed his military 
campaign into Eastern Europe and defeated King Louis of Hungary at the Battle of 
Mohacs. At the battle, King Louis was killed, the cavalry was decimated, 
thousands of Hungarian noblemen beheaded, and Mohacs was burned and 
scorched by the Ottoman soldiers. To the Hungarians, the battle is still knowns as 
“the Destruction of Mohacs” and described as the “tomb of the Hungarian nation” 
to this day (Kinross, 1979; p.187). Ottoman Turks burnt Buda to the ground and 
ravaged the whole country (Clot, 2012).The Ottoman victory in Mohacs had a big 
impact in Europe, as Europeans did not expect the Turks to penetrate so deeply 
into Central Europe, advance to Buda and capture Hungary. Conquering Hungary 
was not enough for Suleiman, as he had his eye on the most cherished European 
prize of all, Vienna. 
 
The Siege of Vienna (1529) 
 According to Wheatcroft (2008), Sultan Suleiman’s secret objective was to 
take the city of Vienna as the political and symbolic importance would be 
immense, equal to Mehmed II taking Constantinople in 1453 (p. 46). On May 10, 
1529 Suleiman left Istanbul with his army and began marching to Vienna. The 
Turkish military advance into the heart of Europe caused grave anxiety and fear. 
Kinross (1979) quotes a German folksong, which was popular during that time, to 
demonstrate how Europeans were intimidated by the Turks and their leader, Sultan 
Suleiman: 
 
From Hungary he’s soon away, 
In Austria by break of day, 
Bavaria is just at hand, 
From there he’ll reach another land,  
Soon to the Rhine perhaps he’ll come. (Kinross, 1979; p.189) 
   
The Turkish army reached Vienna on 27 September, 1529, and Sultan Suleiman 
besieged the city for two months but had to pull back into Hungary due to the 
endless heavy rain. Because of the severe weather conditions, the first Ottoman 
attempt to capture Vienna failed but “the nightmare fear of Turkish invasion 
remained throughout the years of the Counter-Reformation” (Palmer, 1994; p.9). 
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Palmer articulates how Europeans began living with anxiety after the Turkish 
siege: 
 
After 1529 Austrian prelates, alarmed by Suleiman’s deep incursion into Catholic 
Christendom, insisted that the parochial clergy of Central Europe should establish a 
warning system, the Türkenglocken, a peal of bells which would alert the soldiery to the 
coming of the Turks and summon the Catholic faithful to pray for deliverance from Islam 
(Palmer, 1994; p.9). 
 
Sultan Suleiman expanded the borders of the Ottoman Empire to its farthest, 
enriched its wealth to the highest and delivered the biggest progress in law, art, and 
architecture. Europeans both feared and admired the power of the Ottomans Turks 
during his reign and rightfully called him the ‘Grand Turk.’ After Sultan 
Suleiman’s death in 1566, “the qualities of kingship shown by the sultans 
deteriorated rapidly” (Palmer, 1994; p.6). None of the Sultans succeeding 
Suleiman matched his leadership qualities, military abilities and his wisdom. In 
1683, Ottoman Turks attempted to capture Vienna again but the Ottoman troops 
were forced to retreat and their commander fled the battlefield. The scattering of 
the Ottoman soldiers was one of the great turning points in the history of the 
Ottoman Empire as Europeans realized that the Ottoman military was weak. It 
signaled the decline of the Ottoman Empire and assured Europeans that they did 
not need to fear the legendary ‘Grand Turk’ anymore. 
 
 The historiography of the Ottoman Turks reviewed so far shows that the 
rise and the expansion of the Ottoman Empire took place until the first half of the 
17
th
 century. Within the century following Sultan Suleiman’s death, the Ottomans 
continued their military campaigns towards Europe and captured many posts in 
Mediterranean such as Cyprus and Crete. However, the mid of the 17th century 
marks the stagnation period of the Ottoman Empire, which brought its decline 
henceforth and eventually, its dismemberment in 1922 when the Republic of 
Turkey was founded. The European perception of Turks during the rise of the 
Ottoman Empire was often negative. In the Crusade rhetoric, Turks were 
represented as ‘the enemy of Christianity’ and perceived as the wicked ‘Other’ 
until the middle of the 15
th
 century. With the capture of Constantinople from the 
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Byzantine Empire, Turks were not only the evil ‘Other’, but also became the 
bloodthirsty ‘barbarians’ who were willing to destroy Western civilization and 
annihilate Christianity. The humanists often underlined the savagery, barbarity, 
cruelty and immorality of the Turks. During the Renaissance, the stereotypical 
image of Ottoman Turks as the ‘terrible Turk’ was solidified. However, after 
Sultan Suleiman’s accession to throne in 1520, European Christians began viewing 
Turks not only as the ‘terrible Turk’, but also as one of the biggest political and 
military powers in Europe. The Ottoman Empire caused admiration and envy along 
with fear and anxiety. To have a better understanding of this paradoxical image of 
Turks, I will examine the representation of Turks in Western writings during the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
16
th
 AND 17
th
 CENTURY LITERARY REPRESENTATIONS OF TURKS 
 
In his prominent book, The Crescent and the Rose, Samuel Chew (1937) 
describes the unremitting Turkish threat to Europe for centuries: “In the fourteenth 
century a cloud arose in the East and from the fifteenth till far into the seventeenth 
the Ottoman peril hung over Europe” (p.100). After their conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453, Ottoman Turks continued their military advance into 
Europe. As illustrated in the preceding chapter, the looming Ottoman threat next to 
Christian Europe bolstered the image of the Turks as ‘barbarians’, ‘infidels’ and 
the ‘cruel enemy.’ Although humanists still sought to revive the century-old 
conceptions of ‘Christian unity’ and tried to portray Turks as the ‘common enemy’ 
that threatens Christendom, they could not succeed, because Europe was suffering 
from a religious divide within Christianity. Except for some orthodox humanists, 
who continued to portray Turks as ‘infidels’ or ‘barbarians’, most humanists began 
to recognize that the crusade propaganda rhetoric to defend Christianity against the 
Turks would fail. Therefore, throughout the 16
th
 century, humanists began 
abandoning the inflamed Crusade rhetoric and the image of Turks as ‘religious foe’ 
or ‘evil Muslim’ gradually began to fade. Instead, it was replaced with the 
recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a sheer political and military force 
(Cirakman, 2001). Although, Christians were still terrified that Turks would 
conquer Europe and impose Islam, they also envied and admired Ottoman religious 
unity, administration and military. Western authors started to focus on the culture, 
religion and organization of the Ottoman Empire as an imminent threat to Europe.  
 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the Turkish advance into Europe 
was the most daunting during the 16
th
 century when the Ottoman Empire was at its 
peak in terms of military strength, organization and wealth. The continuous 
Turkish military victories prompted Western writers to investigate the ‘Turk’ in a 
serious, calm and inquisitive manner. Western humanists, scholars and writers 
often wrote about Ottoman military success in various textual forms, such as 
treatises, history books, political pamphlets, and state-papers. Furthermore, popular 
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playwrights, dramatists, poets and novelists were also inspired by the Ottoman 
peril and incorporated Turks in their writings. In The Crescent and the Rose, 
Samuel Chew (1937) draws attention to the popularity of the English drama 
involving Ottoman Turks. He suggests that portrayals of Ottoman Turks and their 
encroachments upon Christian Europe were the epicenter of many plays in Tudor 
England and were available on the London theater stage to “a man of average 
education and intelligence” (p.103). Aptly, in this chapter, I will examine the 
representations of Ottoman Turks in Western writings of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries. As these representations were prevalent in both non-fictional and 
fictional texts, I will attempt to divide them in two separate categories. In the first 
category, I will examine the European perception of Turks in historical texts, 
treatises and essays. In the second category, I will look into the image of Turks in 
Early Modern English drama. Both the historical texts and English plays are 
selected based on their significance and popularity during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries. For example, the treatises were written by statesmen, diplomats, 
historians, humanists and political scholars, such as Erasmus, Martin Luther, and 
Richard Knolles, who affected the Christian perception of Turks. On the other 
hand, the selected plays are written by popular English playwrights such as 
Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Goffe, who influenced the European audience with 
their characterizations of Turks in their plays and fostered a stereotypical Turkish 
image in the minds of European Christians.  
 
 
The Image of Turks in Western Historical Texts, Treatises, and 
Essays 
 
During the 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries, Ottoman encroachments upon 
Europe were the single major threat filling the minds and hearts of Europeans 
almost anywhere. Due to consecutive Ottoman military successes, Europeans 
began perceiving the Turks with mixed feelings of anxiety, distress, fear and 
admiration. These mixed feelings caused Europeans to look at the Ottoman 
administration and culture more closely. Towards the end of the 16
th
 century, there 
was an increasing European interest and curiosity about the Ottoman Empire and 
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society, particularly its history, government, customs, manners and religion 
(Cirakman, 2002). Military discipline and organization was the leading issue that 
drew the European attention the most.  
 
The Excellence of Turkish Military Discipline  
Western writers were obsessed with the looming Turkish menace, so they 
often wrote about Ottoman military strength. Many writers concluded that the 
Ottoman Turks’ tremendous ability of warfare and military discipline were the 
main reasons behind their success and found these characteristics admirable. For 
example, Sebastian Munster, a German scholar and cosmographer, was one of the 
first authors to write about the military characteristics of the Ottoman Turks in his 
book, Cosmographia, published in 1544. According to Munster, although Turks 
were ‘cruel’ people, they were also to be admired in many respects, such as their 
‘soldiership’. Munster writes, “Nothing is more marvelous about the Turk than 
their speed in action, constancy in danger and obedience towards their empire” (as 
cited in McLean, 2007; p.255). He praised the Turkish army and described them as 
“honest, without indecency, given neither to sedition nor to rioting, they hope not 
for revelry, but merely to kill or be killed for the Empire” (as cited in McLean, 
2007; p.255). French ambassador René de Lucinge undertook the question of how 
to wage a successful war against the Turks in his treatise, The Beginning, 
Continuance and Decay of Estates, published in 1606. He praised the obedience 
and exemplary discipline of the Ottoman military in his following remarks: 
 
What need I speak of obedience, nurse of order observed among them: since it was never 
seen that the Turks ever lost battle through disorder, much less left off pursuing any 
attempt for their soldiers mutinies. Whereas almost all the battles we have bid them, had 
not been lost but by the mere disorder and disobedience of our men (as cited in Cirakman, 
2002; p.79). 
 
As Chew (1937) suggests, “It is not surprising that this formidable fighting-
machine is again and again pointed to by Christian publicists as a principal cause 
of Turkish success” (p.106).  
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Italian political thinker and diplomat Giovanni Botero emphasizes the 
military abilities of the Ottoman Turks in his popular treatise, The Travellers 
Breviat. The treatise, which was translated into English in 1601, ascribes the might 
of the Ottoman Empire partly to the discords of Christendom, and partly to the 
excellence of the Turkish army. Botero’s observations about the virtues of the 
Ottoman military and the resources of the Ottoman Empire are as follows: 
 
The Great Turk possesses three instruments with which to terrify the whole world: 
multitudes of men, an incorruptible military discipline, and an infinite store of corn and 
other provisions. Added to these are the thrift, patience, and endurance of a soldiery 
accustomed to a hard diet and the severest conditions of life . . . They do not fear death 
because they believe that their destiny is inevitably written on their foreheads . . . The 
picture presented in this treatise of the power, organization, discipline, and resources of the 
Ottoman Empire is formidable indeed (as cited in Chew, 1937; p.110).  
 
The military organization and martial discipline of the Turks were also 
underscored in Short Treatise upon the Turkes Chronicles (1546), which was 
translated by Peter Ashton into English from Paulo Giovio’s Comentario de le cose 
de Turchi (1532) (see Chew, 1937; Ingram, 2009). In the book, the last section 
titled “The Array and Discipline of the Turkish Warfare” points out the military 
methods of the Turks and provides advice on how to use the Christian armies 
against them (McJannet, 2006). At the time, Christian Europe did not have a 
standing army, but rather depended on emergency or volunteer recruits, who were 
mostly ill-trained and resentful, with poor discipline and with no unity (Chew, 
1937). In contrast, the Ottoman Turks’ regular professional army, recruited from 
their subject populations, was regarded with awe and admiration due to its 
discipline and organization (Chew, 1937). Giovio underscores this lack of unity 
and discipline against the Turkish army and concludes that there might be hope to 
defeat the Turks only if the Christian princes are unified. He states: 
 
if the Christian princes were so wholly of one mind and consent, that at the first rumour of 
the Turks coming they would assemble and gather together power and strength of men 
able to resist and withstand him. But certes we can scant trust that this shall happen (as 
cited in Raman, 2011; p.80). 
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Western writers often criticized the lack of unity among Christian princes and 
contrasted the European monarchial structure to that of the Ottoman Empire. The 
religious unity of the Ottoman Turks and the united structure of their Empire were 
frequently admired.    
 
The Virtue of Turkish Unity  
In the treatises and historiographies of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, the 
religious devotion and unity of the Turks were often cited as the reason for their 
military success and enduring Empire. For example, in Cosmographia (1544), 
Sebastian Munster contrasted the religious division in Europe to the religious unity 
of Turks. He cited “the failure of Christian princes, riven by internal discord, to 
oppose the Turk” and “the consequent despoiling and servitude of conquered 
Christians” as the reasons for the Christian disarray (McLean, 2007; p.255). While 
Munster degraded the prophet of Muslims, Muhammad, as “prince of all impiety 
and superstition”, he acclaimed the austerity and the devoutness of the Turks, and 
also the discipline of the Turkish soldier (McLean, 2007; p.255). Fulke Greville, 
who was an Elizabethan dramatist, poet and statesman, believed that although the 
religion of Islam was “mere collusion and deceit”, Turks prevailed upon the 
Christians because they were “first in unity” whereas Christians were “divided 
stood, in schism and sect, among themselves” (cited in Chew, 1937; p.109). In A 
Treatise of Monarchy (1670), Greville points out the disadvantage that Christians 
had against the Ottoman Turks and underscores their religious unity as opposed to 
the discord among Christians: 
 
For whatsoever odds in man or beast 
 Between the Christian and the Turk there be,  
By delicacy, hardness, industry or rest, 
 Our fatal discord or their unity; 
       Yet we that thus on disadvantage stand, 
       Stand fast, because he makes his wars by land (cited in Chew, 1937; p. 116).  
 
Samuel Chew (1937) suggests that it had been painful for the West to acknowledge 
“the unity of Islam” and to “contrast the divisions and seditions of Christendom” 
(p.108). He also goes on to assert that this unity was the “major cause of Turkish 
victories.”  
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The unity of the Ottoman monarchial structure was also the envy of 
European powers and intrigued many writers, such as the Italian diplomat and 
political theorist, Niccolò Machiavelli. In his political treatise, The Prince (1532), 
Machiavelli cites the Ottoman Empire as one of the best examples of a monarchy. 
Machiavelli admires the Ottoman government, as it is entirely ruled by the Sultan, 
who divides the country into districts that are administered by the appointed 
governors
31
. The Sultan could change and replace these governors anytime at his 
pleasure. Because all the administrators and subjects are dependent on the Sultan, 
Machiavelli finds it too hard to corrupt the Turks and conquer the state of the 
Ottoman Empire. He warns the European leaders about attacking the Ottoman 
Turks: 
 
Therefore, whoever attacks the Turks must realize that he will find them united, and he 
should base his hopes more on his own strength than on others’ lack of unity.32 
 
Many 16
th 
century European historians and political thinkers like Giovio, 
Machiavelli, Botero, and Lucinge, considered the Turks to have many virtues 
compared to the Christians. These virtues include “discipline, loyalty, justice and 
absolute authority through which their nation became durable, united and mighty” 
(Cirakman, 2002; p.79). Despite the praise, admiration and envy of some writers, 
Turks continued to remain as the Muslim enemy of the Europeans. However, they 
were no longer the single evil force that the Christians had to unite against, as 
papal schism divided the Christians and destroyed the sense of unity in Europe.  
 
Turks as the ‘Scourge of God’ and the ‘Rod of God’s Wrath’ 
Between the years 1512 and 1517, Pope Leo X pursued a Holy War to stop 
the Ottoman advance into Europe and encouraged Europeans to unite against the 
Turks (Clot, 2012). However, European Christian unity that emerged during the 
Crusades ended with the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Church lost its 
ideological hegemony in Europe due to the permanent division within Latin 
Christendom. Unlike in the Crusade rhetoric, Turks were no longer perceived as 
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the ‘common enemy’ that unified Christian Europe. Instead, both Catholics and 
Protestants began viewing them differently depending on their religious conflict. 
Protestants perceived the Turks as ‘a scourge sent by God’ to punish Roman papal 
pride and Christians for their sins (Levin, 2007). On the other hand, Roman 
Catholics associated Islam with Lutherans and believed that Satan worked for the 
Turks by stirring up the hatred of heretics against the true Church (Chew, 1937). 
Veinstein summarizes the sentiment towards Turks, both in Europe and the Islamic 
World, as follows:  
 
In their reciprocal imprecations, Catholics and Protestants used the Turk as the standard of 
ignominy . . . The Protestants accused the pope and his entourage of being more vile, 
debauched, and dangerous than the Turks. And to discredit the Protestants, the Catholics 
could do no better than to discern their ‘resemblances’ to the Turks (Tolan, Veinstein & 
Laurens, 2013; p.169). 
 
Martin Luther, the iconic figure of the Protestant Reformation, was among 
the first to suggest that Turks were the ‘scourge of God’ to chasten Christians for 
their sins (Levin, 2007). Luther believed that Turks were sent by God as agents of 
the Biblical apocalypse to destroy the Antichrist, whom he viewed to be the papacy 
and the Roman Church. Martin Luther rejected the idea of a crusade against the 
Turks, because he was convinced that it was God’s plan to use the Turks as a 
means to punish a doctrinally corrupt and morally lax Christendom (Francisco, 
2007).  With his Ninety-Five Theses in 1517, Luther defended his notion as, “To 
fight against the Turk is the same as resisting God, who visits our sin upon us with 
this rod” (Henrich & Boyce, 1996; p.252). In his book, On War against the Turks 
(1529), Luther used similar language describing the Turks as “the rod of God’s 
wrath” through which “God is punishing the world” (Henrich & Boyce, 1996). 
After the first Siege of Vienna by the Ottoman army in 1529, Luther became 
increasingly worried about the Islamization of Europe in general and Germany in 
particular. Thus, he revised his earlier position and began supporting a war against 
the Turks. Later, Luther continued to advocate fighting against the Turks in his 
following writings, such as in his preface for George of Hungary’s Treatise on the 
Mores, Customs, and Perfidy of the Turks, and in his 1541 work titled Admonition 
to Prayer against the Turks (Tolan, Laurens & Veinstein, 2013). 
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Similar to Luther, other thinkers of the Reformation also maintained their 
distance from a Holy War against the Turks at the time. For example, Dutch 
humanist Erasmus was against the war in the name of pacifism. In 1530, he wrote a 
short treatise entitled De bello Turcico, in which he suggested that Christians were 
a greater threat to their tarnished faith than an external enemy like the Turks 
(Dimmock, 2005; Bisaha, 2006). By explicitly linking renewed Ottoman 
incursions into Hungary and the Baltic States with Christian depravity, Erasmus 
railed against those Christians who “have conducted themselves like Turks”, 
whose “Turkish vices: avarice, ambition, power-lust” prompted them to become 
“more ruthless towards their own people than the enemy” (Dimmock, 2005; p.21). 
He advocated unity among the dynastic courts of Europe and promoted the notion 
of “pan-European peace and an era of prosperity” (Dimmock, 2005; p.21). 
Erasmus urged Europeans to aim for the conversion of Turks by demonstrating the 
exemplary morality of Christianity (Francisco, 2007; p.50). Following the first 
Siege of Vienna by the Ottomans, Erasmus condoned a defensive war against the 
Turks as long as it was led by secular officials in the right spirit, as he was troubled 
with the negative stereotyping of the Turks by the ignorant, who forgot that Turks 
were human beings too (Francisco, 2007; p.50). As Dimmock (2005) suggests the 
main concern for Erasmus was not the Ottoman military threat, but rather using 
Turks as a means to underscore Christendom’s “inertia and religious decay” (p.21). 
Even though Erasmus was determined to expose the religious corruption among 
the Christians, Turks were still the biggest enemy that Europe had to face. The 
Ottoman military aggression and the Islamic expansion were unstoppable. Ottoman 
Turks were perceived as the ‘present terror of the world.’  
 
The Present Terror of the World 
In his book, Islam and the West, Bernard Lewis (1994) suggests that one of 
the predominant recurring themes in a variety of Western literature about Turks is 
“the deep and ever present fear of the Turks as an intruder and a menace to 
Christendom” (p.79). The anxiety and the fear Europeans felt towards the Turks is 
best reflected in the phrase “the present terror of the world” which was coined by 
British historian Richard Knolles in his seminal book, The Generall Historie of the 
Turkes (1603). On the first page of his book, Knolles indicates the European 
anxiety and admiration towards the Turks as follows: 
84 
 
THE glorious Empire of the Turkes, the present terrour of the world, hath amongst other 
things nothing in it more wonderfull or strange, than the poore beginning of itselfe; so 
small and obscure, as that it is not well knowne unto themselves, or agreed upon even 
among the best writers of their histories, from whence this barbarous nation that now so 
triumpheth over the best part of the world [author’s capitals]33 
 
Knolles also writes about the reign of each Ottoman Sultan and illustrates their 
cruelty, while describing the atrocities Turkish armies commit during the attacks 
on European cities. For example, during Sultan Suleiman’s attack on Vienna, 
Knolles depicts the assault by the Turkish soldiers as follows:  
 
The poore people not knowing where to hide themselves from the furie of their enemies, 
nor of whom to crave helpe, fled as men and women dismaied, carrying with them their 
beloved children, the unfortunat pledges of their love, and what else they could, as things 
saved out of the middest of the fire. For whatsoever fell into the enemies hand, was lost 
without recure: the old men were slaine, the young men led away into captivitie, women 
ravished before their husbands faces, and afterwards slaine with their children, young 
infants were ript out of their mothers wombs, and others taken from their breasts were cut 
in pieces, or else thrust upon sharpe stakes, yeelding up againe that breath which they had 
but a little before received; with many other incredible cruelties, which were then by the 
mercilesse enemie committed [author’s spelling].34     
 
Richard Knolles’ book was the first British chronicle written about the 
history, military and political organization of the Ottoman Empire. Although 
Knolles never visited the Ottoman Empire, he wrote about Turks by relying 
extensively on the literature of travel, mission, diplomacy, and scholarship 
available by the previous authors (Lewis, 1994). Many contemporary scholars 
consider Generall Historie of Turkes as a Christian historiography that reflects the 
perceptions and concerns of Christian Europe with regards to Ottoman Empire and 
the Islamic religion (Lewis, 1994; Senlen, 2005). The British historian Edward 
Gibbon made a similar criticism and described the book as “a partial and verbose 
compilation from Latin writers” (cited in Chew, 1937; p.112). However, the book 
became very popular and influential at the time, because it was published in 
English instead of Latin, which made it available not only to the sophisticated 
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reader but also to the general reading public (Senlen, 2005). During the 17
th
 
century, Knolles’ book had a great impact on the Europeans and provided them 
with a source of knowledge about the life, religion, military and government of the 
Ottoman Turks. The book also inspired dramatists to write about the Ottoman 
Sultans and motivated them to use embellished characteristics and imagery while 
portraying the Turks. 
 
The historical texts, treatises, and essays reviewed so far show that 
Europeans had mixed feelings towards the Ottoman Turks during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries. They admired and envied the success of the Ottoman administration, 
organization and the military discipline as well as the bravery and fortitude of the 
Turkish soldier. On the other hand, Turks were characterized as cruel, violent, 
murderous, and merciless, which is a continuation of the stereotypical Turkish 
image that was dominant in the preceding Western discourse. The stereotype of 
Turks as ‘cruel’ is also manifested in the literary texts of the period under study. 
During the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, many European playwrights, poets and novelists 
were inspired by the military success of the Ottoman Empire and incorporated the 
Turks in their writings. Although there is an ample amount of literary texts and a 
variety of genres produced during this period, my research will be merely limited 
to the English drama only due to the time constraint and the massive amount of 
literature. Another reason for this limitation is that English drama was very popular 
during the period under study, when the English theater stage became a place for 
the writers, inspired by current events, to show their artistic creativity to the public. 
Furthermore, the popularity of the English drama continued following the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 centuries, due to the global dominance of the British Empire with colonialism. 
Even in the 21
st
 century, Early Modern English plays are still highly regarded as 
classic pieces and taught at schools. Therefore, in the second half of the chapter, I 
will examine the representations of the Turks in a selected number of English plays 
written during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. 
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The Image of Turks in English Drama  
 
Background 
The Ottoman attack on Vienna in 1529 shocked the Europeans, who 
realized that no army could slow down Sultan Suleiman’s progress. Although the 
Ottoman Turks failed to capture Vienna, Europe’s fear of the Turkish peril was 
reinforced by the power of the Ottoman military. Under the leadership of Sultan 
Suleiman, the Ottoman Empire became an important factor in the affairs of the 
West during the 16
th
 century, not only militarily but also politically. By 1600, all 
the leading states of Christian Europe, such as Spain, France, Italy and Germany, 
were forced to consider Ottomans as a military, commercial and a diplomatic force 
(Woodhead, 1987; Matar, 1998). English interest in Turks and Turkish matters 
developed later than for its European counterparts and became significant only 
during the closing decades of the 16
th
 century. This delay was mainly because 
England had been beyond the periphery of the Turkish menace geographically and 
besides, it had no share in the Mediterranean trade (Burian, 1952; Matar, 1998). As 
a Protestant nation isolated from a predominantly Catholic Europe, England would 
welcome any ally to support its own position within a hostile Christian world, 
especially after Elizabeth’s excommunication by the Pope in 1570 (Schmuck, 
2006). For those reasons, Queen Elizabeth fostered amicable relations with the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as with the kingdom of Morocco, despite the conflict 
between Christians and Muslims. She became the first English monarch to 
cooperate openly with Muslims, allowing her subjects to trade and interact with 
them without any prosecution for dealing with ‘infidels’ (Matar, 1999).  
 
The Anglo-Ottoman trade, sponsored by Queen Elizabeth, flourished 
during the last decades of the 16
th
 century (Matar, 1999; MacLean, 2007). Recent 
research shows that English people interacted extensively with Muslims of both the 
Ottoman Empire and the kingdom of Morocco during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries 
(See Matar, 1998 & 1999; MacLean, 2007). As a result, most English plays written 
between 1580s until 1650s involved both Turks and Moors. Matar (1999) suggests 
that for English people, “the Turks and Moors were men and women they had 
known, not in fantasy and fiction, but with whom they had worked and lived, 
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sometimes hating them yet sometimes accepting and admiring them” (p.6). 
However, they were also perceived as the Muslim ‘Other’ and viewed as a threat to 
Europe. Hence, the characterization of Turks and Moors in most English plays 
during the period under study reflected the fear, anxiety, and disdain towards 
Muslims, rather than the actual relationships English people had with these people. 
Most of the Turkish and Moorish depictions in English drama echoed the violence 
and cruelty of Muslims described by the age-old anti-Islamic tales in the West. In 
the literary representations, there was no clear distinction between Moors and 
Turks except for their ethnicity (Barbour, 2003; Schmuck, 2006; Vitkus, 1997). 
Although, the words ‘Moor’ and ‘Turk’ represented the people of Morocco and 
Ottoman Empire respectively, they were rather used to signify a generalized 
Islamic “Other” (Vitkus, 1997). Therefore, the Western stereotype of ‘evil Muslim’ 
continued to exist in the form of Turkish or Moorish characters during the Early 
Modern English drama.  
 
Matar (1999) sheds light on how English writers sustained the Western 
stereotype of the ‘evil Muslim’ and thus, maintained the early modern image of the 
Islamic ‘Other’.  
 
They established in their popular and widely read works the stereotype of the Muslim – a 
stereotype that was presented and re-presented in numerous plays and pageants, and that 
gained wider appeal and permanence . . . The ‘Turk’ was cruel and tyrannical, deviant and 
deceiving; the ‘Moor’ was sexually overdriven and emotionally uncontrollable, vengeful, 
and religiously superstitious. The Muslim was all that an Englishman and a Christian was 
not: he was the Other with whom there could only be holy war (Matar, 1999; p.13). 
 
Based on Matar’s remarks, in English drama, the ‘Turk’ represents cruelty, 
tyranny, deviance, corruption and immorality which are qualities associated with 
Turks only rather than all Muslims. In most plays, the Turkish portrayals are 
reminiscent of the Ottoman military aggression that terrified Europe. Turks are 
frequently depicted as the villains whose characteristics match the stereotype of the 
‘terrible Turk.’ To clarify how the image of ‘terrible Turk’ is distinguished in 
English drama compared to the portrayals of Moors, I will examine the portrayals 
of Turks in a selected number of popular English plays during the period under 
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study. These plays were chosen based on their distinct Turkish portraits that show 
stereotypical characteristics frequently attributed to Turks. 
 
The ‘Turk’ in Early Modern English Drama 
Jonathan Burton (2005) notes that between 1579 and 1624 over sixty 
dramatic works featured Islamic themes, characters, or settings in English literature 
(p.28). The theatrical representations of Turks and Moors became predominant on 
the theater stage when the Ottoman Empire was expanding rapidly and when 
Islamic power was posing a sustained threat to Christian Europe (Vitkus, 2000). 
However, Turkish characters as the ‘bogeymen’ or ‘villains’ became more popular 
in theater because of the looming Ottoman military threat. For English people, the 
Ottoman military advance into Europe was the biggest difference between Turks 
and other Islamic cultures. There was an obsession about the Ottoman Turks and a 
greater curiosity about the invincible Ottoman state, mainly because of fear 
(Woodhead, 1987). As Vitkus (2000) aptly puts it, “For London theatergoers, the 
Turk was not an imaginary bogey, and the Turk plays . . . are not simply fantasies 
about fictional demons lurking at the edges of the civilized world” (p.3). Surely, 
the Turks in English drama during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 were not only fictional villains, 
but rather symbolized a genuine threat for Christian Europe and represented an 
anxious interest in Islamic power.  
 
Many English playwrights of the same period often wrote about the 
Ottoman might, wealth and aggression while depicting Turks as murderous, 
treacherous and cruel. For example, Shakespeare’s Othello (1604) draws on 
anxieties about Ottoman Turks, and the play is set in a world that is inhabited by 
‘Turks’ who loom in the distance as an imminent threat waiting to attack the 
Venice’s last outpost, Cyprus (Schmuck, 2006; Vitkus, 1997). Likewise, 
Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine (1588-89) plays rely on “an immovable 
stereotype of the raging and expansionist Turk” (Burton, 2000; p.125). Other 
examples for the Ottoman might, wealth, aggression and cruelty are Battle of 
Alcazar (1588) written by George Peele, Turkish Mahomet and Hyren the Fair 
Greek (1594) attributed to George Peele, The Jew of Malta (1589-90) by 
Christopher Marlowe, Soliman and Perseda (1590) attributed to Thomas Kyd, 
Selimus Emperor of the Turks (1594) attributed to Robert Greene, Mustapha 
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(1608) by Fulke Greville, The Turk (1610) by John Mason, A Christian Turned 
Turk (1612) by Robert Daborne, The Courageous Turk (1618) and The Raging 
Turk (1613-18) by Thomas Goffe, The Renegado (1623-24) by Philip Massinger, 
The Famous Tragedy of Osmond the Great Turk (1657) by Lodowick Carlell, The 
Tragedy of Mustapha, Son of Solymon the Magnificient (1665) by Roger Boyle 
(a.k.a Earl of Orerry), The Siege of Constantinople (1675) by Henry Neville Payne, 
and Ibrahim the Illustrious Bassa (1677) by Elkonah Settle (see Erkan, 2010; 
Senlen, 2006; Vitkus, 2000).  
 
The aforementioned English plays, and many unmentioned others, involve 
Turks either as villains or as a military menace ready to attack Christian lands. In 
his detailed study, Wann (1915) suggests that Turkish characters appear in English 
drama more frequently than any other oriental race and demonstrates that Turks are 
mostly represented as “valiant, proud-spirited, and cruel” (p.440). With his more 
recent research, titled Three Turk Plays (2000) and Turning Turk (2003), Vitkus 
also documents that Turks are often portrayed as immoral, sinful, evil, treacherous, 
lustful and cruel in English plays during the period under study. For example, in 
Massinger’s The Renegado, the Turkish viceroy of Tunis (Tunisia), Asambeg, is 
portrayed as cruel, lustful and tyrannous.
35
 In Mason’s The Turk, the villain named 
Mulleases, who is the agent of the ‘Grand Turk’, is portrayed as proud, cruel, 
lascivious and treacherous. Jowitt (2002) refers to this character as “the dominant 
stage stereotype of the Turk” (p.414). In Shakespeare’s Othello, the ‘Turk’ is 
presented as a conception rather than a specific portrait. When Othello ‘turns Turk’ 
he betrays his love, decries the Christian state of Venice and becomes a 
representative of the Venetian’s greatest foe, “the malignant Turk” (Vitkus, 2000; 
p.2). In these plays, the ‘Turk’ represents all the negative qualities that indicate a 
binary opposition. For example, when Othello turns Turks, he becomes a polar 
opposite of his old himself. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the binary 
opposite of an ideal Christian becomes a Turk, who possesses the ‘unacceptable’ 
virtues vs. the ‘acceptable’ ones.  
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According to Vitkus (2000), English plays “offered numerous descriptions 
of the ‘Great Turk’ and his court”, particularly during the 17th century (p.9). The 
writings about the Ottoman culture and religion, as well as the Ottoman rulers, 
increased dramatically during the same period. Most of the Turkish characters in 
plays were inspired by the Ottoman sultans or rulers, such as governors or pashas, 
who are generally represented as merciless, cruel, tyrannical and lascivious. For 
example, Peele’s Turkish Mahomet and Hyren the Fair Greek is inspired from 
Sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, and his real-life love interest 
Irene. In the play, the Turkish ruler, Mahomet, falls in love with a Greek named 
Hyren, but kills her in order to prove that his duties are more important than his 
love and thus, regains his control over the Janissaries (Senlen, 2006). His slaying 
of Hyren is presented as “a supreme example of Stoic temperance” which helped 
him restrain his passion (Slotkin, 2009; p.226). Likewise, Goffe’s The Courageous 
Turk dramatizes the life and death of the Ottoman Sultan Murad I. In the play, 
Amurath is deceived into a murderous rage, beheads his true love, Eumorphe, and 
embarks on a military campaign (Slotkin, 2009). Amurath’s love for Eumorphe is 
described as “intemperate lust” whereas, his beheading of his love is characterized 
as a “supreme example of temperate behavior” and “manly government” (Slotkin, 
2009; p.229). In both plays, the Turkish sultans struggle with their passion for 
amorous lust, murder and war. While the Turk is often characterized 
stereotypically as cruel, murderous, tyrannical and lustful in English drama, his 
‘cruelty’ emerges as the most distinctive attribute. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, the image of Turks as ‘barbarians’ was predominant in Renaissance 
humanist rhetoric. With the inspiration of prior Crusade propaganda rhetoric and 
exaggerated war stories, Turks continued to be described as the evil Muslim, 
enemy of Christianity, bloodthirsty savages, murderers and deviants. All of these 
attributes morphed into the stereotype of the ‘terrible Turk.’ In Early Modern 
English drama, following the ages of Crusades and Renaissance, the ‘cruelty’ of 
the Turks seems to be their most significant feature. In other words, the 
representation of the ‘cruel Turk’ in Early Modern English drama encapsulates all 
the qualities of the ‘terrible Turk’ image that was predominant in the preceding 
European discourse. Both terms began to be used interchangeably after the Early 
Modern period.  
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The Cruel Turk 
Patrides (1963) suggests that the most frequent stereotype of the Islamic 
‘Other’ found in European writings is the “bloody and cruel Turk” (p.130). 
Congruently, in Early Modern English drama, the utmost stereotypical feature of 
the Turk appears to be his ‘cruelty’, as most of the plays involve Turkish characters 
who are violent, with intense rage and passion for killing. For example, Amurath in 
Goffe’s The Courageous Turk is represented as a passionate warrior who takes 
pleasure in killing. During the military campaign, Amurath’s sadistic violence is 
displayed with his repeated desire to drink Christian blood (Slotkin, 2009). When 
he is offered the severed heads of Christians, Amurath responds:  
 
O how it glads me thus to pash their braines, 
To rend their lockes, to teare these Infidels! (3.2.23-4)
36
 
 
Slotkin (2009) refers to Amurath, the ‘Turk’ as “the stock character of English 
drama” (p.233). Moreover, the play represents the stereotype of the Turk not only 
as an “inhuman figure”, but also an actual “cultural ideal” that even human Turkish 
characters aspire to (p.233). The Turkish aspiration to be like Amurath indicates 
that Turks’ desire for ‘cruelty’ is in their nature.  
 
 In Marlowe’s Tamburlaine the Great (Part I and II) plays, an English 
audience witnessed for the first time an Ottoman Sultan being portrayed on the 
public stage. Both plays are very significant as they exemplify the ‘cruel Turk’ or 
the ‘raging Turk’ as the Islamic ‘Other’. The story is loosely based on the historical 
events of Ottoman Sultan Beyazid’s capture by the Mongol leader, Tamerlane 
(a.k.a Timur ‘the lame’). In the play, the emperor of the Turks, Bajazeth, is 
disparaged and ridiculed by Tamburlaine while being kept in a cage. Enduring too 
much humiliation, Bajazeth finally commits suicide by hitting his head on the 
metal bars of the cage. He is represented as a ‘raging and expansionist Turk’, 
although his character appears to be more multidimensional later in the play 
(Burton, 2000; McJannet, 2006). According to Burton (2000), “Sultan Bajazeth 
enters the play as an ardent confirmation of Europe’s anti-Turkish, anti-Islamic 
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fears and stereotypes” (p.141). In his first speech, with a bombastic tone, Bajazeth 
reminds Tamburlaine and others of his great power and of the ‘invincible’ Ottoman 
army. He boasts: 
 
You know our army is invincible: 
As many circumcised Turks we have, 
And warlike bands of Christians renied, 
As hath the ocean or the Terrene sea 
Small drops of water, when the moon begins 
To join in one her semi-circled horns (I:3.1.7-12)
37
 
 
Bajazeth’s reference, “small drops of water when the moon begins,” is interpreted 
as an army as numerous as the drops of ocean water at high tide and “semi-circled 
horns” represent the crescent of Islam. Both symbolic descriptions confirm the 
European fears of Ottoman military and Islam. In Part I of the play, unhistorically, 
Tamburlaine remains as the protector of Christendom, while Bajazeth is 
characterized, in contrast, as the Turkish Antichrist (Burton, 2000). Although 
Tamerlane in real life is also Muslim and defines himself as the ‘sword of Islam’, 
in the play, Tamburlaine’s victory against the Ottoman army and his humiliation of 
the Ottoman sultan exhibit a projection of European aspiration at the time. 
Marlowe’s portrayal of Tamburlaine appears to be more compassionate and 
humane than Bajazeth. Marlowe indicates this difference when Tamburlaine talks 
about defeating the Turks and freeing the Christian slaves.  
 
I that am termed the scourge and wrath of God, 
The only fear and terror of the world, 
Will first subdue the Turk and then enlarge 
Those Christian captives which you keep as slaves (I:3.3.46-58)
38
  
 
Chew (1937) argues that European prejudice against the Turks led Marlowe to 
portray the Sultan as “insolently boastful” before the battle and “impotently 
raging” when a prisoner (p.472). By showing Tamburlaine battling the ‘raging 
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Turk’, both Tamburlaine plays illustrate the fascination and anxiety the European 
Christians felt about the Ottoman Turks. In both Tamburlaine Part I and Part II, 
Bajazeth is characterized as the ‘villain’, even against Tamburlaine who is also 
Muslim. When the portrayals of these two Muslim warriors are compared, 
Bajazeth’s ‘cruelty’ is clearly emphasized for the audience, whereas Tamburlaine 
is depicted more sympathetic. Even though European Christians perceive both of 
these leaders as the ‘evil’ Muslim at the time, the Ottoman Sultan’s ‘cruelty’ 
surpasses his image as an Islamic ‘Other’ in Marlowe’s play. Based on Bajazeth’s 
portrayal, one may argue that the ‘cruelty’ of the Turks appears more terrifying for 
Europeans than the fear of being ruled by Islam. Therefore, it confirms that the 
image of the ‘cruel Turk’ is more intimidating in the minds of Europeans than the 
alterity of Muslims. 
 
Imperial Fratricide 
In some plays, Turkish cruelty is presented in the form of fratricide, when 
Ottoman sultans kill their brothers for the purpose of taking over the throne. For 
example, Greene’s Selimus, Emperor of the Turks, which is inspired by the life of 
Sultan Selim I, depicts the extreme cruelty of Turks as Selimus kills his family 
members. The play narrates the events during Selim’s accession to the Ottoman 
throne, although its historical accuracy is disputed. In the play, Selimus poisons his 
own father Bajezet and murders his two older brothers, Acomat and Corcut, in 
order to become the ruler of the Ottoman Empire. The portrayal of Selimus is an 
extremely sensationalized version of the actual sultan. According to Vitkus (2000), 
Selimus is depicted as “a monster and a caricature, a prodigy of egotism without 
compassion” (p.19). He calls the play “a study in monomaniacal cruelty, revealing 
a merciless Machiavel at work” (p.19). Hadfield (2003) describes the portrayal of 
Selimus as “proud, ambitious and ruthless in his pursuit of power and personal 
gain” (p.11). In the play, Selimus never hesitates to commit fratricide, massacre, 
and even parricide, to achieve his goal of accession to the Ottoman throne. His 
portrayal is reminiscent of Sultan Selim’s actual reputation as ‘Selim the Grim.’  
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, historically, Sultan Selim killed his 
own brothers, as well as his nephews, to gain the throne, but he was not 
responsible for his father’s death. Like the other Ottoman sultans before him, 
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Selim also followed the code of fratricide in order to acquire the sovereignty. 
Imperial fratricide in the Ottoman dynasty started when Sultan Murad I was killed 
during the battle of Kossovo in 1389. His eldest son Beyazid I was instantly 
declared as his successor on the battlefield, as the Turks needed a leader for the 
ongoing war. However, due to the ambiguity over his succession, Beyazid was 
pressured to kill his younger brother. Thus, Beyazid initiated the practice of 
‘imperial fratricide’ which became a permanent procedure in the history of the 
Ottoman dynasty (Kinross, 1979). Kinross (1979) sheds light on the 
implementation of this inflexible imperial practice within the Ottoman Empire:   
 
From now onward, at the outset of each reign, they were to follow this inflexible practice, 
thus safeguarding in their own inhuman fashion the principles of their indivisible 
sovereignty – and thus indeed helping to ensure through the centuries the unbroken 
survival of their dynasty (Kinross, 1979; p.61). 
 
In his book, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, Daniel Goffman 
(2002) observes a vital distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the other 
European monarchies and links the long-term success of the Ottoman domination 
to the practice of imperial fratricide: 
  
In the Ottoman case, no favorite legally existed until the succession actually occurred. In 
other words, all sons were groomed for the throne; all sons were expected to be capable to 
assume it even though only one would do so. The Ottoman choice to retain this particular 
element from their central Asian past while throwing off so many others was another 
example of genius (or luck), for by so doing the dynasty considerably improved its 
chances for an extended line of competent rulers (Goffman, 2002; p.38).  
 
Turkish sultans were known in the West as great warriors and conquerors, 
but they were also famous for killing the other members of their nuclear family and 
for executing their trusted advisors (Vitkus, 2000). For that reason, many of the 
Early Modern plays depict the Ottoman sultan and his court as cruel, murderous, 
and irrational. Vitkus (2000) explains how Ottoman fratricide helped the European 
Christians bolster the image of the ‘cruel Turk’ and thus, continue to promote the 
anti-Islamic polemic. 
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the actions of the Turkish royal family gave the anti-Islamic polemicists of Western 
Europe plenty of material to confirm their preconceived notions of oriental despotism. The 
Great Turk became a European bogey partly on the strength of a dynastic track record of 
executions, poisonings, strangulations, and general familicide (Vitkus, 2000; p.21).  
 
It is critical to emphasize here that ‘fratricide’ or any form of ‘familicide’ are by no 
means acceptable practices. However, it was a common practice in the Ottoman 
Empire and was viewed as acceptable within the Ottoman monarchial traditions. 
For the Ottoman Turks, ‘the law of fratricide’ sustained a robust monarchy and 
maintained a powerful Empire without interruptions due to the succession of the 
most powerful heir. However, for the Europeans it was yet another deplorable 
characteristic that defined the Turks as ‘inhuman’ and ‘evil.’ The descriptions of 
fratricide in English drama reinforce the alterity of the Turks, which is implicit in 
binary opposites such as good/evil and human/inhuman.  
 
Turning Turk 
During the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, many English plays involve Christian 
characters who convert to Islam, which is commonly known as “turning Turk”. 
The most popular ones are Shakespeare’s Othello, the Moor of Venice, Robert 
Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk, and Philip Massinger’s The Renegado. 
Among these plays, Othello is noteworthy, because although the main character is 
a Moor who is a general in the Venetian army, literary critics frequently related 
him to ‘Turks’. In the play, although no Ottoman characters take the stage, the 
Turks are defined as a looming threat that is about to attack Cyprus, but the 
Turkish invasion is averted for the time being. However, the plot continues to 
display Turkish aggression, which is exemplified by the behaviors of the Christian 
soldiers. When Othello's lieutenant Cassio starts a fight, Othello asks: 
 
Are we turn’d Turks, and to ourselves do that  
Which heaven has forbid the Ottomites?  
For Christian shame put by this barbarous brawl!” (2.3.158–60)39 
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Othello implies that Christian soldiers act like Turks because their fight is 
‘barbarous.’ These behaviors are deemed unacceptable and can only be expected 
from Turks. Regarding the aforementioned scene, Bergeron (2010) describes the 
state of ‘turning Turk’ as “a nightmare envisioned by Christians, a mark of 
contemptible behavior” (p.267). Vitkus (1997) views this particular scene as the 
conversion of Christian order into Islamic violence. According to Vitkus (2000), 
‘turning Turk’ epitomizes in general “the incorporation of the Turks’ stereotypical 
features” such as “aggression, lust, suspicion, murderous conspiracy, sudden 
cruelty masquerading as justice, merciless violence rather than ‘Christian charity’, 
wrathful vengeance instead of turning the other cheek” (p.2). Othello grows jeal-
ous, vengeful, and cruel under the influence of Iago, the antagonist, and was taken 
over by his passions (Slotkin, 2009). When Othello betrays his state and murders 
his love, Desdemona, he ‘turns Turk’. Barbarous action now characterizes Othello, 
changing him, at least metaphorically, from Christian to Turk (Bergaron, 2010). In 
other words, he is converted into the European stereotype of “malignant Turk” 
(Vitkus, 2000). Othello stabs himself as “a final effort to punish himself for his 
reversion to such an identity” (Vitkus, 2000; p.2). 
 
And say besides that in Aleppo once, 
Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk 
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, 
I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog 
And smote him thus [He stabs himself] (5.2.348-52)
40
 
 
Othello’s conversion reflects the anxiety of European Christians, 
particularly of English people, in the face of Ottoman Turks’ ability to convert 
Christians to Islam. For Christians, ‘turning Turk’ means “yielding to all of the 
depravity associated with Islam” (Burton, 2005; p.97). MacLean (2007) claims that 
“‘Turk’ referred to any Muslim but . . . the word could also be pejoratively applied 
to anyone who portrayed contradictory or violent or tyrannically patriarchal 
characteristics” and suggests that Shakespeare’s use of the term in Othello is an 
illuminating example (p.8). For English Protestants, however, it was not only about 
the fear of being converted to Islam, but also about being placed in a state of 
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damnation by the Turks. Given the example of Shakespeare’s Othello, Vitkus 
(2003) explains the fear of English Protestants about religious conversion during 
the early 17
th
 century England: 
  
The tragedy of Othello is a drama of conversion, in particular a conversion to certain forms 
of faithlessness deeply feared by Shakespeare’s audience. . . . the English also had reason 
to feel trepidation about the imperial power of the Ottoman Turks, who were conquering 
and colonizing Christian territories in Europe and the Mediterranean. English Protestant 
texts, both popular and learned, conflated the political/external and the demonic/internal 
enemies, associating both the Pope and the Ottoman sultan with Satan or the Antichrist. 
According to Protestant ideology, the Devil, the Pope, and the Turk all desired to ‘convert’ 
good Protestant souls to a state of damnation (Vitkus, 2003; p.77). 
 
Daborne’s play, A Christian Turned Turk, focuses on becoming an actual 
‘Turk’ and reveals the anxiety about the act of ‘turning Turk.’ The story is inspired 
by a real-life pirate named John Ward who becomes a Turk by converting to Islam 
and marrying a Turkish woman. While the play exposes the fear about pirates 
during that period, it also highlights the Christian unease about those who ‘turn 
Turk’ (Bergeron, 2010). At the time, Turkish pirates were interfering with the 
international trade in Mediterranean where the Ottoman Empire was asserting itself 
militarily and economically. Due to the temptation of lucrative employment, 
Christian sailors joined the Barbary Corsairs, which was a group of pirates or 
privateers that worked for the Ottoman Turks along the ports of Tunis, Tripoli and 
Algiers, also known as the Barbary Coast. Vitkus (1997) explains what it meant for 
the European Christians to ‘turn Turk’ and become Muslim pirates: 
 
Again we see that “Turks” are not necessarily from Turkey proper – anyone who “turns 
Turk” and joins the Muslim pirates is associated with a group that is imagined as radically 
heterogeneous and, at the same time, united in evil (Vitkus, 1997; p.165). 
 
When Ward ‘turns Turk’, he adopts many of the stereotypical features of Turks 
such as, tyranny, cruelty, wealth, luxury, oriental despotism, sensual and sexual 
vices (Vitkus, 2000).  Moreover, the religious conversion ceremony is staged in the 
play as an anti-Islamic fantasy and a scare tactic to discourage potential converts, 
rather than an accurate depiction of a religious ritual (Vitkus, 2000). In order to 
marginalize and stigmatize the Turks, the act of ‘turning Turk’ along with the 
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circumcision ceremony were often sensationalized in English drama, particularly 
during the 17
th
 century. The playwrights overdramatized the scenes of conversion 
either due to their own fear or for the purpose of intimidation tactics, as ‘turning 
Turk’ was a cultural paranoia for European Christians. For Christians, ‘turning 
Turk’ not only signified becoming a wicked Muslim, but also represented 
becoming a Turk, who embodies the worst qualities that a person can have. 
Therefore, the ‘Turk’ epitomizes the ultimate polar opposite of a good Christian.    
 
Turkish ‘Otherness’ and Orientalism in English Drama 
As Barbour (2003) aptly observes “the Turk was England’s primary eastern 
object of fear and fantasy” during the Early Modern period (p.15). The production 
of English literary texts relating to Turks and the Ottoman Empire reached its 
highest point during the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries (Dimmock, 2005). The 
religious division within Christianity and the Ottoman incursions into Europe, as 
well as the rapid establishment of the printing press, galvanized the Western 
writers to produce a vast amount of material. English playwrights used the ‘Turk’ 
to incite the audience about the current political events, international relations, 
England’s enemies, and also to demonstrate the imminent threat posed by the 
Ottoman Turks, who continue to advance into Europe, conquering, capturing and 
converting. Although the representations of Turks in English writings were mostly 
demeaning, and stereotypical, there was also a sentiment of admiration and envy 
for Turkish power and supremacy. Vitkus (2003) suggests that ‘Turk’ represented 
“a disturbingly illusive and unstable identity”, which “could produce anxiety as 
well as admiration” (p.16). Dimmock (2005) claims: “the portrayal of the ‘Turk’ 
on the stage had achieved an articulacy and a variety that would perhaps be 
repeated, but would not be superseded” (p.6). He also argues that the construct of 
the ‘Turk’ occupied a whole range of associations that fundamentally question 
critical assumptions of a single defining notion of ‘otherness’ (as cited in 
MacLean, 2007; p.7). Schmuck (2006) claims that the term ‘Turk’, during the 16th 
and 17
th
 centuries, was perceived as a template that did not only refer to an ethnic 
identity, but also to a set of specific characteristics alike. In most plays, the ‘Turk’ 
is depicted as a conflicted and unreliable character whom European Christians 
would not and should not aspire to. Despite its fluidity, ambiguity and inconstancy, 
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the concept of Turk was a “powerful ideological construct” (Schmuck, 2006; p.5) 
in Early Modern English drama. 
 
In recent years, scholars such as Nabil Matar, Ricmond Barbour, Daniel 
Vitkus, and Jonathan Burton have frequently examined the alterity of Turks in 
Early Modern English drama. Among these studies, the significance of Nabil 
Matar’s two books, Islam in Britain and Turks, Moors and Englishmen, can hardly 
be overestimated. Matar’s pioneering research examines the nature and range of 
early modern English attitudes towards Islam and the Ottoman Empire by 
surveying the accounts of travel writers, historians, theologians, playwrights and 
poets, as well as the archival documents. As MacLean (2007) emphasizes, Matar’s 
research goes far beyond “the mere cataloguing and summarizing of literary texts”, 
as he has looked into the actual Anglo-Muslim relations and encounters in the 
multicultural Mediterranean. Matar (1999) has found out that in the actual 
interaction between Muslims and English people, “there were social engagements 
marked by ambivalence and reciprocity, attraction and repulsion, but there was no 
violence” (p.40). For English people, “Mediterranean and Islamic alterity 
comprised many divergent identities, and these were defined by an overlapping set 
of identity categories, including race, religion, somatic difference, sexuality and 
political affiliation” (Vitkus, 2003; p.8). However, the literary representations of 
Muslims in general, and Turks in particular, often appear as negative, stereotypical, 
and demonizing. Besides being a “fluid, illusive, conflicted and unstable” character 
in English drama, the ‘Turk’ was always someone that the Christians should not 
be, or simply, the ‘binary opposite’. If English people behaved in ways deemed 
inappropriate, they could be called a ‘Turk’. Particularly, someone who betrayed 
certain qualities, behaving unreliable or arrogantly proud deserved to be called 
‘Turk’ (MacLean, 2007). McJannet (2006) cites the negative descriptions that are 
associated with the Ottoman Turks in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries: 
 
Pejorative epithets associated with the Ottomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
included “bloody,” “cruel,” and “barbarous.” Turks were compared to forces of nature 
(whirlwinds or floods) or beasts (wolves, vipers, boars) and depicted in bestial terms such 
as “unbridled” or “swarming.” Their rule was described as “tyranny” or a “yoke” 
(McJannet, 2006; p.16). 
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Chronologically, although the Early Modern dramatic representations of 
Turks appear before 18
th
 century European colonialism, they can still be 
considered Orientalist. As has been indicated, the main themes of these 
representations are backwardness, barbaric cruelty, licentious eroticism, despotism 
and treachery, which epitomize the Oriental ‘Otherness’ in Edward Said’s thesis of 
Orientalism. According to Said (1978), the preconceived distinction between East 
and West has been created based on a binary opposition that creates an ultimate 
‘Other.’ In his book, Orientalism, he refers to these opposites as the ‘Orient’ and 
the ‘Occident.’ Said (1978) claims: “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the 
West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (p.1). He also 
describes the Orientalist stereotypical characteristics about the East and the Eastern 
people as follows: 
 
one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the distillation 
of essential ideas about the Orient – its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant 
mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness – into a separate and unchallenged 
coherence; thus for a writer to use the word Oriental was a reference for the reader 
sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient (Said, 1978; p.205). 
 
In the paragraph above, as much as Said refers to 19
th
 century Orientalism which 
he views as a “deliberate discourse” to justify Western colonialism, he also argues 
that the distinction between East and West go back as early as the Middle Ages. 
Said (1978) suggests: “the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient, became known 
in the West as its great complementary opposite since antiquity” (p.58). According 
to Said, Muslims were frequently defined as the contrasting image of the European 
Christian in Western writings since the Middle Ages. Citing Norman Daniel’s 
work, Islam and the West, Said notes that Muslims and Islam came to represent a 
certain image for the Christian Europe during the Middle Ages and Renaissance: 
 
The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient. Islam became an image . . .  
whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the 
medieval Christian. . . . This rigorous Christian picture of Islam was intensified in 
innumerable ways, including – during Middle Ages and early Renaissance –a large variety 
of poetry, learned controversy, and popular superstition (Said, 1978; p.60-61).  
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Briefly, Said (1978) suggests that Orientalism is a trans-historical discourse, 
promoted by the Western writings, which represents Muslims as the ‘Other’ and 
constructs an imagined ‘Orient’. 
 
However, some critics have challenged Said’s premise of a broad and 
persistent cultural binary that is trans-historical. They have disputed Said’s 
application of Orientalism to the encounters between Christian Europeans and 
Muslims during the Early Modern period. For example, in Turning Turk, Vitkus 
(2003) argues that Said’s analysis cannot be applied to the discourses of the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, as it would be a “fallacy of back formation” 
(p.11). Vitkus discusses Orientalism’s limitations on going back to antiquity: 
 
The chief limitations of Said’s Orientalism include its theoretical rigidity . . . and its 
attempt to extend the historical limits of orientalism to include two thousand years of 
Western culture, from Homer to the present, arguing that during those two millennia every 
textual and imaginary construction of the nonwestern world to the East was an orientalist 
construction (Vitkus, 2003; p.11). 
 
Vitkus (2003) goes on to suggest that the ‘binary model’ proposed in Orientalism 
fails to take into consideration the mobility, interactivity, and variety of identity 
positions that emerge in texts about cross-cultural encounters in Early Modern 
Europe. Vitkus (2003) claims that Said’s postcolonial theory “must be deployed 
with caution, if at all,” as a theoretical framework to analyze the Early Modern 
representations of Islamic and Mediterranean alterities (p.11). Also, Nabil Matar 
(1998) notes that English writers, in their Early Modern relations with Muslims, 
did not express either the authority of possessiveness or the security of domination 
that is suggested by Edward Said in Orientalism. Regarding Said’s thesis of 
Orientalism, Matar’s remarks are as follows: 
 
Said focused his argument on the post Napoleonic experience of Europe, and he did not 
touch on the Renaissance encounter between England (nor the rest of Europe) and the 
Muslims: for only after the Ottoman Empire began its military and intellectual decline in 
the eighteenth century did Europeans proceed to draw, paint, poeticize and imagine the 
Muslims the way they liked. Only then did the lands of Islam become material for 
orientalist “construction” and for continental and British colonization (Matar, 1998; p.11). 
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Matar (1998) also argues that Britain did not enjoy military or industrial 
power over Islamic countries during the period under study. Instead, it was the 
Ottoman Empire that had the “positional superiority” Said deems essential for 
Orientalism (see Said, 1978; p.7). He continues as follows: 
 
it was not England but the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that 
was pushing into Europe, conquering Rhodes and Crete, attacking Spanish, French, Dutch, 
English, and Scottish trading fleets, landing upon our coasts, impoverishing that part of the 
kingdom near the Channel and enslaving thousands of men and women, many of whom 
converted to Islam. Muslims did not see themselves in a subservient position to 
Christendom, let alone to England (Matar, 1998; p.12).  
 
According to Matar (1998) the binary opposition of ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’ 
cannot be maintained for the English encounters with Turks. While the Spanish, 
Portuguese, English and Dutch ships began exploring and colonizing the foreign 
lands in the New World, Ottoman Turks were rapidly conquering the European 
territories. By the beginning of the 17
th
 century, Europeans were both ‘colonizers’ 
and ‘colonized.’ Therefore, Matar (1998) claims that it would be a mistake to adopt 
the post-colonial discourse of “constructing” Muslims and apply it on Early 
Modern English drama and travelogue (p.12).  
 
Despite their objections about Orientalism’s application to the Early 
Modern period English drama, both Vitkus and Matar acknowledge that the 
representations of Turks in English writings were demeaning and stereotypical. 
Both scholars bring different perspectives for the practice of demonizing Turks in 
English drama. According to Vitkus (2003), ‘fear’ was the main reason for the 
vilification of Turks in writings, because the English people faced the threat of 
being enslaved and converted to Islam by the Turks. He points out: 
 
the English faced the problem of their own people – men, women, and children – being 
captured and enslaved by “Turkish” privateers operating in the Mediterranean and the 
northeastern Atlantic. This crisis led English writers of the early modern period to produce 
demonizing representations of “the Turk,” not from the perspective of cultural domination 
but from the fear of being conquered, captured, and converted (Vitkus, 2003; p.78). 
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Vitkus (2000) also notes that the facts about Turks and Ottoman culture are 
distorted by malicious fantasies fostered by English drama and literature. On the 
other hand, Matar (1998) suggests that it was the ‘allure of Islam’ that motivated 
the English writers to confront it. For most English people, conversion to Islam, or 
‘turning Turk’, represented social and political power. Matar explains this as: 
 
Thousands of European Christians converted to Islam in the Renaissance and the 
seventeenth century, either because their poor social conditions forced them toward such a 
choice, or because they sought to identify with a powerful empire. . . . The Ottoman 
Empire in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries represented a higher civilization than 
Christendom and offered opportunities to numerous Christians who sought employment 
and advancement (Matar, 1998; p.15). 
 
Simply put, the allure of conversion was so great that considerable efforts had to be 
made by the English writers to demonize Turks and those who ‘turn Turk.’ Matar 
(1999) argues that dramatic literature was largely responsible for creating anti-
Islamic and anti-Muslim stereotypes among the English people. He goes on to 
suggest that the alterity of Muslims and Turks was created within literary and 
theological contexts, because in government documents, prisoners’ depositions, 
and commercial exchanges, it is unlikely to find the extent of stereotyping that the 
audience is accustomed to see on the stage. Therefore, “it was plays, masques, 
pageants, and other similar sources” that developed the discourse about ‘Turkish 
Otherness’ in the British culture (Matar, 1999; p.13). As a result, the portrayals like 
Bejazeth of Tamburlaine and Amurath of The Courageous Turk became the 
literary representations of the ‘Turk’ and defined the construct of ‘Turkish 
Otherness’ during the 16th and 17th centuries. 
  
Based on the recent research reviewed so far, I argue that Said’s 
Orientalism can still be applied to the period under study, because the demeaning 
and stereotypical dramatic representations of Turks upholds Said’s literary 
criticism in Orientalism. Concurring with Matar’s (1998) above premise, the 
historical background of the Ottoman Turks in this thesis also shows that the 
Ottoman Empire was one of the imperial powers, especially between the 15
th
 and 
17
th
 centuries. Therefore, English people lacked the ‘positional superiority’ against 
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the Ottoman Turks and their lands were out of British colonial reach during this 
time period. Although Europeans embarked on colonizing American and Asian 
lands, the Ottoman Empire was the dominating military force both in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, and therefore it was not likely for the Europeans 
to invade and colonize the Ottoman territories. Hence, they began marginalizing, 
demonizing and stigmatizing the Turks to obscure the European weakness and 
vulnerability against the Ottoman Empire. Matar (1999) too acknowledges this by 
stating: “Precisely because Muslims were beyond colonial reach, Britons began to 
demonize, polarize, and alterize them” (p.12). Particularly, due to the religious 
dispute within the European Christians, English people were more vulnerable than 
the rest of Europe as they were isolated being Protestants. Also, by vilifying Turks, 
English writers aimed to create a sense of united European hostility and alienation 
towards the Ottomans. As discussed in Chapter 1, Stuart Hall (1997b) suggests that 
defining the ‘Other’ in binary opposites produces a stereotype which can be 
alienated and excluded easily. In the case of Christian Europeans, defining the 
stereotype of Turk in binary opposites also helped them foster a sense of unity 
against the Turks and reinforce the willpower to eliminate the enemy. 
 
Whether it is the fear of being captured and converted or the allure of 
Islam, or the desire to create a sense of unity, English writers made considerable 
efforts to paint the Turks as malicious, immoral and cruel. Although Europe did 
not have ‘positional superiority’ or ‘authority’ over the Ottoman Empire, European 
writers still tried to contain the Turks, in one way or another, by representing them 
as the cultural and ideological opposites. The Early Modern image of Turks has 
been produced by a ‘style of thought’ which alterized the ‘Turk’ consciously or 
subconsciously. Therefore, the literary representations of Turks can still be 
examined within the context of Orientalism. Said (1978) defines the general 
meaning of Orientalism as a “style of thought” which transcends colonialism or 
any positional superiority. Early Modern English literature represents precisely this 
‘style of thought’ that fits within the premise of Said’s Orientalism. Said explains 
what he means by describing Orientalism as a ‘style of thought.’ 
 
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction 
made between “the Orient” and “the Occident.” Thus a very large number of writers, 
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among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and 
imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the 
starting point of elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political 
accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,” destiny, and so on (Said, 
1978; p.2). 
 
Based on Said’s generalized definition of Orientalism, I argue that English writers 
were driven by the prior religious and humanist discourse, as well as the existing 
circumstances, and acted on their preconceived distinction when characterizing 
Turks in their writings. As a result, Turks were represented in negative terms, 
mostly as binary opposites, and stigmatized as the ‘Other’ in early modern English 
literature. When reading such representations, Said suggests that it is not difficult 
to detect the pre-conceived distinction writers have towards the Orient. He insists 
that it is crucial to look at the social and historical circumstances at the time, as the 
representations do not always reflect the reality: 
 
My analysis of the Orientalist text therefore places emphasis on the evidence, which is by 
no means invisible, for such representations as representations, not as “natural” depictions 
of the Orient. This evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful text 
(histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e.openly 
imaginative) text. The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting narrative 
devices, historical and social circumstances, not the correctness of the representation nor 
its fidelity to some great original [author’s italics and parentheses] (Said, 1978; p.21). 
 
While the characterizations of Muslims and Turks in English literature 
appear to be ‘binary opposites’, they were just representations to contain, control 
and construct the ‘truth’. These representations simplified the multicultural and 
complex world, which they claimed to be portraying, by distortions and 
misconceptions. The demonization of Turks, Muslims and the religion of Islam in 
Early Modern English drama demonstrates Europe’s effort to control the Islamic 
power led by the Ottoman Empire. In particular, English writers used demeaning 
representations to contain the fear, fascination and admiration felt towards the 
Turks, as well as the appeal of ‘turning Turk.’ MacLean (2007) characterizes the 
pre-colonial English attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire as a dominant 
discursive formation caused by “imperial envy” (p.20). He introduces the concept 
of ‘imperial envy’ as follows: 
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During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at least, English writers . . . never 
forgot that they were dealing with an empire that controlled a great deal of Eastern Europe 
and a third of the known world, not a backward, vulnerable and somehow ‘orientalized’ 
space waiting to be conquered and controlled. Where imperial discourses might be 
expected to produce empowered imperial subjects constituting themselves at the expense 
of colonized subalterns, the situation proves to be more complex in the case of English 
views of the Ottomans. Instead of any simple desire for domination, we will find instead a 
restructuring of desire, knowledge and power: imperial envy. 
 
According to MacLean (2007), the English national imagination was greatly 
stimulated and challenged by everything that was known about the Ottomans such 
as their religion and manners, as well as their social and cultural life. MacLean 
(2007) also argues that Early Modern English writers framed an imaginary Anglo-
Ottoman relation that complicates our understanding of both Orientalism and the 
emergent culture of British imperialism (p.20). Therefore, both cultural factors and 
commercial interests influenced the ideas, images and clichés produced by the 
English writers about the religion, culture, society and empire of the Turks, who 
came to be known as ‘cruel Turks.’ As Said (1978) suggests, “the European 
representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling 
the redoubtable Orient” (p.60). I suggest this was the case in English literature 
during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century England.  
  
Said (1978) also views Orientalism as a trans-historical discourse starting 
from the antiquity. Likewise, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
demonization of Turks began even before the 16
th
 century, when Seljuk Turks 
invaded Jerusalem and prompted the First Crusade in the 11
th
 century. European 
Christians stigmatized Turks by characterizing them as barbarians, bloodthirsty 
murderers and infidels who were corrupt, evil and immoral. These negative 
representations originated from the anti-Islamic polemic during the Middle Ages 
and became predominant, particularly after the Ottoman victories during the 
Crusades and the fall of Constantinople to Turks in 1453. Early Modern literary 
representations of Turks were also inherited from the medieval religious polemic, 
Crusade rhetoric, and Renaissance humanist discourse. Based on the literature 
review in this chapter, one may conclude that the image of Turk has a historical 
107 
 
continuity, as the demeaning images about Turks in Early Modern literature are 
similar to those of the preceding anti-Islamic and anti-Turk discourse. Therefore, 
the stereotypical image of Turks as ‘cruel’ remained uniform as Turks were 
frequently represented as such in Early Modern European writings, as well as in 
English drama.  
 
The continuity and uniformity of the European image of Turks indicates 
that the myth of the ‘cruel Turk’ or ‘terrible Turk’ is consistent with Said’s 
assertion of Orientalism being a ‘trans-historical discourse’. Like Orientalism, 
Early Modern English writings about the Turks also benefited from 
‘intertextuality’, which indicates borrowing from and referring to the previous 
literature. Said (1978) notes that the Western writings frequently refer to each other 
and suggests that “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors” 
(p.23). As discussed in this chapter, Europeans did not have the ‘positional 
superiority’ against the Ottoman Empire during the period under study. However, 
European literary representations were still demeaning despite the lack of the 
colonial aspirations towards the Ottoman lands. My discourse analysis indicates 
that the discursive formation about the Turks is still Orientalist despite the absence 
of European ‘positional superiority’ against the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, I 
argue that the European perception of Turks is Orientalist because the image of 
‘terrible Turk’ continues as a ‘style of thought’ during the 16th and 17th century 
Western discourse.   
 
During the 16
th 
and 17
th
 centuries, the notion of ‘Turk’ became central to 
the definition of Europe’s self. Both the internal and external threats to the unity 
and existence of Christendom created the need to define the ‘Turk’ in such terms 
that the image of Turk may either be justifiable or demeaning, depending on the 
political, religious, or ideological allegiance. The alterity of the Turks provided 
European Christians with the means to construct their self-image as opposed to a 
threatening ‘Other’ that had superior military and political power, as well as 
religious unity. The ‘cruel Turk’ encapsulated the threat to European ‘self’ and 
motivated both England and the rest of Europe to strive for more opportunities, 
explore other lands, and become superior. Towards the end of the 17
th
 century, 
European monarchs began capitalizing on their efforts and spreading to other 
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lands. Therefore, the turn of the 18
th
 century marked the beginning of European 
colonialism, domination and supremacy. European colonialism and ethnocentrism 
brought the emergence of Orientalism as a discursive formation. In the next 
chapter, I will examine the image of Turk in the Orientalist discourse and look into 
Western travel accounts in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE WESTERN IMAGE OF TURKS DURING THE 18
TH
 AND 19
TH
 
CENTURIES: ORIENTALIST DISCOURSE 
 
Background 
The signs of weakness within the Ottoman Empire became visible when the 
Turkish fleet was horribly defeated by the Crusading forces in the battle of Lepanto 
in 1571. The Christian victory against the Ottoman Empire brought tremendous joy 
and relief to Europe. Pope Pius V was thrilled with the news of the European 
victory and praised the Crusading forces of the Holy League led by Don Jon: 
“There was a man sent from God, whose name was John” (Kinross, 1979; p.271). 
However, when Ottoman Turks rebuilt their fleet in just six months after Lepanto, 
the Christian allies were discouraged and avoided any confrontation with them. 
The revival of the Ottoman sea power in such a short time precipitated the peace 
treaty in which Venice formally ceded Cyprus. Despite the loss of Cyprus, Lepanto 
remained a Christian victory for Europeans in the moral and psychological sense. 
Kinross (1979) stresses the significance of Europe’s victory against the Ottoman 
Turks as follows: 
 
The Turk, who held Europe in thrall since his capture of Constantinople more than a 
century earlier, was for the first time seen not to be invincible. A legend was exploded, and 
the Christians breathed more freely (Kinross, 1979; p.272). 
 
Lepanto was a turning point in terms of Turkish prestige, but the Ottoman Empire 
still remained powerful with its unsurpassed material resources, unimpaired 
military skills, revived sea power and formidable armed forces (Kinross, 1979). 
Ottoman Turks kept expanding towards East by moving into the Persian territory. 
With the treaty of Constantinople in 1590, the Ottoman Empire seized Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and the northwest of Iran.  
 
However, the beginning of the 17
th
 century signaled the stagnation of the 
strongest Islamic Empire due to decadence, corruption, depriving economic 
resources, increased population, a series of incompetent sultans, intrigues in the 
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imperial harem and Seraglio for the accession of heirs, and most importantly, 
disorder among the Janissaries, the Sultan’s armed forces. The Janissaries began to 
present a serious threat to the Ottoman Empire as they were becoming a burden 
because of their greed and indiscipline (Kinross, 1979). Contrary to their reputation 
as brave and skilled soldiers, they began displaying ineptitude and cowardice in the 
battlefield and failing as the Empire’s armed forces. On the other hand, the same 
Janissaries were developing into a subversive force at home, gaining power within 
the Ottoman government. Meanwhile, the situation in the Ottoman capital looked 
grim as the sultans presiding over the dynasty were incredibly inept. The Ottoman 
Empire was slowly nearing its end “as one inadequate Sultan followed another, 
each at the mercy of his corrupt Seraglio, they came to be a dominant power and a 
focus of sedition” (Kinross, 1979; p.292). In 1622, the Janissaries revolted against 
the Ottoman sultan, Osman II, put him in jail, and executed him in his jail cell the 
next day. Until that moment, imperial fratricide was a common practice, but the 
murder of a sultan in the hands of his soldiery was unprecedented. The magnitude 
of this incident was grave as “the first act of regicide to taint the annals of the 
Ottoman Empire” (Kinross, 1979; p.295). At the time, the British ambassador, Sir 
Thomas Roe, suggested “the precedent of king-killing and its attendant blood bath 
signaled the end of Ottoman hegemony” and referred to the Ottoman Empire as 
“incurably sick” (Birchwood, 2007; p.24). 
 
Following the accession of Sultan Murad IV to the throne in 1623, 
monarchial authority was reinstated. Murad IV was determined to end the revolt of 
the Janissaries. He had all the ringleaders and traitors among the Janissaries 
executed. Sometimes, they were even killed on the streets with a sword or a 
bowstring and their corpses were thrown into the Bosphorus to be washed up on 
the shore for the others to see. He even rode among his subjects in disguise and 
killed suspicious ones with his own hands. Sultan Murad’s brutal actions appear as 
a testament to the image of ‘cruel Turk’ that is frequently portrayed in the 17th 
century English drama as discussed in the preceding chapter. While Murad’s 
cruelties became legendary, his tyrannical actions helped him crush the Janissary 
revolt and bring military anarchy to an end. He also regained the Ottoman 
dominions in the East with military campaigns and killed the incompetent 
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provincial officials. However, his iron rule did not last long, and he died in 1640 
leaving the Ottoman Empire to await its decline.  
 
The regeneration of the Ottoman Empire lapsed once more into disorder, 
decadence and decay. None of the succeeding Sultans could revive the previous 
glory and might of the Ottoman Empire. In 1683, the final Turkish attack on 
Vienna resulted in defeat and marked the beginning of an inevitable descent for the 
Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699 was a turning point in 
the history of the Ottoman Turks as they lost their domains in Central Europe. 
Following that, a series of unsuccessful military engagements and unfavorable 
treaties forced the Ottoman Empire to retreat from its Western domains. Ottoman 
Turks were no longer considered an aggressive, expanding power that the Christian 
Europe had known and feared for almost four centuries. On the Eastern border, the 
Ottoman Turks fought with the Safavids of Persia, as well as Russians, which is 
known as Russo-Turkish Wars that lasted intermittently between 1787-1829. 
Meanwhile, France was advancing into the Ottoman territories in North Africa, 
first invading Egypt and later, Tunisia and Algeria. Furthermore, the Greek War of 
Independence began in 1821. Ottoman Turks not only had to deal with the Western 
colonial powers and Russia, but also control the rising minorities within the 
borders of the Empire.   
 
By the 1820s, the status of the Ottoman Empire became critical as it turned 
into The Eastern Question for the Western colonial powers because “the last 
bastion of oriental power was decrepit, incapable of reforming itself, and near to 
death” (Nash, 2005; p.11). Ottoman weakness prompted international instability 
among expanding imperialist powers. They were not only eager to get their share 
from the Ottoman lands, but also trying to prevent them from falling into the hands 
of rivals due to the stability of their colonies in the East (Quataert, 2005; p.5). 
Europeans were nervous about the end of the Ottoman Empire, as it would result in 
a power vacuum in the Middle East. For that reason, the ramifications of the 
Turkish collapse were only considered from the European point of view. Western 
historians were not concerned about the “Muslim nations who might have had an 
interest in the Ottoman Empire’s continuance as the last powerful standard bearer 
of Islam” (Nash, 2005; p.11). Instead, they became occupied with probing the 
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Ottoman failure, while questioning or criticizing the Oriental lifestyle, culture and, 
even the religion of Islam. For most Western writers and travelers, the Ottomans 
Turks were backward and incapable of progress (Cirakman, 2002; Turhan, 2003). 
As a result, the Western representations of Ottoman Turks were mostly 
condescending, disparaging and demeaning. On the other hand, it was not only 
Ottoman backwardness and weakness alone that generated Western feelings of 
contempt and disparagement. In their texts and representations, Western writers 
also sought to justify the actions of the Western imperialist powers. Turhan (2003) 
suggests that “the Ottoman Empire was an Eastern Other whose Otherness was 
always subject to qualification and change, and easily manipulated by writers for 
their own rhetorical and political purposes” (p.3). Therefore, the irreversible 
decline of the Ottoman dynasty brought about the positional superiority of the 
West, which dominates the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century Orientalist discourse. Kinross 
(1979) points out the inferiority of the Ottoman Empire and underscores the 
‘positional superiority’ of the West: 
 
Definitely there would be no return to the great days of the conquerors. By the European 
statesmen the inferiority of the Ottoman Empire to Europe and increasing dependence 
upon it was henceforward accepted as a political fact. Once and for all, the power of the 
West, with its rising nation-states, had outstripped the power of the East. The gap between 
them was to widen from now onward, not only in military standards, but in the pattern of 
economic and social development which underlay and conditioned them. Internally, the 
Ottoman Empire was, in modern terms, backward; its evolution, in the face of continuing 
decline, remained obstinately slow and indeed at periods deliberately static. Internationally 
its future was thus to be a matter of concern, no longer in military but increasingly in 
diplomatic terms (Kinross, 1979; p.357). 
 
From the beginning of the 18
th
 century until its dismemberment in 1923, the 
Ottoman Empire was no longer considered as a formidable enemy, nor was it 
viewed as a powerful military and political force. The European image of the 
Ottoman Empire as the terror of the world faded and the Ottoman Turks came to 
be known as the sick man of Europe.   
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Turkish Image in Orientalist Discourse  
 
As documented in the previous chapter, European representations of Turks 
during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries were driven by anxiety, terror and fear, mixed 
with the feelings of admiration, curiosity and fascination about the Ottoman 
Empire. However, beginning from the 18
th
 century, the European image of Turks 
seems to invoke a certain contempt or even hatred, because the representations of 
Ottoman Turks are condescending and arrogant as they focus on the themes of 
decline and corruption of the empire (Cirakman, 2002). Nevertheless, there was 
still tremendous interest in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish culture and 
lifestyle. As documented by Schiffer (1982) in his book Turkey Romanticized, 
there were numerous books published about the Ottoman Empire and these books 
were frequently reviewed, which is a sign of interest, attention and curiosity. Just 
for the period between 1805 and 1825 alone, there were 46 extensive reviews of 
Near East travel books in the Eclectic Review, which indicates that “Ottoman 
Empire was a contemporary center of interest” (Schiffer, 1982; p.11). In most of 
these books, the characterizations of Turks show similarities and involve common 
themes, because certain aspects of Ottoman life appealed to Western people more 
than others. Western writers and travelers were particularly fixated on what they 
viewed as the bewildering characteristics of Turks such as, indolence, ignorance, 
backwardness, lustfulness and despotism. These characteristics were perceived as 
the main reasons for the decadence, decay, decline and ultimately, the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. In this chapter, I will examine the representations of Turks in the 
Orientalist discourse to assess how the European image of Turks changed during 
the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. I will attempt to determine the effects of European 
colonial superiority on the Western perception of Turks during a time when the 
Ottoman Empire lost its power. Also, I will assess the associations between the 
characteristics of the Turks in these writings and the Oriental imagery that has been 
common in Western discourse.   
 
The Indolent Turk 
During the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, Western travelers to the Orient were 
stunned by the strange habits, routine rituals and laidback lifestyle of Middle 
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Eastern people. While travelling within the Ottoman Empire, they were 
particularly taken aback by the quiet and somber relaxation ritual of the Turkish 
men. The ritual of ‘relishing the moment’, which the Turks called keyif, involved 
resting, meditating, smoking pipe, and sipping coffee. Most of the Western 
travelers perceived this customary practice of relaxation as ‘indolence’ or 
‘idleness’. This leisurely activity was very different from their own and they had 
difficulty understanding the Ottoman willingness and capacity to relax and be 
satisfied with small pleasures. In Oriental Panorama, Schiffer (1999) claims that 
these travelers became exasperated over quiescent Turks, so such an innocent habit 
of sitting motionless and doing nothing but smoking a pipe was perceived as a 
moral defect of the Turkish nation, and their repose was seen as ‘indolence’ 
(p.215). Charles Pertusier, French embassy official in Constantinople, views the 
Ottoman preference for ‘keyif’ as a form of complete inactivity: 
 
The different nations that compose the Turkish, seem to place their happiness in repose, or, 
rather, in a state of complete inertia. The lord and the plebeian rest and smoke under a 
plantain, sipping a cup of coffee, or partaking of a dish of curdled milk (Schiffer, 1999; 
p.214) 
 
Particularly for the English people, sitting and doing nothing at all was ‘indolence’, 
and it was unacceptable. It was against their work ethic and might even be 
considered as immoral. If Turks did not work, English people expected them to at 
least indulge in vigorous sports and manly exercises (Schiffer, 1999). In 1859, 
English author George Walter Thornbury observed a group of Turks relaxing in the 
shade of a plane tree and criticized them for not doing any sports: 
 
They sit with the mind asleep, but the body and eyes open; this is what they call ‘taking 
kef,’ and they do it when we should be cricketing, partridge shooting, riding, or boating. It 
is the miserable amusement of a worn-out race . . . If they were driven back to get their 
bread by tilling the desert paradises of Asia Minor, these Turks might find less time for 
‘taking kef,’ and more for honest work (Schiffer, 1999; p.215). 
 
In Thornbury’s comments, similar to ‘barbarity’ and ‘cruelty’ that have been 
discussed in the preceding chapters as ‘natural’ Turkish qualities, indolence is also 
presented as a natural ethnic quality of a worn-out race. It is an indication of the 
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ethnocentric perception resulted from the preconceived superiority of Europeans. 
Contrary to the European admiration of the Ottoman military discipline and 
political organization previously, the image of Turks in Orientalist travel accounts 
reflects Turkish inferiority as a race.    
 
 Western travelers were not only bothered by the Turks’ indolent relaxation 
ritual but also despised the Ottoman soldiers because of their indifference and 
cowardice. Although Ottoman Turks were once known and feared for their military 
skills and bravery, European travelers began observing sluggish and indifferent 
attitudes among the Turkish soldiers. Elias Habesci (a.k.a Alexander Gika), an 
ideologist of British supremacy, wrote about the cowardice and indolence of 
Ottoman soldiers while praising the Russians during the Russo-Turkish Wars 
between 1769-1771: 
 
Neither soldiers nor officers any longer believe that they shall go to paradise, from being 
slain in the field of battle, and, therefore, they fly before the enemy; in the sea service in 
particular, one admiral excepted, they could hardly be brought to face the enemy . . . in 
their late war with the Russians – a nation as remarkable as their perfidy and ingratitude, 
as the present Turks are for their indolence and cowardice.
41
  
 
According to Habesci, the reasons for the indolence of the Ottoman soldiers go 
back as far as the 17
th
 century, when the degeneration of the Janissaries reached its 
height during the short reign of Sultan Ahmed II between 1691-1695:   
 
The spirit of these troops (Janissaries), by this time, was broken, and they were so far 
degenerated, that no reliance could be placed upon their conduct in the field. Thus 
circumstanced, it is no wonder that the rest of the Turkish forces became indolent and 
effeminate. In fine, such was the confusion which prevailed in the Seraglio, that everything 
went wrong during this short reign.
42
  
 
Beginning from the late 17
th
 century, Europeans despised the incompetence of the 
Ottoman Sultans and decried particularly their idleness and their indulgence in 
decadence. The inaptitude of the Ottoman military also prompted Europeans to 
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42
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insult and ridicule the Turkish soldiers whom they were once terrified of. 
Motivated by their colonial ambitions, Europeans used ‘indolence’ and ‘idleness’ 
as the cultural distinction to prove that Ottoman Turks deserved to be dominated 
by a superior power like Europe. As Said (1978) claims, Europeans had this 
assumption that the Orient was inferior and was “in need of corrective study by the 
West” (p.41). When Europe began seeing the Ottomans as ‘inferior’ rather than 
their ‘equal’ in terms of political and military power, Orientalist travelers began 
depicting the Turks as coward, indolent and idle caricatures in their accounts. 
 
Schiffer (1982) puts forward three major theories offered by the English 
travelers as an explanation for the Turks’ indolence. According to Schiffer, the first 
theory is about Islam, the religion of Turks. Based on the teachings of their 
religion, Turks accept everything as predestined by God. The easy acceptance of 
Turks worked against industriousness and exertion, and thus led to their fatalism, 
apathy, and indolence. William Hunter, who traveled through the Ottoman Empire 
during the end of the 18
th
 century, comments on the Turkish religious beliefs and 
exposes the Christian bias towards Turks:  
 
The Turk regards every occurrence of his life with the same torpid indifference; and, being 
fully persuaded, that no exertion or prudence can prolong his happiness, or avert his 
destruction . . . nor the approach of danger . . . can awaken him from his lethargy. Grave 
and uncommunicative . . . he trifles away his life in the listlessness of negligent activity . . .  
as if entirely separated from the concerns of the world . . . he scarcely fulfills one duty . . .  
If he read the Koran a specified number of times, pray . . . five times a day, and conform to 
a few of the positive ordinances of his prophet . . . he imagines that he has discharged 
every obligation . . . and that . . . he has secured . . . the endless and voluptuous enjoyments 
of his ideal paradise.
43
 
 
British publisher John Reid, who traveled to Turkey at the beginning of the 19
th
 
century, also blames the Turks’ Muslim religion for their indifference and idleness. 
Reid views the Turks so inferior that he likens them to the primitive native people 
living in British colonies. With a sense of colonial superiority, Reid suggests that 
the Turks become as inhuman as the uncivilized tribes of Africa or New Zealand: 
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The Turks, after they conquered a rich and fertile country, abandoned in a great measure 
their predatory habits; preferring ease and idleness in the enjoyment of their conquests, 
they sat quietly down and smoked their pipes . . . the abandonment to habits of ease and 
idleness became more general, until it had seized upon every one, of whatever rank, 
professing the creed of Mahomet. This idle feeling of quietly sitting down, and allowing 
the events of world to pass along, believing that all that takes place was predestined, and 
could not have been changed by any act of the believer, is in exact consonance with the 
faith of the prophet; and with sloth, consequently, the Turks increased in apathy and 
indolence every generation, until, at the present day, they are farther sunk in the scale of 
humanity than the Hottentots of Africa, or the aborigines of New Zealand.
44
  
 
John Reid also praises the industrious Christians living in the Ottoman lands and 
characterizes them as the backbone of the Empire, while he disparages the Turks 
for being lazy. Reid’s remarks are as follows: 
 
To whom is Turkey indebted for her existence for the last few generations? Certainly not 
to the Turks, but to the Christians . . . who consequently were obliged to labour for the 
lords of the soil. Who have been the architects of the palace and the hovel? The Christians: 
they alone have been busy, while the Turks sat and smoked their pipes. The Christians 
alone have built the bridges and wells, and constructed the aqueducts; have attended to the 
supply of necessaries of life; have been the merchants, the shopkeepers, the mechanics, 
and the very existence, of the kingdom.
45
  
 
On the other hand, Habesci calls attention to Ramadan, the Muslim tradition of 
fasting. He claims that Ramadan is just another excuse for Turks to be lazy and 
idle and blames the Muslim religious holiday for Turkish indolence: 
 
But it may readily be conceived, that the night is turned into day during the Ramadan, for 
the Turks, being of an indolent disposition, will not work when they do not eat, so that 
they sleep through the greatest part of the day.
46
  
 
Similar to the prior Western discourses discussed in the preceding chapters, the 
pattern of stigmatizing the Turks based on their racial and religious difference 
continues in the remarks of these Western travelers. They argued that Turks’ 
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religious beliefs and practices were one of the main reasons for their indolence. 
Western Orientalist writers defined the Turks in polar opposites against the 
European Christians, such as indolent/industrious, lazy/hardworking, or 
indifferent/concerned. Therefore, Europeans viewed themselves entitled to 
colonize or invade the Ottoman Empire because Turks were too indifferent to 
defend themselves and too lazy to utilize the potential in their country. In contrast, 
Christians know how to build, develop, enrich and use them. The religious and 
ethnic distinction between the Turks and Christians justify the European colonial 
reach to the Ottoman Empire. Western travel writings reflect the European colonial 
mindset as the idleness of Turks is presented as a justification for exploiting the 
Ottoman lands, treasures and natural resources.  
 
The second theory deems despotism as the reason for the Turks’ indolence, 
because the Ottoman government took away all profits from the individuals and by 
doing so, extinguished the will of work among its population. Therefore, Turks 
became idle and sluggish without any motivation to work. Habesci (1784) claims 
that the major reason for the Ottoman Empire to near its end is “despotism on the 
part of rulers” combined with “cowardice and indolence on the part of people, 
uniting with superstition and voluptuousness” undermining its foundation (p.269). 
Lastly, the third theory suggests that financial tributes from all corners of the 
Ottoman Empire made labor unnecessary for the masters, and thus resulted in 
idleness (Schiffer, 1982; p.29). Among the three theories, ‘despotism’ is 
predominantly used in Oriental travel writing as the main reason for the Turks’ 
presumed indolence and indifference (see Cirakman 2001 & 2002). For example, 
French military officer, Francois Baron de Tott blames the despotic Ottoman 
government for the laziness of the Turkish people because of the way Turks treat 
their property and environment. According to Tott, Turks neglect maintaining their 
houses and gardens, and ignore planting trees and enjoying surroundings because, 
“Under a despotic government, a man must enjoy the trees that he can find; he has 
not the time to see them grow up.”47 Despotism is a predominant theme in the 
European representations of Turks during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries when the 
Orientalist travelers began viewing Oriental despotism as one of the reasons for the 
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indolence and ignorance of the Turks as well as one of the primary reasons for the 
inefficiency of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In addition, one of the most controversial theories known as the climatic 
opposites was put forward by Montesquieu, and also used by some other writers to 
assess the Ottoman Turks. Montesquieu argues that the moral and physiological 
characteristics of Eastern (Oriental) people are in contrast with those of Europeans 
due to their geographical origins and different climates. Schiffer paraphrases 
Montesquieu’s concept of ‘climatic opposites’ as follows: 
 
Cold climates . . . were bracing: they strengthened the bodily and moral nerves of the 
inhabitants: hence these were virtuous, frank, and courageous. In contrast, hot climates 
rendered the physiology of men delicate and weak: hence these were indolent of mind and 
body, given to vices and timorous (Schiffer, 1982; p. 27). 
 
According to Montesquieu, for Europe and the East, binary opposites exist on the 
moral, social, and religious level. Europeans had courage and liberty, while 
Easterners had indolence, effeminacy, despotic governments and slavery. 
Therefore, while Europe was the seat of Christianity and progress, Eastern people 
had the religion of Islam that their climatic and spiritual indolence deserved 
(Schiffer, 1982; p.27). Although Montesquieu’s climatic theory was disputed by 
British merchant Thomas Thornton and French philosopher Comte de Volney, they 
both admitted the existence of Oriental indolence. Volney attributed the Turkish 
indolence to the Ottoman governmental system and Islamic religion (Schiffer, 
1982; p.28). He suggested that Turks became fatalistic due to their acceptance of 
the Islamic concept of predestination as Muslims would accept anything as the will 
of God (as cited in Curtis, 2009, p. 60). Likewise, Thornton suggested that social 
institutions, government, religion and domestic economy should be considered as 
the reasons for the indolence of Turks and the inefficiency of the Ottoman Empire 
(cited by Cunningham, 1993; p.77). Said refers to indolence or fatalism as one of 
the Orientalist clichés that defines the Middle Eastern people, such as Turks. He 
describes what an Oriental means through the lenses of ethnocentrism and 
eurocentrism: 
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An Oriental lives in the Orient, he lives a life of Oriental ease, in a state of Oriental 
despotism and sensuality, imbued with a feeling of Oriental fatalism (Said, 1978; p.102). 
 
Overall, the indolence of Turks ultimately became a stereotypical feature that 
defines the Oriental ‘Other.’ In other words, the ‘indolence’ of Turks was viewed 
as “one of the most durable frequent, and ideologically loaded topoi of the Oriental 
description” (Schiffer, 1982; p.27). During the period when the Ottoman Empire 
weakened, Turkish ‘indolence’ was used as a justification for colonizing the 
Ottoman lands as Turks were perceived too lazy to utilize what they had. Turks’ 
indolence, inferiority and barbarous nature were not the only features that were 
emphasized by the European travelers. Their ‘ignorance’ and ‘backwardness’ were 
also predominantly represented in the Orientalist discourse. 
  
Ignorance and Backwardness of Turks 
Oriental travelers of the 18
th
 century often wrote about the ignorance and 
backwardness of the Turks. They often contrast Ottoman Turks with the Greeks, 
particularly their willingness to progress, their interest in arts and sciences, as well 
as their moral characters. Turks are considered inherently ignorant and backward, 
unlike the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire, who are industrious and 
progressive. For example, British politician, Charles Thompson suggests that 
Turks live a sluggish, indolent and inactive life, given the fact that they hardly 
cultivate their land. They are also indifferent towards travelling or arts and 
sciences, instead they pass time in their coffeehouses or in their harems. These 
strange habits can only be explained with reference to their inherent characteristics 
as a nation, because, although, “they live under the same heaven and possess the 
same countries the ancient Grecians did, they are far from being animated by the 
same spirit or endeavoring to imitate such noble examples.”48 William Eton also 
shows his contempt towards Turks by referring to their ignorance and mistreatment 
of Greek science and arts, because the Turks “like barbarians, invaded Greece, and 
swept before them the mighty monuments of ancient science, and like barbarians, 
they hold their captives to present day, under the benumbing yoke of ignorance and 
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slavery.”49 Eton makes an interesting comparison between the Turks and Romans, 
the two conquerors of Greece. He suggests that Turks did not make any progress 
after they conquered Greece as opposed to Romans, whose civilization advanced. 
Eton’s remarks are as follows: 
 
Conquered Greece polished Rome, but the conquerors were Romans. Conquered Greece 
did not polish Turkey, for the conquerors were Turks. The insensibility of these barbarians 
is astonishing: living amid the effulgence of genius, they have not caught one spark; they 
gaze with unfeeling stupidity on the wonder and boast of art, on their glorious monuments 
. . .  and then destroy them . . . where ignorance, tyranny, superstition and gross sensuality 
only dwell in sad and stupidly solemn pomp, or issuing out with savage fury, lay waste the 
country round, and imbrue their hands in the blood of the helpless, murdering without 
remorse those they have conquered.
50
  
 
The European image of Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarians’ prevalent during the 
Renaissance is also manifested in the Orientalist travelogue. The Western travelers 
suggested that Turks were ignorant about arts and science and also indifferent 
about protecting the artistic and cultural artifacts. Instead they chose to destroy 
them because of their savagery, barbarity and tyrannical government. Therefore, 
Turks continue to be the inferior barbarous race compared to Christians, who are 
much more civilized, progressive and sophisticated. Simply, the stereotypical 
image of Turks as ‘barbarous’ and ‘inferior’ continued to exist in Orientalist 
discourse.  
 
 In addition to the Turks’ indifference to arts and sciences, and their ill-
treatment of cultural treasures, Western travelers were also concerned about the 
Turks’ sluggish trade practices. The Turks’ lack of knowledge in commerce, 
combined with their indolence, particularly disturbed Lady Craven who panned the 
Ottoman Turks for their ignorance and idleness in her travelogue, compiled of 
letters. In Craven’s assessment, due to Turks’ indolent and backward nature, the 
Ottoman Empire is reduced to being a ‘dead wall’ that separates England from 
India. She explains her point of view as follows: 
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Perhaps sir, it is lucky for Europe that the Turks are idle and ignorant – the immense 
power that Empire might have, were it peopled by the industrious and ambitious, would 
make it the ministers of the world – at present, it only serves as a dead wall to intercept the 
commerce and battles which other powers might create upon one another.
51
 
 
As Craven points out, the inactivity of the Turks is an obstruction of free trade, and 
disrupts the progress of other nations, particularly England. Therefore, Turks 
should be denied of the rightful possession of their domains. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the Turks misuse and squander the gifts of God and the treasures of 
mankind. Ottoman lack of respect for cultural and natural resources is another 
reason for other nations to deny Turks the monopolization of these treasures. 
According to Lady Craven, there is every justification to colonize Turkey 
(Cirakman, 2002; Turhan, 2003).  
 
Though I have not been absolutely all over this peninsula, I think I am perfectly acquainted 
with it; and though it is a new acquaintance to me, I sincerely wish it to be peopled by the 
industrious, who may restore to it that commerce and opulence, which the natural 
productions of it demand from the hand of man. Can any rational being, dear Sir, see 
nature, without the least assistance from art, in all her grace and beauty, stretching out her 
liberal hand to industry, and not wish to do her justice? Yes, I confess, I wish to see a 
colony of honest English families here; establishing manufacturers, such as England 
produces, and returning the produce of this country to ours; establishing a fair and free 
trade from hence, and teaching industry and honesty to the insidious but oppressed Greeks, 
in their islands – waking the indolent Turk from his gilded slumbers, and carrying fair 
liberty in her swelling sails.
52
  
 
Therefore, Ottoman Turks deserve to be dominated by the Europeans because they 
did not appreciate arts and sciences, and also, lacked the skills for trade. The 
positional superiority of the West once again manifested in Craven’s Eurocentric 
remarks. Like Lady Craven, the attempt of Orientalists to define the Ottoman 
Turks as ignorant, backward and lazy people who were incapable of managing and 
utilizing their own resources encouraged European colonial powers to intrude into 
the Ottoman Empire.        
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William Hunter felt nothing but pity, contempt and disgust towards Turks. 
Hunter viewed the Turks as the enemies of all improvements and claimed that their 
prejudice and ignorance could not be overcome. Hunter argues: 
 
At present, they are enervated, a superstitious, an ignorant and a sluggish people; the 
bigotted slaves of a tyrannic government; declared enemy of arts and sciences; and the 
firm opposer of every useful institution. Too stupid to comprehend, or too proud to learn, 
or too infatuated to be convinced . . . and although they are surrounded on almost every 
side by civilized and enlightened nations, their attachment to opinions which are founded 
in folly, and upheld by prejudice, does not diminish. 
53
 
 
Even Thomas Thornton, who admired the country of Turkey and defended the 
Ottoman civilization, criticized the Turkish education system. He was stunned by 
the lack of simple scientific knowledge and the nonexistence of basic scientific 
instruments in the Turkish education, as well as in the Ottoman navy.  
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the objects of Turkish study, the rhetoric and 
logic, the philosophy and metaphysics, of the dark ages, do in reality only remove men 
further from real knowledge. The instruments, without which the researches of the acutest 
natural philosopher would be imperfect, are either entirely unknown in Turkey, or only 
known as childish playthings, to excite the admiration of ignorance, or to gratify a vain 
curiosity. The telescope, microscope, the electrical machine, and other aids of science, are 
unknown as to their real uses. Even the compass is not universally employed in their navy, 
nor its common purposes thoroughly understood. Need it then be observed, that 
navigation, astronomy, geography, agriculture, chemistry, and all the arts, which have 
been, as it were, created anew since the grand discoveries of the two last centuries, are 
either unknown, or practised  only according to a vicious and antiquated routine. 
54
 
 
As demonstrated so far, Turks are predominantly described as barbaric, indolent, 
ignorant, and backward in the Orientalist travelogue. According to Said, these 
characteristics are commonly presented as Oriental or Islamic in 19
th
 century 
Orientalist travel accounts. He suggests that anyone who comes across these 
descriptions would know their signification. His remarks are as follows: 
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Now one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the 
distillation of essential ideas about the Orient – its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its 
aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness – into a separate and 
unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word Oriental was a reference for the 
reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient (Said, 1978; 
p.205) 
 
Another significant Turkish characteristic, which has been mentioned previously 
but not discussed thoroughly, is despotism. A closer look at the Ottoman 
despotism, which is commonly used in the Orientalist travel accounts, will provide 
a better understanding of the cliché ‘Oriental despotism’ and its association with 
the Turks. 
 
Ottoman Despotism 
 By the early 18
th
 century, the Ottoman Empire was often characterized as a 
despotic or ineffective government in Western writings. Most writers used the 
image of ‘Turk’ as a metaphor for archetypal despotism in both literary genres and 
political texts or speeches. They continued this practice throughout the 18
th
 century  
and used Ottoman despotism not only to mark the Turkish ‘Otherness’ but also to 
benefit from it for their own rhetorical and political purposes. Regarding the 
manipulation of Ottoman despotism by the Enlightenment writers, Turhan (2003) 
suggests: “such despotism was sometimes used to defend Western ways and 
sometimes to condemn them, depending largely on the political needs of the 
writer” (p.3). For example, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), 
British statesman Edmund Burke uses the Ottoman Empire as a reference point for 
his comparison when commenting on the value of the French monarchy before the 
Revolution. In his comparison, he disparages Turks as barbarous and despotic 
people who do not value arts, science and trade. 
 
To hear some men speak of the late monarchy of France, you would imagine that they 
were . . . describing the barbarous anarchic despotism of Turkey, where the finest countries 
in the most genial climates in the world are wasted by peace more than any countries have 
been worried by war; where arts are unknown, where manufactures languish, where 
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science is extinguished, where agriculture decays, where the human race itself melts away 
and perishes under the eye of the observer. Was this the case with France?
55
 
 
Cirakman (2001), on the other hand, argues that the concept of ‘Ottoman tyranny’ 
during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries transformed into ‘despotism’ during the 18th 
century. In other words, ‘Ottoman despotism’ was redefined to represent the 
corruption and backwardness of the Ottoman government and became an Oriental 
characteristic, known as Oriental despotism, in the 18
th
 century. Oriental despotism 
not only signifies the despotic Ottoman government, but also epitomizes the 
Eurocentric perception of the East (Cirakman, 2001; p.49). 
 
When one looks at Western discourse concerning the Ottoman Turks as 
‘oppressors’ of Christians, there is a striking contrast between the accounts of the 
18
th
 century compared to the previous centuries. Before the 18
th
 century, Ottoman 
government was known for its toleration of religious minorities and the Ottomans 
Turks were admired for their peaceful coexistence within the different peoples of 
the Empire (Barkey, 2005). The Orientalist accounts of the 18
th
 century portray the 
Ottoman Turks as the ‘oppressors’ who hate Christians and their religion 
(Cirakman, 2002). According to British diplomat Sir James Porter Christians were 
frequently subject to violence, fraud and rapine by the Turks because Turks 
despised them and their faith. 
 
The real worth of Pashawlycks, or [provincial] governments are in proportion to the 
number of the Christian inhabitants; because the Pashaws may with them indulge all their 
lust, their zeal and avarice; tyrannize, harass, oppress, and suck their very vitals; from 
them they fear no complaints. But they cherish and spare those of their own religion: and 
they, when any Christian representations of a Pashaw’s misconduct reach the Porte, are 
sure evidence in his favour.
56
  
 
The depiction of Turks as oppressors became extremely common during the Greek 
War of Independence in 1820s and Turkish character was frequently demonized 
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due to the European Philhellenic sentiment. During that time, “the Turk was seen 
as an oppressor of freedom, a cruel and bloody foe, an enemy of civilization, the 
epitome of barbarism” (Schiffer, 1999; p.240). The more travelers were concerned 
by the state of the oppressed Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, the more they 
emphasized the image of the ‘despotic’ Turk to show their support for the Greek 
independence. Sir William Eton suggested that if the Greeks were freed from the 
evil despotism of the Ottoman government, Greece will resurrect as the epicenter 
of civilization once again, excel with the talent of its remarkable people and take 
its place among the advanced nations, while becoming a reliable ally for Britain 
and Russia. He continues as follows: 
 
Humanity itself is disgraced by the prolongation of Turkish despotism, and justice with an 
imperious voice demands the liberation of the oppressed Grecians, and their re-
establishment in the seat of their heroic ancestors. But it is not only on the removal of 
existing evils that we have to speculate; we may contemplate with proud exultation the 
substitution of a new system of things, founded on principles more equally just and liberal. 
Who can look forward without animation to revival of learning, of arts and arms in 
Greece, when the iron yoke, under which she now bows, shall be broken? A Grecian state, 
the free and independent ally of Britain and Russia, will form a connecting link in the 
social bond of commerce; will be fitted, by the favourableness of its situation and the 
genius of its inhabitants, for bold and successful enterprize; and, in fine, will quickly attain 
a proud pre-eminence among nations.
57
   
 
However, some European travelers were perplexed by the difference 
between modern and ancient Greeks. They struggled to detect the traces of ancient 
civilization of the Grecians among the Greek peasants, bandits, fishermen and 
pirates living in the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Europeans had difficulty 
portraying the actual Greeks in Turkey as ‘heroes’ like they used to be. Because 
the Greeks were no longer the ancient heroes they once were, they had to be 
portrayed as “the Christian victims of Islamic oppression” (Turhan, 2003; p.38). 
According to Schiffer (1999), some writers argued that because “they had been 
living under the Ottoman Turks in a state tantamount slavery” this heavy “burden 
had crushed the moral fiber of the Greeks” (p.267). Baron de Tott, a passionate 
supporter of Montesquieu’s ‘climatic theory’, associated the state of the oppressed 
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Greeks not only with the despotism of the Ottoman government, but also with the 
climate they were living in. 
 
It is by considering, in this point of view, the descendants of Patroclus and Achilles, that 
one perceives that under the influence of the same climate, the despotism that has crushed 
the later Greeks . . . has marked them with the character of slavery . . .
58
  
 
According to Tott, ‘despotism’ is a psychological feature of the Turks. When this 
characteristic is combined with the climate Turks live in and their belief system, it 
reveals itself as a way of life and political regime. In addition to instigating a 
despotic society and government, Turks’ climate and religion also trigger their 
violent nature. As a result, Turks despise foreigners and foreign cultures so much 
that they prefer living in ignorance with their arrogant sense of pride. Tott argues: 
 
If the climate which Turks inhabit relaxes their fibres, the despotism under which they 
groan transports them to violence. They are not unfrequently ferocious, their system of 
predestination adds to their fierceness; and the same prejudice that in a cold climate would 
have rendered them courageous, in a hot one produces nothing but fanaticism and 
rashness; the burning fever which elevates their brain, makes them despise everything that 
is not Turkish; and from that mode of reasoning with themselves, pride and ignorance are 
the natural result.
59
 
 
Western writers were so convinced about Turkish despotism that they sought to 
find excuses for the underdeveloped condition of the Greeks living in the Ottoman 
Empire. Ottoman despotism and oppression of minorities were perceived as the 
‘norm’, because for the West, Turks were incapable of behaving in a non-barbaric 
way. The Western fanatic excitement for the Greek independence produced a 
caricature of the Turk, whose vices were so overrated that it turned into a 
“ferocious beast” (Schiffer, 1999). In reality, for the Western travelers, writing 
about the “oppression of the Greeks was more of a convenient means to vilify the 
Ottomans” rather than actually helping the Greeks for their independence (Turhan, 
2003; p.38). Lady Craven even believes that “England would simply make a better 
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colonizer of Greece than the Ottomans” (Turhan, 2003; p.38). Western imperial 
powers were more concerned about colonizing the Ottoman lands than liberating 
the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman oppression of the 
minorities has been an ongoing theme in the Western representation of Turks, and 
still being frequently promoted in the modern popular media. The oppression of 
Greeks and Armenian people by the Ottoman Turks has been depicted in many 
contemporary films, which will be examined in the next chapter. Another prevalent 
Turkish feature in Orientalist discourse is ‘sensuality’. Turks are commonly 
depicted as ‘lustful or ‘lascivious’ in Orientalist accounts. Next, these 
characteristics will be explored in the context of Turkish female and male 
sexuality. 
 
Harem and Lascivious Turkish Woman  
The condition and appearance of Turkish women captivated the Western 
travelers, even before the 18
th
 century. These travelers were interested in writing 
about the veils, costumes, behaviors and exotic beauty of Turkish women, while 
often speculating about their sensuality, and voluptuousness. Turkish women are 
often presented as lewd, promiscuous, and hypersexual in the Western travel 
accounts. For example, the British diplomat and historian Sir Paul Rycaut 
describes the Turkish women as “the most lascivious and immodest of all women” 
and suggests that they “excel in the most refined and ingenious subtilties [subtlety] 
to steal their pleasures” as the custom of segregating men from women heightens 
their desires (cited in Bohls, 1995; p.29). French traveler, Jean Dumont (a.k.a 
Baron de Carlscroon) portrays Turkish women as amorous and passionate. His 
remarks are as follows:  
 
The Turkish women are the most charming creatures in the world: They seem to be made 
for love; their actions, gestures, discourse and looks are all amorous and admirably well 
fitted to kindle a soft and lasting passion. Since they have nothing else to do they make it 
their only business to please which they do successfully and in so natural and easy a 
manner.
60
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Even though Dumont’s representation of Turkish women seems relatively positive, 
it is actually degrading because he portrays them as servants whose only job is to 
satisfy male sexual appetite. British writer and traveler, Aaron Hill, views Turkish 
women as sexual predators and imagines what could happen if an ordinary man is 
surrounded by them. 
 
So lascivious are their Inclinations, that if by the ingenuity of their Contrivances they can 
procure the Company of some Stranger in their Chamber, they claim unanimously an equal 
share of his Caresses, and proceed by Lots to the Enjoyment of his Person; nor can he 
permitted to leave them, till having exerted his utmost Vigour in the Embraces of the 
whole Company, he becomes incapable of further Service, and is dispatch’d with the 
Thanks and Presents of the oblig’d Family.61 
 
In his 19
th
 century travelogue, French writer Gustave Flaubert’s descriptions of 
Kuchuk Hanem (meaning young lady in Turkish) are typically Oriental. Kuchuk 
Hanem is a Muslim woman who lived in Ottoman Egypt and worked as a dancer 
and courtesan to entertain men, especially the wealthy Western men. She 
represents excessive sexuality, promiscuity, and sensuality which are attributed to 
Muslims, as well as Turkish women. Said elaborates on the authoritarian 
Orientalist discourse and refers to Flaubert’s depiction of her as a reflection of the 
Western dominance over the East.  
 
She [Kuchuk Hanem] never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, 
presence, or history. He [Flaubert] spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, 
comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed 
him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers 
in what way she was ‘typically Oriental’ (Said, 1978; p.6).       
 
For the Western travelers, the most fascinating aspect of women in the 
Ottoman Empire was the harem, also known as seraglio, where the Ottoman 
Sultan kept countless beautiful women he captured or enslaved for his own 
pleasures. Other than the Ottoman Sultan himself, both the rich privileged men and 
the administrative elite of the Ottoman Empire, such as the governors, pashas and 
beys in the provinces, had harems in their private grounds. The ‘imperial harem’, 
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as the biggest, richest, the most hierarchical and most popular of Ottoman harems, 
has become the stereotype for the Oriental harem, which is the epicenter of many 
sexual myths in Western writings. Harem comes from the Arabic word, harām, 
which means ‘forbidden’ and ‘sacred.’ Imperial harem was a sacred place for the 
Sultan’s wives and female relatives like his mother, sisters and daughters, as well 
as female slaves who were called concubines. No men were allowed into the harem 
except for eunuchs and the Sultan himself. Although no visitors were allowed into 
the harem, it has been the most popular theme of the Orientalist discourse as 
Western writers described the affairs within the harem using their imaginations and 
sexual fantasies. For example, Rycaut comments on the sexual activities of 
Ottoman women and claims lesbianism is rampant in the harems. He states: “they 
die with amorous affections one to the other; especially the old Women court the 
young” (cited in Bohls, 1995; p.30). In her important work, The Imperial Harem, 
Leslie Peirce (1993) suggests that many works about the Ottoman Empire during 
the 16
th
 and particularly 17
th
 centuries involve descriptions of harem, which were 
written either by European travelers and ambassadors, or captives and renegades 
who had served in the Sultan’s palace.  
 
The first detailed description of harem was written in the early 1600s by 
Ottaviano Bon, the Venetian representative in Istanbul. As the first-class 
diplomatic agent, he was instructed to send home reports about the Ottoman Court. 
Bon never entered the harem as it was forbidden for men other than the Sultan and 
eunuchs, who were castrated male servants. His descriptions of the harem mostly 
relied on his observations of the surrounding rooms in the Court (Penzer, 1936). 
Once, Bon also had an access to the selamlik, where the Sultan’s rooms were 
located next to the harem (Penzer, 1936; p.38). Bon’s reports were later translated 
by Robert Withers, as his own, and published without any acknowledgment in 
1650 as A Description of the Grand Signor’s Seraglio (Penzer, 1936; Akalin 
2001). In the book, Withers describes Turkish women as ‘deceptive, dishonest, and 
adulterous’ and continues: 
 
And although the women may not be conversant with any other man than with their 
husbands, fathers, or brothers, and although they live in lodgings apart, by themselves, out 
of the sight of men, and go always abroad with their faces covered; yet many of them 
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being extraordinarily wanton, and very dishonest & lascivious, who taking the opportunity 
of their husband’s absence, at the wars or in some long journey, under colour of going to 
the Baths, and being covered with all, go wither, and to whom they lust, knowing that the 
worst of it is be put away, if so be it should any time to be discovered.
62
  
 
Withers then goes on to elaborate on the sensuality of women in the harem and 
depicts a rather erotic image of the harem women and their sexual desires. He 
points out: 
 
If they have a will to eat radishes, cucumbers, gourds, or such like meats, they are sent in 
unto them sliced, to deprive them of the means of playing wantons (cited in Bohls, 1995; 
p.30). 
 
As suggested by Peirce (1993), these descriptions were usually “a mix of fact, 
hearsay, and fantasy” and therefore, “helped to sell books about the Ottomans and 
were therefore featured prominently” (p.114). The West has always been obsessed 
with the sexuality of Muslims and the harem is viewed as the prevalent symbol of 
Muslim sensuality (Peirce, 1993). The British traveler and physician Richard 
Madden describes the Turkish sensuality and the sexual dealings inside the harem 
as follows: 
 
The orgies of the evening, in most harems, are conducted with all the levity of 
licentiousness . . . roars of laughter are to be heard in the adjoining houses; and . . . the 
gravity of the Turk during the day is only the exhaustion of his spirits from previous 
excitement (as cited in Schiffer, 1999; p.290).   
 
In Oriental travel accounts, the harem represents Muslim ‘promiscuity’ as it is 
frequently described as a secluded part of the palace where the Sultan is 
surrounded by half-naked women and over-indulges in every conceivable kind of 
vice. For the West, the harem has typically represented sexual license and Oriental 
luxury, as well as confinement and oppression of women, which is also an 
indication of Ottoman ‘despotism.’ In Orientalist discourse, the harem is primarily 
characterized as an integral part of Islamic religion and it is considered as a 
theological component rather than a cultural one (MacLean & Matar, 2011). In 
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Western discourse, promiscuity, polygamy, sensuality and sexual vices are 
frequently attributed to Muslims and the Ottoman harem has become the symbol 
for all these concepts.  
 
 In her book, Rethinking Orientalism, Reina Lewis (2004) documents the 
representations of the harem described by both Western female travelers and 
Ottoman female writers that challenged the Oriental stereotypes. Lewis suggests 
that the characterizations of the harem by these women writers are not 
stereotypical, but rather “heterogeneous and contradictory” (p.13). The first 
Western female account of life inside the harem was written in 1717 by Lady Mary 
Wortley Montagu, who spent time in Constantinople during her husband’s 
ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire. Her renowned Embassy Letters published 
in 1763 provides a much different account of the harem than the already prevalent 
Western representation of a place of sexual depravity and random cruelty (Lewis, 
2004; p.13). In her letters, Montagu presents Ottoman women “as possessing 
freedoms not available to their European counterparts” (Lewis, 2004; p.13). 
However, Montagu’s descriptions of the harem did not alter the stereotypical 
image of the harem that has been predominant in Orientalist discourse, neither did 
Ottoman female writers’ insider accounts. Lewis explains this as follows: 
 
By the time that Halide Edib, Zeyneb Hanim, Demetra Vaka Brown and Grace Ellison 
[Ottoman female writers] were writing in the early twentieth century, the West’s image of 
the secluded, polygamous Oriental had accrued the layers of myth, rumour and stereotype 
of a longstanding fascination. The vision of the harem as a sexualized realm of deviancy, 
cruelty and excess has animated some of the West’s best known examples of dominant 
Orientalism from fine art, to operas, to novels and popular literature (Lewis, 2004; p.96).   
 
The main reason for these clichés to remain was the fictional novels and 
stories that became extremely popular. In addition to the travel accounts and 
memoirs, Western fantasies about the harem were even promoted further by these 
fictional stories and novels. One of the most popular ones, Thousand and One 
Nights, was published by the French Orientalist scholar Antoine Galland in twelve 
volumes during 1704-1717. It is a collection of manuscripts, folk tales and stories 
transcribed and translated by Galland from Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. Due to 
the European fascination with harem fantasies, Galland’s book, which is also 
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known as Arabian Nights, produced an unprecedented frenzy of excitement and 
became a phenomenon (Marzolph, 2004). Galland’s collection was translated into 
English several times, some of which offered new editions, variations and 
extensions that generated and Oriental tale (Sallis, 1999). Among these 
translations, Richard Burton’s version focused on “more erotic and crude 
passages” (Sallis, 1999; p.5). His translation was criticized for being “excessively 
literal . . . often giving rise to quaint and ugly effects” (Irwin, 1994; p.36). Burton 
was known for his interest in sex at the time, as his notes often concentrated on 
“curious sexual lore” (Irwin, 1994; p.33). Burton’s translation helped enrich 
Europeans’ erotic fantasies about the harem and false imagery about the Orient. 
The Arabian Nights created a literary sensation that affected mainstream European 
literature, particularly the writers of the Romantic movement, who were captivated 
by a mythical Orient that had no resemblance to any real Eastern place (Marzolph, 
2004). Marzolph explains this imaginary world and how it inspires the writers by 
using Byron’s term of ‘poetic policy’: 
 
No attempt was ever made to describe urban scenes or depict social misery. Poverty was 
absent from this mythic Orient, its place taken by magical riches and sensual pleasures . . .  
This Orient gave writers a foil, an alternative world, a ‘poetic policy,’ as Byron put it 
(Marzolph, 2004; p.28). 
 
With his literary criticism of Orientalist novels and travelogues, Edward Said 
(1978) explains what these kind of Oriental imagery and clichés mean to the 
Western readers as follows: 
 
Oriental clichés: harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancing girls and boys, 
sherbets, ointments, and so on . . . the association is clearly made between the Orient and 
the freedom of licentious sex . . . so the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual 
experience unobtainable in Europe. Virtually no European writer who wrote on or traveled 
to the Orient in the period after 1800 exempted himself or herself from this quest (Said, 
1978; p.190). 
 
In Orientalist discourse, the representations of Ottoman imperial harem reveal a 
Western fantasy embellished with promiscuity, sensuality, sexual vices and lust. 
Western writers portrayed the women in the harem as caricatures, who live only 
for sexual pleasures but cannot satisfy their sexual appetite. In addition to Turkish 
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female sexuality, Western writers also probed into the sexuality of Turkish men, 
particularly focusing on the issues of ‘homosexuality’ and ‘sodomy.’ Turkish male 
sexuality will be analyzed next to have a better understanding of the stereotypical 
image of the ‘lustful Turk.’  
 
The Lustful Turk 
The excessive or perverted sexuality of the Turkish men was common 
knowledge in Western discourse even before the 18
th
 century travelers and “the 
implication was that the Turks had more animality and less intellectual control 
over their instincts than Europeans” (Schiffer, 1999; p.253). For example, William 
Lithgow, traveler of the early 17
th
 century, described the decadent sexual activities 
of Turkish men as follows: 
 
They are extremely inclined to all sorts of lascivious luxury, and generally addicted, 
besides all their sensual and incestuous lusts, unto Sodomy, which they account as a dainty 
to digest all their other libidinous pleasures.
63
 
 
When the Turkish male sexuality is described in the Orientalist discourse, the main 
theme often appears to be sodomy. Lithgow’s observations about the Turkish male 
addiction to sodomy are also cited in Matar’s book, Turks, Moors and Englishmen. 
In Ottoman Morocco, Lithgow watched thousands of sodomitical boys wandering 
in the marketplace of Fez and “Moors buggering” them at midday, in the middle of 
the same marketplace, “without shame or punishment” (Matar, 1999; p.118). 
Another early 17
th
 century traveler, Sir Henry Blount, wrote about ‘Catamites’ in 
the Ottoman Empire, while pointing out that sodomy was not considered a vice in 
Ottoman culture (cited in MacLean, 2004; p.149). These writers considered 
‘sodomy’ as an exclusively Islamic sin and suggested that Muslims indulge in 
sodomy not only in the privacy of their bedroom, but also in the middle of 
marketplaces at midday. Likewise, other Western writers, travelers and captives 
who were eager to dehumanize and alterize the Turks and thus, render them as 
illegitimate viewed sodomy as the dividing line between the civilized Christians 
and the Ottoman Turks. In 1614, the British barber-surgeon William Davis 
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suggested: “These Turks . . . they are altogether sodomites, and do all things 
contrary to a Christian” (as qtd in Matar, 1999; p.113). According to Matar, 
English writers used sodomy to represent the dividing line between the civilized 
Christians and uncivilized Muslims. The stereotype of ‘sodomitical Turk’ was 
created to mark the difference. Matar suggests:  
 
Belonging to the former group signified normalcy, civility, and humanness, while sodomy 
signified barbarity. By predicating the barbarous on the sodomite, English writers created 
the stereotype of the Turk and the Moor (Matar, 1999; p.113). 
 
Therefore, even before the 18
th
 century, the construct of the Turk as ‘sodomite’ 
was well established in Western travel writings, indicating the European perception 
of Turkish ‘Otherness.’  
 
Throughout the 18th century, the image of the ‘lustful Turk’, who has no 
morals and no limit to his sexual practices, became even more predominant. 
Sodomy was frequently seen as a typical characteristic of Turkish men. Western 
travelers viewed it as a widely accepted practice among Turks, even in public 
places, such as a Turkish bath. Lord Byron referred to the Turkish bath as the 
“marble paradise of sherbet and sodomy.”64 He also wrote about the differences of 
sensual pleasures between Turks and English people, and underscored the image of 
Turkish man as a sexual demon fond of catamites. Lord Byron remarks: 
 
I see not much difference between ourselves & the Turks, save that we have foreskins and 
they none . . . In England, the vices in fashion are whoring & drinking, in Turkey, Sodomy 
& smoking, we prefer a girl and a bottle, they a pipe and pathic.
65
 
 
It was even used as a justification for socioeconomic and demographic problems of 
the Ottoman Empire. According to William Eton, due to economic hardships 
created by the Ottoman despotism Turkish men hesitated to raise a family and 
preferred ‘sodomy’, which caused depopulation of the Ottoman Empire. He 
continues:  
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another cause of depopulation, the tyranny of the pashas who . . . impoverish the people, 
that they prevent marriages being so frequent as they are where there is less danger of 
being unable to maintain a family; and this gives rise to an abominable vice, which brings 
sterility with it, and when men are so degraded as to become habituated to it, they lose the 
natural instinct in man for the fair sex.
66
   
 
The Orientalist perception of Ottoman Turks as sodomites or pederasts 
(homosexuals who like young boys) became more common after Richard Burton’s 
translation of Arabian Nights into English in 1885. In his translation, Burton’s 
Terminal Essay refers to a geographical area named “Sotadic Zone” where these 
vices are permissible and are not considered as sin.  In his book, Exploring Turkish 
Cultures, Laurence Raw cites Burton’s comments as follows: 
 
the whole of the so-called “Sotadic Zone” covering the whole of Asia Minor and 
Mesopotamia had been colonized by the “unspeakable Turk, a race of born pederasts.” 
Evidently in the towns and cities of Anatolia “Le Vice [homosexuality] prevails more . . . 
than the villages, yet even these are infected (cited in Raw, 2011; p.241). 
 
Western travelers like Burton often commented on the pervasiveness of Turkish 
pederasty and wrote about young boys being captured, enslaved, and sold to older 
men. These writers frequently suggested that sodomy and pederasty were not only 
acceptable, but also inherent among the elite of the Ottoman Empire (Matar, 1999). 
Therefore, sodomy was not only a perverted morality acceptable by Turks, but also 
represented a depraved political institution such as the Ottoman Empire, where 
homosexuality was institutionalized. However, there was sodomy in other 
societies, even in England too. Matar (1999) criticizes English writers for 
completely ignoring the existence of European homosexuality and sodomy in their 
writings, but consistently disparaging Muslims in general, and Turks in particular, 
for having these ‘abominal vices.’ He elaborates:   
 
While homosexuality may have been either ignored by the general populace, or was so 
socially acceptable that it merited no mention by writers, it was repeatedly denounced in 
the Muslim context . . . The accounts therefore that describe Muslim sodomy are wide-
ranging and appear in all genres – captivity accounts, drama, travel and, much less 
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frequently and significantly, in government documents. Readers luxuriated in the 
degeneracy and deviance of the Muslims (Matar, 1999; p.114).  
 
Furthermore, Matar (1999) claims that there are no texts in the 17
th
 century 
England that place homosexuality in English cultural history, while nearly every 
text on the Muslim dominions refers to it, even if it is anecdotal and brief (p.126). 
English writers focused on these sexual concepts only if it involved Muslim or 
Turkish men, but never mentioned an incident that involved Englishmen.  
 
 Lastly, aside from the context of homosexuality and sodomy, the 
anonymous pornographic fiction, The Lustful Turk (a.k.a Lascivious Scenes from a 
Harem) published in 1828, also reinforced the myth of the sensual and licentious 
Turk in Western discourse. The novel is compiled of fictional letters written by an 
English woman named Emily, who is abducted by the pirates during her trip to 
India and taken to the harem of a Turk named Ali Dey. The book details all the 
sexual acts that take place between Emily, Ali Dey and the other women in the 
harem. The book combines abdominal vices, sexual violence and Orientalist harem 
fantasies all in one plot. Steven Marcus analyzes the sexual content in the book as 
follows:    
 
The chief sexual fantasies represented in The Lustful Turk . . . have largely to do with the 
sexuality of domination, with that conception of male sexuality in which the aggressive 
and sadistic components almost exclusively prevail. Each of the separate stories is in this 
sense identical with the others. Each begins with a virgin, reluctant, proud, chaste, a young 
woman . . . She then undergoes a series of violent experiences, which ritually include 
beating, flogging, and defloration in the form of rape (Marcus, 2008; p.211) 
 
The descriptions of sexual relationships between the Dey and his ladies include 
anal sex, sadistic pleasures, flagellation and rape. While offering harem fantasies 
and rendering sexual imagination, the book also embodies the stereotypical 
qualities of the Turks, such as cruelty, sexual aggression, perversion, lewdness and 
degeneracy, that have been prevalent in Western discourse since Middle Ages. Due 
to its popularity during the 19
th
 century, The Lustful Turk was reprinted several 
times and it helped bolster the stereotype of ‘lustful Turk’ as defined by its title. 
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My brief examination of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century Orientalist travel 
accounts indicate that Turks were often represented as indolent, backward, 
ignorant, despotic, and lustful by the Western travelers. The descriptions of 
Turkish indolence, ignorance, inferiority and backwardness in these accounts 
appear to be ethnocentric. As put forward by Said (1978), the clichés presented in 
the Orientalist discourse create a “system of truths” in which the representations 
about the people of Orient are “ethnocentric.” These representations are often used 
to reinforce the Western positional superiority against an inferior East. As the 
Ottoman Empire became a colonial prospect for Europe due its deteriorating 
condition, Western travelers focused on the Turks’ inability to govern and to 
administer the military, as well as to capitalize and utilize the resources in their 
country. Western writers used disparaging and demeaning imagery to characterize 
the Turks while they attempted to justify the opportunity for the colonization of the 
Ottoman Empire by the West. On the other hand, Ottoman despotism was viewed 
as one of the main reasons for the decline and decay of Empire. Based on the 
reviewed sources, it is probable to suggest that Oriental despotism is significantly 
associated with the Ottoman despotism in the Western travel accounts. Western 
travelers were also obsessed with the imperial harem, where polygamy, 
promiscuity, sensuality and sexual vices prevail. They often described the 
lascivious and promiscuous Turkish women without giving voice to them in their 
writings, indicating a Eurocentric superiority. The representations of Ottoman 
despotism and harem can still be found in the current popular media. Furthermore, 
in the travelogues, Turkish male sexuality is often defined by the representations of 
sodomy and homosexuality. The image of ‘lustful Turk’, which grew to be more 
widespread due to the pornographic novel with the same title, became a stereotype 
that has continued to exist even in modern media representations. This 
stereotypical image of ‘lustful Turk’ reinforced with the Turkish male sexual 
features of sodomy and homosexuality is still being promoted in many Western 
contemporary films. To better understand how these stereotypical characteristics of 
Turks in Orientalist travel accounts transformed into a Turkish stereotype in 
cinema, I will look into the representations of Turks in Western contemporary 
cinema in the next chapter. I will attempt to identify the associations between the 
cinematic characterizations of Turks and their stereotypical imagery in the 
Orientalist discourse.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE IMAGE OF TURKS IN WESTERN CONTEMPORARY CINEMA 
 
The preceding chapters document the representations of Turks in Western 
discourse starting from the Crusades in the 11
th
 century until the end of the 19
th
 
century when the Ottoman Empire neared its end. The literature review of the 
Western writings, including Crusades rhetoric, Renaissance humanist discourse, 
Early Modern English drama, and Orientalist travel accounts indicates that the 
European perception of Turks was primarily negative. Turks were frequently 
characterized as the ‘Other’ and represented stereotypically. The stereotypical 
features of Turks in the Western texts reviewed so far can be summarized with two 
phrases: ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’ In this thesis, I argue that these two 
stereotypical images also continue to exist in the Western contemporary cinema. I 
suggest that the Western perception of Turks has remained consistently negative as 
a continuation of the previous literature discussed so far and thus, generated 
cinematic images resembling the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’ In this 
chapter, I will examine the representations of Turks in Western cinema to 
determine the associations between these myths and the cinematic image of Turks.  
I will also investigate how the Western cinematic image of Turks has bolstered the 
myth of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ and helped these images to survive into 
the 21
st
 century. To achieve this goal, I will review a selected number of films 
involving Turkish portrayals in both the American and European contemporary 
cinema. First, it is essential to discuss the media representations of Turks as the 
Oriental ‘Other’ in order to distinguish the Turkish stereotype from the negative 
images of Muslims and Arabs which are also common in Western cinema. 
 
The Media Image of Turks as the Oriental ‘Other’ 
The image of Turks in Western entertainment media has been consistently 
negative. It is highly unlikely to see a decent Turkish character or even a regular 
Turk who happens to be civil on the movie or TV screens. The cruel and corrupt 
Turk has been the norm whenever a Turkish portrait is presented in films or TV 
shows. Turks are characterized as cruel, violent, immoral, and lewd in most 
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popular films, such as Lawrence of Arabia (1962), Midnight Express (1978), and 
The Usual Suspects (1995), as well as in many highly rated TV shows, such as The 
West Wing
67
, and 24
68
. The demonization of Turks and Turkish culture by the 
popular media may be deemed emblematic of the deeply rooted Western attitude 
towards Muslim alterity. The demeaning images of Muslims in general, and Arabs 
in particular, have been quite common in Western media. Particularly in the US 
media, the vilification of Arabs and Muslims has become more frequent and 
customary since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (see Shaheen, 2008). 
However, long before the tragic events of September 11, negative portrayals of 
Muslims and Arabs, as well as Turks, had already existed in both the US and 
European media. For decades, scholars have intensely criticized the 
misrepresentations of Muslims and Arabs by the media. There has been ample 
amount of research about the distorted media images of Muslims, the biased media 
coverage of the Middle East, negative images of Arabs in US films and TV shows, 
as well as the misrepresentations of Arabs in history textbooks, literature, fiction 
novels, and popular culture (e.g. Gerges, 1997; Ghareeb, 1983; Kamalipour, 1997; 
Said, 1981; Shaheen, 2001 & 2008; Suleiman, 1999; Terry, 1985). Based on the 
previous research, one may argue that stereotypes of Muslims in the media stem 
from preconceived beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes by the West, which have been 
discussed in this thesis. Therefore, the misrepresentation of Muslims and Arabs in 
the entertainment media can be explained by the long-lasting Western tradition of 
stigmatizing Muslims and the Middle East. In other words, the Western popular 
media look at Muslims and the Middle East through an Orientalist lens. 
 
Since Edward Said (1978) put forward the concept of ‘Orientalism’, it has 
been used to imply the Eurocentric exotic and biased representations of the East 
based on the ‘positional superiority’ of the West. When Said described 
‘Orientalism’, he mainly referred to representations in academic writings, Western 
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travel literature, and novels as embodiments of Western ideology. However, he 
also suggests that mass media, such as television and films, have forced the 
Orientalist stereotypes into popular culture and “intensified the demonology of the 
mysterious Orient” (Said, 1978; p.26). The Orientalist stereotypes are so common 
in mass media that it is entrenched in popular culture and is mostly overlooked. 
Most of the popular media such as films, TV shows, magazines, comic books and 
the like, offer distorted images of the Middle Eastern people and the mysterious 
Orient. According to McAlister (2001), “Europeans and Americans have ‘seen’ an 
Orient that is the stuff of the children’s books and popular movies: a world of 
harems and magic lamps, mystery and decadence, irrationality and backwardness” 
(p.8). Western cinema has been one of the most influential entertainment media in 
propagating the Orientalist imagery. It inherited the narrative and visual traditions, 
as well as the cultural assumptions, on which Orientalism was based and 
filmmakers discovered how popular Orientalism could be (Bernstein & Studlar, 
1997; p.3). Particularly, Hollywood films have often presented the Middle East and 
Islamic cultures to the audience through an Orientalist perspective, by using exotic 
esthetics.  
 
Since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, Hollywood has been a significant 
influence on the Western perception of Muslims and the Middle East, because, in 
Orientalist sense, it has been “a site of representing the world abroad to US 
audiences” (Rosenblatt, 2009; p.61). Rosenblatt (2009) claims that Hollywood film 
industry exploited the Orient by transforming it into a commodity available for 
widespread visual consumption. Popular films such as, The Sheik (1921), The Thief 
of Bagdad (1924), The Son of Sheik (1926), Arabian Nights (1942), The Ten 
Commandments (1956), Lawrence of Arabia (1962), and Cleopatra (1963)
69
, 
epitomize the exotic Orientalist stereotypes about the Middle East. In these films, 
“the lands and cultures were depicted as beautiful, mysterious, and sexually 
alluring, while the inhabitants were barbaric, savage, and tyrannical” (Rosenblatt, 
2009; p.61). However, since World War II, representations of the Middle East in 
Hollywood films have shifted from exotic Orientalist myths to more violent and 
vicious characterizations of Muslims. In Covering Islam, Edward Said (1981) 
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points out “the old habit of exoticizing the Orient” no longer exists and “the 
romance and charm have now been completely eliminated” from the films 
(p.xxvii). He describes the new type of films as follows: 
  
There is now; for example, a new wave of large scale feature films (one of them True Lies, 
Karabell reminds us, “had as its villains classic Arab terrorists, complete with glinty eyes 
and passionate desire to kill Americans”) [author’s parentheses] whose main purpose is to 
first demonize and dehumanize Muslims in order, second, to show an intrepid Western, 
usually American, hero killing them off (Said, 1981; p.xxvi). 
 
In Reel Bad Arabs, Shaheen (2001) makes a similar observation suggesting that 
today’s Arab image on the screens is more ‘stereotypical’ than ever. He reminds 
his readers that the Arab Muslim has always been the cultural “other”, but 
Hollywood has made it worse by creating a distorted image of Arabs that look 
“different and threatening” (p.8).  
 
Projected along racial and religious lines, the stereotypes are deeply ingrained in American 
cinema. . . . filmmakers have collectively indicted all Arabs as Public Enemy #1 – brutal, 
heartless, uncivilized, religious fanatics and money-mad cultural “others” bent on 
terrorizing civilized Westerners . . . Hollywood’s caricature of the Arab has prowled the 
silver screen. He is there to this day – repulsive and unrepresentative as ever (Shaheen, 
2001; p.8). 
 
When Muslims and Arabs are stereotyped and demonized constantly in American 
cinema, it is only natural to see the Turks lumped into the same group. Yet, Turks 
in films have their own unique set of characteristics besides the common qualities 
of the Muslim stereotype. Even though Turks are treated as the Oriental ‘Other’ in 
cinema, there is a peculiarity with the Turkish stereotype that sets it apart from the 
Arab image. In addition, there has been a uniformity and permanence in the 
Turkish cinematic image that neither Arabs nor other Muslims have embodied on 
the film screens. To better understand the uniformity of the Turkish stereotype, it is 
imperative to look at the distinction between the image of Arabs and Turks in 
Western cinema.  
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The Distinction between Arabs and Turks 
The extent of Hollywood’s ongoing vilification of Arabs is well 
documented by Jack Shaheen in both of his extensive works, Reel Bad Arabs 
(2001) and Guilty: Hollywood’s Verdict on Arabs after 9/11 (2008). In these 
books, Shaheen criticizes American filmmakers for misrepresenting Arabs and 
Muslims and argues that Arabs remain the most maligned ethnic group in the 
history of Hollywood. Considering Hollywood’s tradition of demonizing Arabs 
and other Muslim groups, why should one regard Turks differently? To answer this 
question, I shall again refer to Shaheen’s work. Although Shaheen exposes the 
ongoing stereotyping of Arabs by Hollywood, he also acknowledges that the 
characterization of Arabs in films has improved lately, as Arab portrayals have 
become more “complex” and “even-handed” than in the past (Shaheen, 2008, 
p.35). Shaheen goes on to admit that several popular films offer more in-depth, 
nuanced and fair portrayals of Muslims and Arabs, characterizing them as descent, 
compassionate, regular human beings, and in some cases even as champions or 
victims. Some examples are, The 13
th
 Warrior (1999), Three Kings (1999), The 
Recruit (2003), Flightplan (2005), Kingdom of Heaven (2005), Syriana (2005), 
Babel (2006), Rendition (2007), The Kite Runner (2007), and A Mighty Heart 
(2007)
70
. Lately, Hollywood producers, directors and screenwriters have become 
more sympathetic to the reactions of the Arab community in the US and therefore, 
they tend to create less offensive and biased Arab characters both in films and TV 
shows. Consequently, Muslim portraits become more nuanced and multifaceted in 
US films and TV series whereas the depictions of Turks remain constantly 
unfavorable and stereotypical. Unlike Arabs, the image of Turks in the US 
entertainment media has not improved. While more objective and impartial images 
of Muslims and Arabs emerge in Hollywood productions, the image of Turks in 
US films has continued to be uniform over the years. This chapter focuses on the 
negative stereotypical image of Turks in cinema and argues that Turkish portrayals 
have been consistently uniform without any nuance or improvement.  
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In his book, The Turk in America, McCarthy (2010) makes the same 
argument and claims “despite great gains in cleansing film and television of overt 
prejudice, negative stereotypes of Turks have remained” (p.288). In films, Turks 
have often been depicted as ‘cruel’, ‘violent’, ‘murderous’, ‘treacherous’, 
‘corrupt’, ‘sexually aggressive’ and ‘sexually perverted’. It is almost impossible to 
find a decent Turkish character in Hollywood films. Turks are frequently portrayed 
as the villain, the ruthless criminal, the evil official, the thug, the treacherous 
sidekick, the corrupt drug addict, the murderer, the rapist, the sexually deviant 
male or the promiscuous, lustful female.
71
  According to Burris (2008), filmmakers 
depict Turkey as “a merciless and monstrous land” and the Turk as “a threat to 
normality” at the expense of the Turkish nation (p.165). His argument regarding 
the ‘Otherness’ of the Turks in films is as follows: 
 
From the earliest days of the silver screen, filmmakers have portrayed Turkish foreignness 
as the antithesis of normality. Because of its perceived “otherness,” the Turk is set up as a 
straw man whose way of life is seen as “different” beyond reconciliation (Burris, 2008, 
p.165). 
 
From an Orientalist perspective, the cinematic image of a Turk is always equipped 
with negative moral and sometimes physical features, and is manifested as the 
binary opposite of the Western hero. The actions taken by the Turkish villain or 
antagonist are unacceptable, indecent, immoral, and repulsive as opposed to the 
Western protagonist’s righteous characteristics. Burris (2008) points out to this 
binary opposition in films and emphasizes how the Turkish image as the ‘Other’ is 
contrasted with the Western ‘Self’ and helps bolster the Western image. He 
suggests: 
 
‘Turkish’ injustice is juxtaposed with ‘Western’ law and order; backwardness with 
sophistication; masculine oppression with gender equality; poverty with economic success; 
and Islam with Christianity. When these supposed Turkish differences are revealed as 
perverse and morally bankrupt, the collective identity of the audience is confirmed and 
strengthened (Burris, 2008; p.165). 
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Therefore, as the ‘polar opposite’ of the Western hero, the Turkish character 
always appears to be inferior and reprehensible. The inferiority of the East versus 
the superiority of the West is recognized, once again, through the Turkish 
portrayals in films. Even though Hollywood may be motivated by an Orientalist 
mindset when depicting Turks, it is still puzzling to see uniformity, homogeneity 
and consistency only in the Turkish stereotype, whereas Arab and Muslim 
portrayals are increasingly evolving and becoming more multidimensional. In this 
thesis, I argue that the stereotypical image of Turks in films is not only a product of 
prior discourses discussed so far in this thesis, but also a continuation of the 
Terrible Turk myth. Besides the “positional superiority” suggested by Edward Said 
in Orientalism, the historical image of Turks inspired filmmakers to create an 
image that reminds us the myth of the ‘terrible Turk’ which has been discussed in 
the previous chapters. To better understand the uniformity of the Turkish 
stereotypical image in Western cinema and its associations with the myth of the 
‘Terrible Turk’, a closer look at the Turkish portrayals in films is needed. 
 
The Hollywood Image of Turks 
 
Since the 1950s, Hollywood’s representation of Turks has been almost like 
a caricature and the cruelty of Turks has been reaffirmed repeatedly with the 
Turkish portraits in films such as, Lawrence of Arabia (1962), America, America 
(1963), Midnight Express (1978), The Usual Suspects (1995), Eastern Promises 
(2007) and many others. Turks have been constantly vilified as ‘cruel, murderous, 
violent, corrupt, vile, and lewd.’ In all of the aforementioned popular films and in 
many others, the Turkish character is reminiscent of the ‘terrible Turk’ image 
featured in Western discourse and being examined in this thesis so far. As Burris 
(2008) suggests, filmmakers have perpetuated the longstanding image of the 
‘terrible Turk’ since the early days of cinema. Even in 1904, The French silent film 
Le Bourreau Turc, which is known in the US as The Terrible Turkish Executioner, 
mocked Turkish injustice by showing four prisoners at an Istanbul bazaar reattach 
their own freshly decapitated heads and seek revenge against their executioner 
(Burris, 2008). The film humorously showed “the apparent barbarism of the Turk” 
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(Burris, 2008; p.166). In most Western films, the ‘Turk’ represents ‘cruelty’, 
‘violence’, ‘barbarism’, ‘oppression’, ‘corruption’ and ‘sexual perversion’. To be 
able to determine the symbolic associations between Turks’ historical image and 
their stereotypical image in Western cinema, it is crucial to have a closer look at 
the characteristics that are frequently attributed to Turks in films.  
 
The Turk as the Despot 
Ottoman despotism and tyranny have been the focus of some Western 
films. These films depict Turks as ‘oppressors’ and even in some cases, as ‘mass 
murderers’ when they show the minorities under the despotic regime of the 
Ottoman Empire. For example, America America (1963) offers the audience a 
glimpse of Ottoman despotism and cruelty. The film depicts how minorities living 
in Turkey were oppressed and brutalized by the Ottoman government. In the film, 
Turks are shown assaulting the Greek and Armenian villages, and massacring the 
Christians. The director and screenwriter of the film, Elia Kazan, is from a Greek 
family that emigrated to the United States from the land of the Ottoman Empire. 
The film tells the story of Kazan’s paternal Uncle, Stavros, who was the first in the 
family to escape from the Turkish atrocities and come to America. In the film, the 
despotic Ottoman government, as the oppressor of the Greek minority, is 
juxtaposed with the United States, as the land of freedom and opportunities. 
Because Ottoman Turks are often represented as the oppressors of the minorities in 
Western discourse, the film was widely embraced by the reviewers without 
questioning its ideological message. In films, the themes of ethnic cleansing, 
massacres, and even genocide are more compelling whenever Turks are portrayed 
as the antagonists. Therefore, such cinematic portrayals become more believable, 
as the audience would accept Turks in that role more easily without questioning it. 
Keeping in mind ‘intertextuality’72 a term coined by Julia Kristeva which was 
discussed in Chapter 1, the insertion of history into text helps filmmakers create a 
more persuasive storyline based on the characterization of Turks. 
 
More recently, Atom Egoyan’s film Ararat (2002) presents the Ottoman 
atrocities towards the Armenian minorities in Turkey. The storyline centers around 
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a film director, Edward Saroyan (Charles Aznavour), who wants to make a movie 
about the alleged ‘Armenian Genocide’ by the Ottoman Empire during World War 
I. The film offers two timelines, as a ‘movie within a movie’, showing both the 
present day and the past, when the genocide took place in Ottoman Turkey. 
Although Ararat is a film about the Turks and Armenians, there is only one 
Turkish character in the film, a Canadian born half-Turkish homosexual man 
named Ali (Elias Coteas). Ali is an actor who plays the brutal Turkish governor, 
Cevdet Bey, in Edward’s film that portrays the Turks as genocidal murderers. Ali’s 
character, governor Cevdet Bey, reaffirms the image of ‘terrible Turk’ for the 
audience. Furthermore, Ali himself, by constantly denying the Ottoman atrocities 
towards the Armenians, reminds the audience that modern day Turks and the 
Turkish government are in denial of the ‘Armenian Genocide.’ Although Ararat’s 
director and writer, Egoyan, rejects the allegations of ‘propaganda’, his film makes 
references to Hitler and likens the Turks to Nazis, while equating Armenians to 
Jews.
73
 The film is loosely based on the book, An American Physician in Turkey by 
Clarence Ussher who is a missionary. According to McCarthy (2010), Ussher “is 
so blinded by his prejudice that even his English and American contemporaries 
spoke of his innate dislike of Turks and his inordinate fanaticism” (p.288). Ararat 
also alludes to the Armenian terrorist organization, ASALA that plotted against the 
Turkish government in 1970s and 1980s, by assassinating Turkish diplomats and 
civilians. Raffi, one of the main characters in Ararat, sympathizes with his late 
father, who was an ASALA member and was killed trying to assassinate a Turkish 
diplomat. The image of the ‘terrible Turk’ is so forceful that even terrorist acts 
against the Turkish Republic and the modern-day Turks, who have nothing to do 
with the wrongdoings of the Ottoman Empire, seem to be justified in the film.
74
 In 
the film, there is an underlying message suggesting that historical facts of the past 
are always subject to interpretation depending on personal bias and tradition. The 
long interrogation of Raffi by a customs officer, when he was suspected of 
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smuggling drugs into Canada, establishes this underlying message. Whether Raffi 
is telling the truth or not during this interrogation metaphorically represents the 
critical question of historical reality.  
 
Ottoman oppression towards minorities is depicted in other films that are 
not perceived as propaganda tools. For example, the British film Pascali’s Island 
(1988) presents similar accounts of minority massacres in association with the brutal 
images of the greedy Turkish officials of a Greek Island controlled by the Ottoman 
Empire. The film also portrays the Turkish Pasha of the island as a cruel and 
murderous Ottoman ruler. In the film, Pascali (Ben Kingsley) works as a spy for the 
Ottoman Sultan, but finds himself in the middle of bizarre events after a British 
archaeologist arrives at the island and becomes romantically involved with the 
Austrian painter (Helen Mirren), whom Pascali secretly was in love with. Because of 
Pascali’s obsessive jealousy and condemnation, the lovers are murdered by the 
Turkish Pasha. In Pascali’s Island, as well as in America America and Ararat, the 
Turkish characters underscore the image of Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarian, cruel, 
tyrannical, murderous’ as discussed in the previous chapters. Therefore, the Turkish 
portrayals in these films become more compelling and believable. Ottoman 
oppression and cruelty are depicted even in a recent Dracula film titled Dracula 
Untold (2014). In this film, Vlad the Impaler, the prince of Wallachia and 
Transylvania, is taken hostage by the Ottomans and trained to be a Janissary warrior. 
When he becomes an Ottoman soldier, he turns into a merciless murderer and gets 
the nickname ‘impaler’ by killing thousands of people. The film implies that Vlad 
transforms into a killer due to the Ottoman military training. Therefore, it attests that 
the natural state of a Turkish soldier is a ‘bloodthirsty murderer.’ After Vlad returns 
home to rule his own domains, Sultan Mehmed II (the conqueror of Constantinople) 
comes to demand 1000 boys from Vlad’s domains, including his own son. 
Collecting young boys from the annexed Ottoman territories was a common practice 
called devshirme, which served the purpose of training Janissary soldiers. In the film, 
it underscores the Ottoman despotism and the oppression that the Christian 
population was subjected to.  It is also a justification for Vlad’s later attempt to turn 
into a vampire and acquire supernatural powers to resist the invasion of Ottoman 
Turks led by Sultan Mehmed II. 
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The Turk as the Criminal, Murderer or the Barbarian 
In Western cinema, Turkish barbarism and cruelty are not reserved solely for 
the portrayals of the Ottoman Empire. The films that tell modern-day stories also 
portray Turks negatively. Particularly, Hollywood films have often exploited the 
so-called ‘barbarism’, ‘violence’ and ‘cruelty’ of the Turks by portraying them as a 
‘boogeyman” or a ‘villain’. For example, in The Usual Suspects (1995), one of the 
main characters, Verbal Kint (Kevin Spacey) fabricates a fictitious criminal 
mastermind named Kayser Soze, while being interrogated by the police. Kayser 
Soze is described as ruthless, violent and a bloodthirsty murderer. His cruelty is 
legendary to an extent that he murdered his own family. Reminiscent of the 
Ottoman Sultans, who were accustomed to the practice of ‘fratricide’, the film 
presents Kayser Soze as a Turk, who is capable of killing his own family members. 
When the name of Kayser Soze is given to the police as the ‘Turkish ruthless 
criminal’, they release the ‘real’ criminal without even questioning the facts. Usual 
Suspects is a critically acclaimed film that received several award nominations. 
The film won the BAFTA award, which is an equivalent of British Oscars, for its 
original screenplay. The same year the film also won the Oscar for the screenplay 
category, along with Kevin Spacey as the actor in a supporting role category. Due 
to the high recognition the film has received, it has reached a larger audience and 
become more popular. Thus, Kayser Soze has become a mythical film character, 
like the myth of ‘terrible Turk’, who is widely known by the movie audience 
worldwide. After 20 years, the film is still being watched on DVD and online. 
 
The characterization of Turks as bloodthirsty murderers is also found in 
King Solomon’s Mines (1985). The evil Turkish slave trader and bandit named 
Dogati (John Rhys-Davies) collaborates with a Nazi colonel for a treasure quest on 
a German military expedition. During the quest, they go into a tribal village in 
Africa and attack the villagers with full force. When they run into a moat of 
quicksand and have trouble crossing it, Dogati kills both the colonel’s men and his 
own men, and uses the dead bodies as stepping stones to cross the moat. Once 
again, the ‘terrible Turk’ image is reaffirmed as Dogati acts even more ruthless and 
barbaric than a Nazi colonel. In America America (1995), during an attack of 
Ottoman soldiers, a group of helpless Armenian villagers, mostly women and 
children, hide in a church for safety. The church is set to fire and burned to ashes 
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by the Ottoman soldiers, reinforcing the image of Turks as ‘cruel’ and 
‘murderous’. The tragic events happen in the Greek protagonist Stavros’s village. 
Later, Stavros befriends a duplicitous Turkish bandit named Abdul, who steals his 
money and family belongings. Furthermore, Abdul tries to kill Stavros to get the 
three coins that he swallowed, but Stavros stabs him in self-defense. The portrait of 
Abdul reminds the audience of the brutal Turkish soldiers who attacked Stavros’s 
village and killed both Greeks and Armenians. Therefore, the pain, frustrations, 
and hardships that Stavros has gone through, because of the Turks, justify the 
murder of Abdul. 
 
The ‘murderous’ Turk pattern continues with a more recent critically 
acclaimed film named Eastern Promises (2007). The opening scene of the film 
shows a young Turkish man named Ekrem (Joseph Altin) walking into his uncle’s 
barber shop in London. While his uncle Azim (Mina E. Mina) is cutting her 
customer Soyka’s (Aleksander Mikic) hair, Ekrem locks the door, closes the 
shades and changes the sign from ‘open’ to ‘closed.’ When Azim introduces his 
nephew to Soyka, Ekrem gets extremely nervous. Azim gives his razor blade to 
Ekrem, tells him to move forward as planned and urges him to kill Soyka. Ekrem 
slits Soyka’s throat with the razor blade and lets him die painfully. Later in the 
film, the audience discovers that Azim helped the Russian mafia kill Soyka. As a 
Turk, Azim is portrayed not only as a paid killer, but also as a mentor who helps 
his nephew with his first murder. Once again, the image of the Turk both as a 
murderer and a criminal is re-affirmed. Eastern Promises drew more attention and 
audience after the film was nominated for Golden Globe awards in both best 
motion picture and best actor categories for Viggo Mortensen, who plays the lead 
role as the Russian mobster, Nikolai. Viggo Mortensen was also nominated for an 
Oscar for his acting in a leading role.  
 
In other films, Turks are also depicted as shady businessmen or organized 
crime members, like arms dealers or drug dealers, as seen in International (2009) 
which is a popular film about an Interpol agent (Clive Owen) and an American 
district attorney (Naomi Watts) who investigate the corruption in a fictitious bank. 
The film also portrays a Turkish duplicitous businessman named Ahmet Sunay 
(Haluk Bilginer). Sunay is an aerotech manufacturer who sells his navigation 
151 
 
technology to both sides of the opposition and thus, extends the international 
conflicts in countries. Engaging in drug dealing is one of the common crimes 
Turkish characters commit in films and Turkey is represented as a country that 
supplies narcotics to the world. As discussed in the preceding chapter, it is a 
stereotypical feature reinforced by the Orientalist perception of Turks as lazy, 
indolent people who smoke pipe or opium all day. For example, in Mediterraneo 
(1991), a film about a group of Italian soldiers stationed on a Greek island during 
World War II, the lone Turkish fisherman named Aziz arrives at the island and 
offers the Italian soldiers hashish. When the soldiers fell asleep due to the drug’s 
effects, Aziz robs them taking away their weapons, equipment and valuables. After 
the island’s Orthodox priest learns about this, he laughs and says: “Never trust the 
Turks.” Mediterraneo won the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film 
in 1991 and has been viewed by a large audience worldwide. In Buffalo Soldiers 
(2001), Ray Elwood (Joaquin Phoenix) is an American soldier who is stationed at a 
military base in Germany. Ray is portrayed as a sympathetic character that passes 
time by cooking high-grade Turkish morphine into high-grade heroin. Unlike Ray, 
his Turkish drug supplier, nicknamed the Turk, is depicted as an unsympathetic 
and cruel businessman. The Turk, played by the Turkish actor Haluk Bilginer, is 
ready to kill Ray rather than see his drug profits drop. Although both Ray and the 
Turk are corrupt in their own ways, the Turk is presented as an unattractive and 
one-dimensional character in contrast with Ray’s likability and nuances. In some 
films, sometimes just the mention of Turks may be enough to explain where the 
drug problem originates. For example, in Coppola’s The Godfather (1972), the 
character who introduces the narcotics trade to the Italian mafia is known as the 
‘Turk.’75 Also, in The French Connection (1971), Turkish farmers sell the opium 
poppies to the underworld market where it is converted into heroin. The heroin is 
smuggled from Turkey into France and then, transported into the United States.  
  
The Turk as Sexual Beast 
Western filmmakers usually eroticize Turks in their films by either 
depicting them as lascivious, sensual, lustful, and promiscuous, or showing them 
engaging in abnormal or forceful sexual conduct. Although Turkish sexuality is 
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sometimes reflected as an alluring quality and as the realization of repressed sexual 
fantasies, more often, the Turk is seen as ‘sexual beast’ to repulse (Burris, 2008). 
The audience is so familiar with the gruesome Turkish sexuality that sometimes it 
is sufficient for the filmmakers to mention the ‘Turk’ to convey the image of a 
sexual predator. For example, in A Knight’s Tale (2001) the film’s hero, William 
Thatcher (Heath Ledger) is introduced to a crowd as the knight who once “saved a 
fatherless beauty from the would-be ravishings of her dreadful Turkish uncle.” By 
the same token, Turks may also be characterized as repugnant people who even 
target children for sex. The Steven Seagal action film, Out of Reach (2004), shows 
a sex-trafficking network that preys on orphans as being operated from the Turkish 
embassy in Warsaw, Poland.
76
 The sexuality of Turks in Western films needs to be 
examined under the categories of female and male sexuality. First, I will have a 
closer look at the Turkish female sexuality in the context of harem and 
promiscuity.  
 
Harem Women 
Oddly, despite the predominant representations of harem and Turkish 
women in the Orientalist travel literature, it is not so common to see Turkish 
women in Western cinema as erotic, voluptuous and seductive harem girls, who 
desire sensuality and offer sexual pleasures. Most of the harem representations on 
the movie screens involve either Arab harem girls or Western women abducted and 
trapped in the harem of an Arab sheik or chieftain. Popular films like The Sheik 
(1921), The Thief of Baghdad (1924), The Son of the Sheik (1926), Kismet (1955), 
Road to Morocco (1942), and Harum Scarum (1965) all show harems in Arabic 
lands, rather than showing Turkish women in Ottoman imperial harem. In such 
films, the Orientalist description of the Ottoman imperial harem manifests itself in 
the Arabic settings, involving either Arab women living in the harem or Western 
women who are forced to be in the harem. Inspired by the Orientalist travel 
accounts and novels that were discussed in the previous chapter, these popular 
films exploit the Western harem fantasies about polygamy, sensuality, lesbianism 
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and eroticism. Shohat (1991) explains this Orientalist pattern in Hollywood films 
as follows: 
 
The topos of the harem in contemporary popular culture draws, of course, on a long 
history of Orientalist fantasies. Western voyagers had no conceivable means of access to 
harems . . . Yet Western texts delineate life in the harems with great assurance and 
exactitude (Shohat, 1991; p.49). 
 
As with voyeuristic anthropological studies and moralistic travel literature concerning non-
normative conceptions of sexuality, Western cinema diffused the anachronistic but still 
Victorian obsession with sexuality through the cinematic apparatus (Shohat, 1991; p.48). 
 
The harem scenes in Western films are not necessarily Ottoman imperial harems 
but still reflect the European obsession with the harem concept, which is a product 
of the Orientalist imagination.  
 
The film called The Favorite (1989, a.k.a Intimate Power) is a rare example 
for the Turkish harem representation because it specifically shows the Ottoman 
imperial harem rather than a generic harem. It is a film inspired by the true story of 
a French woman, named Aimée du Buc de Rivéry (1776-1817), who was captured 
in the sea by the Barbary Corsairs and forced into the Ottoman Sultan’s harem in 
Turkey. The film shows a Turkish harem woman attempting to kiss and fondle the 
French protagonist, Aimée, while she is sleeping. Because of the Western 
obsession and fantasies about lesbianism in harems, Western filmmakers often 
emphasize lesbian sexual endeavors when describing Turkish female sexuality. 
Besides the common lesbianism theme, it is unlikely to see Turkish female 
sexuality explored in Western cinema. For example, in the TV movie, Dark 
Holiday (1989), the Turkish female prison guard is sexually attracted to the 
American woman, who was imprisoned in Turkey for smuggling an antique while 
she was on vacation there. In America America (1963), on the other hand, Elia 
Kazan depicts Turkish women as ‘promiscuous’ and ‘unattractive’. In the film, the 
character of Kazan’s uncle Stavros repeatedly rejects the sexual opportunities 
presented by the promiscuous Turkish women. In a scene, he is offered two chubby 
and bad-looking Turkish women who dance for him vulgarly, manifesting a beast 
like sexuality. To emphasize their sexuality, their panderer refers to one of the 
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women as ‘beast.’ Later in the film, Stavros finally surrenders to the Turkish 
lasciviousness and engages in sexual activity with a veiled female prostitute, who 
uses this opportunity to steal his money. Therefore, Turkish women are represented 
as not only lewd, but also deceitful. Overall, despite the sparse number of 
portrayals, Turkish female sexuality is often identified with promiscuity, 
lasciviousness, lesbianism and immorality in Western cinema. On the other hand, 
there is a substantial amount of Western films that characterize the sexual 
aggression, homosexuality and sexual perversion of Turkish men. 
 
Turkish Men: Sexual Aggression and Homosexuality 
A significant part of the Turkish stereotypical image in Western cinema 
embodies male sexuality given that Turkish men are often characterized as a 
‘sexual monster’. Even silent films show Turkish men abducting Western women, 
or trying to force them for sexual intimacy, usually by raping them. For example in 
The Sixteenth Wife (1917), an American dancer is kidnapped by a Turk named 
Kadir, who wants her to become his 16
th
 wife.
77
 Another silent film, Virgin of 
Stamboul (1920) shows a poor girl in the streets of Istanbul (Constantinople), who 
witnesses a man, named Ahmed Hamid, murdering someone.
78
 To silence her, 
Ahmed forces the girl into his harem, but when she refuses, he takes her to his 
fortified camp outside the city walls. After the silent films, the representation of 
Turkish men in cinema as sexual predators has also continued in contemporary 
Western cinema. Portrayals of Turkish sultans or beys (chieftains), who enslave 
Western women and restrain them in their harems for their sexual appetite, exist 
even in the modern day entertainment media. Besides the aforementioned film, The 
Favorite (1989), the American TV movie titled Harem (1986) is another example 
of the Turkish male desire to subdue a Western woman in his harem. 
 
In contemporary Hollywood films, Turkish male characters usually possess 
two distinctive sexual qualities: sexual aggression, and homosexuality. Turkish 
men are commonly depicted as aggressive sexual predators who abuse or assault 
women. Furthermore, they are presented as tough looking macho men who secretly 
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enjoy homosexual relationships and particularly prey on Western men. The 
prevailing Turkish homosexuality theme is derived from the prior Orientalist 
writings involving Turkish ‘sodomy’, which were discussed in the previous 
chapter. Not only in Orientalist travelogue, but also in earlier Western texts during 
Renaissance and Early Modern period, Turks were commonly described as 
‘sodomites’. In particular, English writers helped create the stereotype of ‘lustful 
Turk’ who enjoys ‘sodomy.’ In Western discourse, the representations of sodomy 
among Muslims and Turks are more common than those among the native people 
in colonial discourse. Matar (1999) suggests that there are even more allusions to 
Muslim sodomy in the Western writings about Ottoman Empire than the colonial 
discourse on Americas.
79
 Inspired by the Turkish men’s so-called obsession with 
sodomy, Western filmmakers often show them engaging in homosexual acts that 
are sometimes consensual but often times not. The Turk attempts to rape a man 
more often than not if his homosexual urge is denied. If there is no actual rape in 
the film, there is always a sexual innuendo for the audience regarding the 
sodomitical intentions of the Turkish male character. Apart from these typical 
qualities, they may also be portrayed as bisexuals or sexual perverts. For example, 
in Pascali’s Island (1988), bisexuality is attributed to the Ottoman spy, Pascali 
(Ben Kingsley), although his Turkishness is never made clear in the film. When 
Pascali realizes that the woman he secretly loves is having an affair with another 
man, he tries to recover from his sexual frustration by soliciting the services of a 
Turkish boy in a Turkish bath (hamam). Beacuse Pascali is perceived as a straight 
Ottoman, the bath scene exposes his bisexuality, while at the same time, 
emphasizes the Turkish passion for homosexual conduct. This scene also 
underscores the representation of Turkish baths in the Orientalists texts as a 
meeting place for homosexual encounters.  
 
Undoubtedly, the films that emphasize Turkish male sexuality and cruelty 
the most are Lawrence of Arabia (1962) and Midnight Express (1978). In these two 
films, Turkish portrayals epitomize the historical image of the Turks as the ‘terrible 
Turk’. Lawrence of Arabia is inspired by the story of T.E. Lawrence, a British 
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army officer who helped the Arabs revolt against the Ottoman Turks during World 
War I. Despite the film’s huge financial and critical success, it has been considered 
as an Orientalist film by most scholars (see Rosenblatt, 2009; Shohat, 1991). The 
film’s portrayals of Turks are particularly noteworthy, as they appear strikingly 
worse compared to the Arabs in the film. The representations of Turks in Lawrence 
of Arabia will be examined closely because the film attests the uniformity of the 
Turkish image, and therefore supports the argument made in this chapter. 
Moreover, Midnight Express is another example that shows the utmost Turkish 
stereotype inspired by the historical image of Turks. This film not only solidifies 
the ‘terrible Turk’ image on the movie screens, but also takes it beyond by turning 
it into a ‘myth’ in popular culture. Therefore, it is essential to look into Midnight 
Express and its implications on the image of Turks in general. First, I will examine 
the representation of Turks in Lawrence of Arabia and analyze the cinematic image 
of Turks as a juxtaposition of Arabs in this film. 
 
Lawrence of Arabia (1962) 
Lawrence of Arabia is based on the story of T.E. Lawrence, an archetypal 
English hero who single-handedly undertook the Arab revolt against the Ottoman 
Turks and enabled the liberation of Arabs from the Ottoman Empire. It is mostly a 
British-made film that was directed by David Lean and produced by the 
Hollywood independent producer, Sam Spiegel. The film was backed by the 
American film company, Columbia Pictures, which managed the marketing and 
distribution of the film all around the world. Based on the life of T.E. Lawrence, 
the screenplay was a collaboration of British and American screenwriters, Robert 
Bolt and Michael Wilson, respectively. Praised by the critics, Lawrence of Arabia 
became a huge success and received ten Academy Award nominations, including 
best director, best picture, best screenplay, and Peter O’Toole as best actor for his 
portrayal of T.E. Lawrence. Among these nominations, the film earned the best 
picture and best director Oscars.  
 
As Lawrence of Arabia is considered an Orientalist film, it is critical for 
this study to understand the content of T.E. Lawrence’s book, Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom, which inspired the film. Published in 1922, Seven Pillars of Wisdom is 
T.E. Lawrence’s autobiographical book about his involvement in the Arab revolt 
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and the events transpired during the liberation of Arabs. In his book Orientalism, 
Edward Said (1978) harshly criticizes Lawrence’s book as an “Orientalist 
discourse”, a “storylike work” and accuses him of being an ‘Orientalist-as-agent’ 
and “imperial agent” (p.238-240).  
 
if the collective academic endeavor called Orientalism was a bureaucratic institution based 
on a certain conservative vision of the Orient, then the servants of such a vision in the 
Orient were imperial agents like T.E. Lawrence. In his work we can see most clearly the 
conflict between narrative history and vision, as – in his words – the “new Imperialism” 
attempted “an active tide of imposing responsibility on the local peoples [of the Orient].”   
. . . It would be important, nevertheless, never to let the Orient go its own way or get out of 
hand, the canonical view being that Orientals had no tradition of freedom (Said, 1978; 
240-241). 
 
Said regards Lawrence’s biography as the story of a typical Orientalist view based 
on the preconception of “uncivilized” East (Orient) guided and liberated by the 
“sophisticated” West. He elaborates:  
  
In any event, what matters to Lawrence is that as a white expert, the legatee of years of 
academic and popular wisdom about the Orient, he is able to subordinate his style of being 
to theirs, thereafter to assume the role of Oriental prophet giving shape to a movement in 
the “new Asia” (Said, 1978; p.243). 
 
Said (1978) accuses T.E. Lawrence of being an archetypal Orientalist who wrote a 
biased account of Arab revolt and reduced the entire narrative to his vision of 
himself and the Orient. According to Said, it is Lawrence’s version of the Orient 
that counts. He suggests: 
 
Indeed, what Lawrence presents to the reader is an unmediated expert power – the power 
to be, for a brief time, the Orient. All the events putatively ascribed to the historical Arab 
revolt are reduced finally to Lawrence’s experiences on its behalf. In such a case . . . one 
voice becomes the whole history, and – for the White Westerner, as reader or writer – the 
only kind of Orient it is possible to know (Said, 1978; 243).  
 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom exemplifies a white-man who fights along with the Arabs, 
on behalf of colonial power, and liberates them from the despotism of Ottoman 
Turks. It is Lawrence who carries the storyline, Lawrence who gives shape to the 
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Arab revolt, and Lawrence who directs its strategy (Macfie, 2007). Said criticizes 
this Western authority exemplified by Lawrence: 
 
The British vision, exemplified by Lawrence, is of the mainstream Orient, of peoples, 
political organizations, and movements guided and held in check by the White Man’s 
expert tutelage; the Orient is “our” Orient, “our” people, “our” dominions (Said, 1978; 
p.245). 
 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom is Lawrence’s version of the Arab revolt, during 
which he sees himself as the progressive Western man who leads the helpless and 
unsophisticated Arabs to have their independence. Said is not the only scholar who 
criticizes Lawrence’s subjective description of Arabs’ liberation from the yoke of 
the Ottoman Turks. Some historians, particularly Arab historians, also dispute 
Lawrence’s account of the Arab revolt and rebuff it as a work of history because of 
the alleged distortions of fact.
80
 For example, in his biography of T.E. Lawrence, 
Suleiman Mousa writes that Arab revolt was predominantly an Arab affair and that 
Lawrence exaggerated his own part in it, which was a minor one, and gave 
insufficient credit to the Arab leaders and fighters (cited in Mack, 1976; p.181). 
Based on his review of the historians’ critiques, Mack (1976) suggests that there 
are distortions in the Seven Pillars of Wisdom. His remarks are as follows: 
 
The distortions and inaccuracy result from Lawrence’s need, deriving from the conflicts 
and his self-regard, to elevate the tale to epic proportions and to make of himself a 
contemporary legendary figure. The legend-making did not of course end with Seven 
Pillars of Wisdom. The Lawrence of myth continued to grow and be enriched by the tales 
of he told his friends (from which, once they are retold, it is impossible to distinguish the 
embellishment and embroidering that is Lawrence’s from that of his friends and 
biographers) and especially from the accounts he supplied his biographers (Mack, 
1976/1998; p.224). 
 
The image of Lawrence of Arabia was created by Lowell Thomas, an 
American journalist who wrote a biography of T.E. Lawrence and turned him into 
a world figure by creating a legendary hero. According to Macfie (2007), Thomas 
was unofficially sponsored by the American government during the First World 
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War in order to raise popular support for American participation in the war. 
Thomas met Lawrence in 1918 during his visit to see General Allenby in Jerusalem 
and took several photographs of Lawrence in his Arab dress. Thomas used them, 
with a brilliant imagination, to prepare a series of lectures about his travels. The 
series of lectures was titled “With Allenby in Palestine and the Conquest of Holy 
Arabia” at first which was then changed to “With Allenby in Palestine and 
Lawrence of Arabia.”81 His lecture was illustrated with photographs of Lawrence 
in Arab dress, along with more than 240 lantern slides and about 30 film segments. 
It was also embellished with Levantine music and an Oriental dance routine 
(Macfie, 2007). Beginning from March 1919, Thomas had given about 4000 
lectures all around the world for four years, including venues like Madison Square 
Garden, New York and the Royal Opera House, London, and places like Australia 
and New Zealand. By the time Lawrence published Seven Pillars of Wisdom in 
1922, he had already become famous worldwide. People came to know him as 
“Lawrence of Arabia,” which is an image that has lasted for a long time. 
 
David Lean’s film, Lawrence of Arabia (1962), magnified Lawrence’s 
legendary image invented by Thomas and turned it into a myth. The film is 
criticized by many scholars for being Orientalist, such as Ella Shohat (1991) who 
argues that Lawrence of Arabia provides a typical example of a European 
penetration into the Third World. She suggests that the film is a “Western 
historical representation whereby the individual Romantic ‘genius’ leads the Arab 
national revolt, presumed to be a passive entity awaiting T.E. Lawrence’s 
inspiration” (Shohat, 1991; p.27). She claims that films like Lawrence of Arabia 
reinforce the reductionist Orientalist thinking and the dichotomy of ‘uncivilized’ 
Easterner versus the ‘civilized’ Westerner. Shohat continues:  
 
The portrayal of a Third World region as undeveloped, in the same vein, is reinforced by a 
topographical reductionism, for example the topographical reductionism of the Orient to 
desert, and metaphorically to dreariness. The desert, a frequent reference in the dialogues 
and a visual motif throughout the Orientalist films, is presented as the essential unchanging 
decor of the history of the Orient. While the Arabs in such films as Lawrence of Arabia . . . 
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are associated with images of underdevelopment, the Westerner as the antithesis of the 
oriental desert, is associated with productive, creative pioneering, a masculine redeemer of 
the wilderness (Shohat, 1991; p.32).  
 
On the other hand, Caton (1999) disputes Shohat’s observations about Lawrence of 
Arabia suggesting that they are “not dialectical enough” (p.175). He argues that the 
Arab representations in the film are not ‘orientalized’ in archetypical sense because 
the film seeks to challenge the common stereotypes of ‘uncivilized’ Arab by using 
nuanced portrayals. However, Caton (1999) also admits that the representations of 
Turks in the film appear “more Other than those of Arabs”, but fails to take them 
into account while questioning the film’s Orientalism (p.195). As Turks are 
Orientalized more than the Arabs in the film, Caton’s omission of Turkish 
portrayals in his detailed study weakens his argument that Lawrence of Arabia is 
not a textbook Orientalist film. Yet Caton is not an exception, as it is not 
uncommon for critics to overlook the representations of Turks when they discuss 
Orientalism. This indicates that the Turkish stereotype in the film is such a widely 
accepted norm that it can be ignored even though Turks are ‘Otherized’ and 
‘Orientalized’ more than the Arabs in the film.   
 
Like Caton, other scholars too have barely paid any critical attention to the 
representations of Turks in the film while analyzing the Orientalism in Lawrence 
of Arabia. The Turks in the film are characterized stereotypically as incompetent, 
murderous, cruel, and perverted, as opposed to the Arab portraits that are normal, 
compassionate and more nuanced. The cruelty and vileness of the Turks in the film 
are highlighted to an extent that they present a contrast with the Arab depictions. 
The filmmakers show a considerable effort to highlight the atrocities and brutalities 
committed by the Turks in order to justify the violent acts performed by the Arabs 
in retaliation. For example, there is a scene that shows the aftermath of the 
massacre executed by the Turks in the town of Tafas. The camera slowly shows the 
slaughtered, disemboweled men, slayed children, and murdered women, with 
blood between their legs. After the massacre, Turks encounter the Arabs led by 
Lawrence (Peter O’Toole), who orders the killing of every single Turk by shouting 
“No prisoners.” During the battle scene, Sherif Ali (Omar Sharif) tries to stop 
Lawrence from killing unarmed Turks who surrender. Sherif Ali’s composed 
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demeanor is an indication of Arab compassion and humanity as opposed to the 
Turks’ cruelty. Both the slaughter of Turks by the Arabs and Lawrence’s brutality 
are perceived as retaliation against the Turkish atrocities and thus justified. Arabs 
and Lawrence are depicted as ‘freedom warriors’ who render justice in contrast 
with the Turks who are characterized as ‘bloodthirsty murderers.’   
 
In the aforementioned scene, Lawrence’s uncontrolled killing spree is not a 
reaction only to the massacre executed by the Turks. Lawrence himself is 
possessed with vengeance because of the torture and sexual assault he had to 
endure at the hands of Turkish soldiers. In Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence 
writes about how he was captured in Deraa by the Turks, brutally beaten and 
presumably raped. According to Lawrence, after he was captured by the Turkish 
soldiers, he was taken to the Bey named Nahi, the Governor. He was told that he 
would be permitted to leave if he “fulfilled the Bey’s pleasure” (Lawrence, 1991; 
p.442). When Lawrence rejected his sexual advances, he was beaten, whipped and 
gang raped by the Bey’s soldiers. Lawrence’s remarks about the incident are as 
follows: 
 
He [The Bey] began to fawn on me, saying how white and fresh I was, how fine my hands 
and feet, and he would let me of drills and duties, make his orderly, even pay me wages, if 
I would love him. . . . The Bey cursed me with terrible threats and made the man holding 
me tear my clothes away, bit by bit. . . . Finally, he lumbered to his feet, with a glitter in 
his look, and began to paw me over (Lawrence, 1991; p.443). 
 
The corporal had run downstairs; and now came back with a whip . . . and then he began to 
lash me madly across and across with all his might . . . After the corporal ceased, the men 
took up, very deliberately, giving me so many, and then an interval, during which they 
would squabble for the next turn, ease themselves, and play unspeakably with me. . . . By 
the bruises perhaps they beat me further: but I next knew that I was being dragged about 
by two men, each disputing over a leg as though to split me apart: while a third man rode 
me astride. It was momently better than more flogging . . . how in Deraa that night the 
citadel of my integrity had been irrevocably lost (Lawrence, 1991; p.444-447).   
 
 
The rape of T.E. Lawrence by the Turkish soldiers has long been disputed by the 
critics. Some suggest that Lawrence made up the whole story, while others claim  
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that he was actually captured and beaten, but not raped
82
. There are also others 
who even argue that Lawrence enjoyed the beating and the rape, because he 
discovered that he was a sadomasochist. In his biography of Lawrence, Harold 
Orlans (2002) claims that Lawrence had a homosexual disposition, as “he fled 
sexually eligible women, admired handsome men, worshipped large men, sought 
and enjoyed male companionship” throughout his life (p.240). He also comments 
on Lawrence’s homosexual interests and alleged sadomasochistic practices. 
 
His one known love, for the Arab boy Dahoum, probably found physical expression only 
in friendly wrestling . . . His one known physical relationship, with a young Scotsman, was 
perverse. He enjoyed his whipping and rape in Deraa and was driven to repeat the 
whippings, perhaps also the sodomy (Orlans, 2002; p.240). 
 
In Desmond Stewart’s 1977 biography of T. E. Lawrence, it is maintained that 
Lawrence fabricated the rape in Deraa and also, suggested that his post-war 
flagellation episodes derived not from the beating and rape, but from his 
relationship with an Arab man during that time (cited in Crawford, 1998; p.168). 
Although T. E. Lawrence’s private life and sexual preferences are not relevant to 
this thesis, his presumed rape is crucial, because there is a particularly memorable 
scene in Lawrence of Arabia based solely on his allegations of rape in his memoir.  
  
In the film, after Lawrence is captured in Deraa by the Turks, he is put in a 
line-up inspected by the Turkish Bey (José Ferrer). The Bey, who is wearing shiny 
leather boots, rips open Lawrence’s shirt and observes intently. The scene takes 
place as follows: 
 
Turkish Bey: Yes, you are a deserter . . . but from which army? Not that it matters at all. A 
man cannot be always in uniform. 
He removes his right glove and taking Lawrence's pectoral muscle between thumb and 
forefinger begins to knead. The Bey admiringly kneads Lawrence's muscles between his 
fingers, remarking, “Your skin is very fair." Lean cuts to a close-up of the Bey's moist lips, 
followed by a close-up of Lawrence's frightened eyes. Lawrence strikes out in homophobic 
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mania, which prompts the Bey to issue an order to strip him to the waist and beat him 
(Raw, 2005; p.254). 
 
As described effectively by Raw, the scene is enriched with indications of the 
Turkish Bey’s sexual desires towards Lawrence. Even the leather boots of the 
Turkish Bey are an allusion to his sadomasochistic tendencies. After the Turkish 
soldiers strap Lawrence face down on a wooden bench and ensure that his legs are 
well spread, the beating begins. Although the whipping is not shown directly, the 
filmmakers make it obvious by showing the Turkish soldiers grinning lasciviously, 
contrasted with Lawrence's agonized look as he sees the whip being raised to strike 
him. As the Bey is seen peeping from the adjoining room, his voyeurism reveals to 
the audience that Lawrence’s punishment gives him sexual excitement. Despite the 
absence of an actual rape scene, the filmmakers make sure that the sexual innuendo 
is apparent and the sexual assault is unequivocal. Outside, the camera shows the 
horrified reaction of Sherif Ali (Omar Sharif) hiding behind a column and listening 
to the voices inside. His disturbed and shaken look on his face offers a contrast for 
the Arab humanity versus the Turkish cruelty.   
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, whenever Turkish sexuality is 
represented, ‘homosexuality’ and ‘sodomy’ are predominant themes in Western 
writings, particularly in Orientalist travelogues. These themes continue to exist in 
contemporary cinema and promote the stereotypical image of Turks. The sexual 
assault by the Turks in Lawrence of Arabia is one of the best examples of the 
Turkish cinematic stereotype that is deeply rooted in the Orientalist image of 
Turks. While Turks’ sexuality is represented from an Orientalist standpoint, Arabs 
are portrayed as normal and decent. In Orientalist travel accounts, sodomy and 
homosexuality are described as common practices of Muslim men however, in the 
film it is applied specifically to the Turks, but not to the Arabs. Raw (2005) calls 
attention to the contrast between the depictions of Turkish male sexuality versus 
the sexuality of Arabs in Lawrence of Arabia. He also points out the how the 
representation of Turks in the film is associated with the image of Turks in 
Orientalist discourse as homosexuals or sodomites:  
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In their efforts to challenge orientalist representations of the Arabs, the screenwriters –like 
Lawrence himself – Orientalized the Ottomans. Lawrence of Arabia stresses the contrast 
between the two races by drawing upon a tradition of homosexual orientalism, applied 
specifically to the Ottoman (and the Turks) that dates back to the work of nineteenth-
century travelers such as Sir Richard Burton, and that persists in more recent films such as 
Midnight Express (1979). Lean was not particularly anti-Ottoman; rather he chose to 
demonize them as a means of explaining the behavior of his Arabic and British central 
characters (Raw, 2005; p.253). 
 
Considering the sexuality, despotism and cruelty of Turks in Lawrence of Arabia, 
one may conclude that the depiction of Turks in the film is a continuation of the 
Turkish image in the Western discourse, particularly the Orientalist discourse 
where Turks are commonly represented as sodomites and despots. The film is a 
testament to the image of Turks as “cruel and beastly, murderers and rapists”, 
which has been promoted and disseminated by the “European tutelage” (Macfie, 
2007; p.84). Lawrence of Arabia is critical to this thesis as it shows the uniformity 
of the Turkish image. The film “tries to understand the Arab state of mind, 
particularly its preoccupation with male honor and blood feuds” (Raw, 2005; 
p.259), but it never attempts to analyze the Turks or consider the state of the 
Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Instead, it portrays the Turks as 
violent, cruel, murderous and perverted, which is the stereotype that has been 
frequently found in Western writings discussed so far.  The fact that the Arabs are 
represented more human than the Turks in Lawrence of Arabia supports the 
uniformity of the Turkish image. The second significant film that upholds this 
argument and promotes the Turkish stereotype is Midnight Express, which will be 
examined next. 
 
Midnight Express (1978) 
Midnight Express is about an American college student, named Billy 
Hayes, who was imprisoned in Turkey in 1970 for drug smuggling. The film is 
based on Billy Hayes’ memoir, which was published in 1977 and was adapted into 
a screenplay by American screenwriter Oliver Stone. As a British and American 
collaboration, the film was directed by Alan Parker, produced by David Putnam 
and Alan Marshall who are British, and backed by Columbia Pictures, an 
American film company. After its release in 1978, the film became a favorite 
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among film critics on an international scale. Midnight Express received six Oscar 
nominations including best picture and best director, and best adapted screenplay, 
for which Oliver Stone won the Oscar. The huge commercial success of the film 
provided both Oliver Stone and Alan Parker with the popularity upon which they 
successfully capitalized in Hollywood during the following years. Midnight 
Express also inspired several other films in the 1990s that depict Americans 
imprisoned on drug-related charges in Third World countries. Two noteworthy 
examples are Return to Paradise (1998) and Brokedown Palace (1999) that take 
place in Malaysia and Thailand, respectively. 
 
Midnight Express was first screened at Cannes Film Festival in May 1978 
and immediately became the epicenter of controversy. The film received mixed 
reviews and was primarily criticized for its ‘anti-Turk’ rhetoric. According to 
Mutlu (2005), some critics appreciated it as a powerful ‘real-life drama’, and ‘anti-
drug film’ and ‘courageous filmmaking’, while others criticized it for its ‘needles 
violence’, ‘xenophobia’, ‘racism’ and ‘homophobia’ (p.480). The Turkish 
government and press considered Midnight Express as an insult and a political 
assault against Turkey and Turks, and the film was banned in Turkey shortly after 
the Cannes screening (Mutlu, 2005). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs even 
released a statement through its embassies worldwide in an attempt to prevent its 
screening in other countries (Raw, 2011). Despite the protests of the Turkish 
government and the Turkish communities in Europe, Midnight Express was shown 
in many countries such as France, Britain, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and Holland, where some scenes were cut (Mutlu, 2005). The reaction to 
the film in Europe was covered in the US press even before the film’s release in 
America. The Washington Post reported the reaction from the Turkish community 
living in Netherlands as follows: 
 
Protests from Holland’s 100,000-member Turkish community caused the distributors of 
the American movie Midnight Express to cut certain scenes from the film for Dutch 
release. They cut scenes in which the main character abuses Turkey and Turks in general, 
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which Turkish organizations argued incite hatred and discrimination by portraying Turks 
as inferior (The Washington Post, 1978, August 31).
83
 
 
The reaction to Midnight Express in Europe created anticipation and curiosity in 
America and increased the film’s publicity in the American film market. Since its 
release in October 1978 until the end of January 1979, the film became one of the 
20 top-grossing films in the United States.
84
 
 
Midnight Express presents a powerful modern horror story about Billy 
Hayes’ ordeal in a Turkish prison and his ultimate escape. After the film’s release, 
some critics argued that Oliver Stone’s depiction of Turks was ‘racist’ (Whaley, 
2013). Film critic Pauline Kael characterized Stone’s screenplay as “indicting a 
whole people on the presumption that the brutality of the prison guards represents 
the national way of life” (quoted in Whaley, 2013). The film’s racist quality was 
even discussed in the House of Lords in England. The British newspaper The 
Independent wrote: 
 
When Midnight Express was released, there was some debate about whether its depiction 
of the Turks was racist. Lord Coleraine raised the issue in the House of Lords, suggesting 
that the film, about western prisoners in a Turkish jail, might have contravened the Race 
Relations Act. When the producers offered the proceeds of the British premiere to 
Amnesty International, that body declined. It wished to dissociate itself from "any 
tendency which could be interpreted as a generalized denigration of Turkey and the 
Turkish people" (McArthur, 1997, Aug 15, The Independent, p.15).
85
 
 
The charge of racism about Midnight Express mainly originates from one of the 
scenes where Billy Hayes (Brad Davis) delivers a blistering speech in the 
courtroom condemning the Turkish justice system and the Turkish nation as a 
whole. In the scene, Billy loses his temper and curses the Turks in the court, after 
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his jail sentence is increased from four years to thirty years due to the smuggling 
conviction. An excerpt from his speech is as follows: 
 
you’d know a society is based on a sense of fair play, a sense of justice. For a nation of 
pigs, it sure is funny you don’t eat’em. Jesus Christ forgave the bastards, but I can’t. I hate 
you. I hate your nation, I hate your people, and fuck your sons and daughters because 
they’re all pigs, you’re a pig, they’re all pigs! (Midnight Express, 1978). 
 
Film critic Hubert Niogret from the French film magazine Positif stated that Billy 
Hayes’s courtroom speech, including the statement “I hate your nation, I hate your 
people”, was a fabrication of the film-makers and marked the moment when the 
film turned into ‘the discourse of an unsupportable racism’.86 Bruno Villien from 
Cinématographe associated it with ‘anti-Turk racism’, while Bernard Bolan from 
Cahiers du Cinéma found the film’s representation of the ‘Other’ as ‘racist’ and 
argued that “These Turks are not Turks but the abstract and undifferentiated signs 
of the Other [inspiring] hatred.”87 As Hubert Niogret suggested, the speech is a 
fabrication as it does not exist in Billy Hayes’s memoir, which the film is based on. 
While trying to dramatize Billy’s frustration towards the Turkish justice system, 
the filmmakers took it to an extent that they insult the Turks as a nation. Because 
of the common perception of Turks as brutal, cruel and barbarian, it may be likely 
for the audience to overlook the insult against the Turkish nation. Therefore, 
despite the offensive language used against the Turkish nation in the scene, the 
filmmakers are likely to avert any criticism because of the well-known image of 
the ‘terrible Turk.’  
 
The filmmakers were primarily criticized for altering the facts in Hayes’s 
memoir and for overdramatizing his story. The film portrays Billy Hayes and all 
the other Western inmates as sensitive, decent, and honest people who are 
imprisoned unfairly by the Turkish justice system and treated brutally by the Turks 
in the prison. For example, Jimmy Booth (Randy Quaid) is portrayed as a fellow 
American imprisoned for stealing candlesticks from a mosque, whereas his 
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character is actually inspired by a drug smuggler in the memoir, who was 
sentenced to fifteen years for smuggling 88 pounds (forty kilos) of hashish.
88
 In 
contrast, the Turks in the film are characterized as ugly, brutal, and perverted. The 
Turkish inmate and informant, Rifki (Paolo Bonacelli), and the head prison guard, 
Hamidou (Paul L.Smith) are the two villains in the film. Although Rifki is 
Jordanian in Billy Hayes’s memoir, the film presents him as a Turk who is vicious 
and ugly looking. He even kills the cat that belongs to Max (John Hurt), who is a 
sensitive and vulnerable British prisoner, and also Billy’s friend. However, Billy 
Hayes does not mention such an event in his memoir, nor does he talk about the 
existence of any cats in the prison.
89
 To emphasize the cruelty of the Turks even 
more, both Turkish villains, Rifki and Hamidou, collaborate on the most horrifying 
scenes of the film. When Billy asks for a blanket during his first night in prison, 
Rifki refuses to give him one, so he gets a blanket from another cell. Because of 
his disobedience, Billy gets beaten very badly by Hamidou. In that particular 
scene, the guards tie him up from his feet and hang him upside down, and 
Hamidou beats him with a thick, wooden stick, recalling the scene from the 
Lawrence of Arabia, where T.E. Lawrence was beaten by the Turkish soldiers. The 
brutality of Turks is reaffirmed as the film shows Hamidou beating the prisoners 
frequently, and once even letting his own children watch.  
 
At the end of the aforementioned beating scene of the film, Billy Hayes is 
also sodomized by the head guard, Hamidou. The actual rape is not shown in the 
film, but the audience is assured that the rape took place. Similar to Lawrence of 
Arabia, the theme of sodomy is replicated in Midnight Express, being emphasized 
even further. In both films, the Western protagonists are beaten and sodomized by 
Turkish men, but in Midnight Express the homosexuality of Turkish men is 
highlighted even more. For example at the beginning of the film, when Billy Hayes 
gets arrested and is taken to the police station, he is stripped down naked by the 
police during a drug search. When he is standing naked in the room, the camera 
shows the lewd and nasty looks of the Turkish policemen around him. They all 
stare at Billy’s naked body with desire, implying their homosexual tendencies. In 
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fact, there is a scene in which Hayes makes generalizations about the sexuality of 
Turkish men. He claims that Turkish men are either bisexual or homosexual, 
because they love to have sex with each other all the time, although they consider 
it to be a shame. At the end of the film, when Hamidou attempts to rape Billy 
again, Billy kills him and escapes from the prison. However, in his memoir, Billy 
Hayes does not claim to have been assaulted sexually in the prison and does not 
accuse any Turkish guards either.
90
 Instead, he writes about his consensual 
homosexual relationship with a Swedish inmate named Arne, who is portrayed as 
Erich in the film.
91
 However, the film shows Billy refusing any homosexual 
advances by Erich in contrast with the book. Receiving the Oscar for Best 
Screenplay, Oliver Stone was asked why the events in the film did not correspond 
with those in the book. He answered: “We were not making a documentary. The 
book did not have the dramatic cohesion the film needed” (qtd in Holden, 1994; 
p.77). Therefore, Stone embellished the screenplay with the prison rape overtones 
which are fitting to the image of Turks as ‘sodomizers’ in the Western discourse, 
prevalent particularly in the Orientalist travelogues. 
 
Since its release in 1978, Midnight Express has been a big hurdle for 
Turkey and the Turks, as the film disparages Turkish judicial system, Turkish 
police, Turkish prisons, and Turkish male sexuality while at the same time 
vilifying Turks as a nation. In his article, Turkish journalist Haluk Sahin describes 
below how the film tarnished the reputation of Turks as a nation.   
 
This unsolicited new identity, this cursed Hollywood passport, this media-age Star of 
David that was branded upon me, upon all citizens of Turkey, has caused incalculable 
suffering for millions of my countrymen
92
 (Haluk Sahin, 1999, March 2, Hurriyet Daily 
News). 
 
Midnight Express also affected the touristic travel to Turkey for a long time and 
had a huge economic impact on Turkey as the country lost a big chunk of its 
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tourism revenue for several years. In her article, Leslie Esbrook suggests: “it is 
commonly known that this film singularly ruined Turkey’s tourism industry and 
global economic growth for years.”93 According to Tulin Daloglu, even Billy 
Hayes himself, whose memoir inspired the film, said in a newspaper interview: 
“There’s no doubt it changed the whole face of Turkish tourism . . . It’s not fair. 
The burden fell on people who weren’t to blame.”94 Sweden’s ambassador to 
Turkey, Christer Asp, points out the power of the film’s negative cultural 
promotion and its long-lasting effect. 
 
the single worst picture, that the worst thing that would have happened Turkey was that 
film . . . Midnight Express, it was devastating I think to the Turkish image. I've never seen 
a film provoke that kind of a lasting impression of a country (qtd. in Kemming, 2009; 
p.172). 
 
In 2004, right before the European Union’s decision whether or not to launch 
membership talks with Turkey, Oliver Stone apologized for offending the Turks in 
the film. During his trip as a guest of Turkish Culture Ministry, Stone commented 
about Turkey’s response to Midnight Express and why he had not been able to visit 
Turkey for a long time: 
 
It is true I overdramatized the script, but the reality of Turkish prisons at the time was also 
referred to . . . by various human rights associations . . . For years, I heard that Turkish 
people were angry with me and I did not feel safe there. The Culture Ministry gave me a 
guarantee that I would be safe, so I feel comfortable now.
95
 
 
Regarding Stone’s remarks, Billy Hayes also confirmed that the screenplay was 
overdramatized. He also stated that the prison conditions in Turkey were not much 
worse than those in other countries, even in the US. Still it was unfair to depict all 
Turks bad in the film just based on that fact.  
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My biggest problem with the screenplay and the film was that you did not see a single 
good Turk . . . so the overall impression was that all Turks are like those depicted in the 
film. And, of course, this is not true. It does not take away from the fact that the prison was 
brutal and the legal system hypocritical, but that can be said of almost any country, 
particularly, and unfortunately, ours. Prison guards are not necessarily the cream of any 
society.
96
 
 
  Despite the fact that the film’s screenplay is overdramatized and has many 
discrepancies with Hayes’ memoir, the appalling prison scenes and the brutality of 
the Turks in Midnight Express have remained in the minds of film audiences 
around the world for years to come. It has also been argued that the film might 
have been one of the biggest reasons why the EU did not address Turkey’s 
membership application for a long time. In an interview the film’s director Alan 
Parker commented on this issue by saying: “They do polls asking why people do 
not want Turkey in the European Union, and the prevalent reason is Midnight 
Express. I feel terrible.”97 Midnight Express may not be the reason for EU’s 
decision to delay Turkey’s application, but it is plausible to suggest that the film 
had an effect on the public opinion regarding Turkey’s membership. Midnight 
Express is available on DVD and online, and is still being watched worldwide, 
possibly having the same petrifying effect on the viewers. The film has been so 
infamous that the phrase ‘Turkish prison’ became synonymous with ‘hellish 
ordeal’ in American English.98  
 
 Midnight Express has promoted the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ image that has 
been examined in this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 1, Barthes (1957) suggests 
that myth should have a historical foundation and “it is therefore by no means 
confined to oral speech” (p.109). The image of Turks in the film is inspired by the 
Turkish stereotype that originates from the Western discourse since the Middle 
Ages. As being analyzed in this thesis, this stereotype has been uniform and has 
not changed in Western discourse throughout different time periods. The same 
stereotype continues to exist in Midnight Express and the mythical Turkish image 
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has been bolstered by the popularity of the film. Therefore, the myth of ‘terrible 
Turk’ has remained uniform, constant and everlasting.  
 
The Turkish Image in European Cinema 
 
The selected films being discussed so far are largely representative of 
Hollywood productions that are either American films or British-American 
collaborations. Usually, Hollywood productions are advertised, promoted and 
distributed worldwide and thus, reach a large number of audience around the 
world. These films, including the collaborated ones, are released and marketed 
internationally with the financial backings of American film companies. Some of 
them, such as Lawrence of Arabia and Midnight Express, are advertised and 
promoted more forcefully than the others and hence, bring in both critical and 
commercial success worldwide. Therefore, these films have become popular not 
only in American and European markets, but also become widely known all around 
the world. Other than these well-known films, there are also some European films 
that are not as popular as the Hollywood productions. These small budget films are 
usually released in the European market only and fairly seen by the European 
audience in most cases. Therefore, they are not widely available in the US, except 
for DVD release or online stream. These films are primarily reviewed by critics, 
but usually go unnoticed by the general film audience around the world. Due to 
their limited viewership, the popularity and the impact of these films are not as big 
as the Hollywood productions. Nevertheless, some of these films are still 
noteworthy in terms of their representations of Turks and Turkish culture. Also, it 
is essential to discuss the representations of Turks in European cinema because the 
main focus of this thesis has been the Eurocentric perception of Turks. Therefore, 
to present a more sound argument about the Turkish image in Western discourse, I 
will examine a selected number of European films in this section. 
 
Like the Hollywood films, European cinema offers several examples that 
represent Turks negatively. The same pattern of depicting Turks as oppressors, 
criminals, murderers, drug dealers and rapists can also be found in many European 
films. The films that show the Turks as oppressors usually focus on the Ottoman 
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yoke and despotism in European countries, whereas other films just offer a glimpse 
of Ottoman military attacks in the background as the plot advances. For example, 
the Macedonian entry for Best Foreign Language Film Oscar, To the Hilt (2014), 
takes place in Ottoman Macedonia, a small Eastern European region that was 
under the Turkish rule for five hundred years. The film offers a love quadrangle 
between a romantic Macedonian rebel, an educated wealthy young man, a 
merciless Turkish officer, and a spoiled European woman. The film portrays the 
Turkish officer as arrogant and cruel, while depicting Ottoman Turks as murderous 
and brutal, who massacre defenseless Macedonian villagers. The British comedy 
film, The Adventures of Baron Munchausen (1988), takes place in an unnamed 
European city, which is under the attack by the Ottoman army in the late 18
th
 
century. The whole storyline revolves around the Baron’s efforts to save the city 
from the invasion of the Ottoman Turks. The Ottoman Turks are portrayed as a 
force of the nature that attacks Europe constantly and terrifies Europeans. 
 
Representation of Turks as murderers, criminals, drug dealers and sexual 
predators is also the most common pattern associated with the Turkish image in the 
European cinema. For example Empire of the Wolves (2005), the French film 
originally named as L’Empire des Loups, involves all these negative elements 
while the plot centers around a Turkish crime network that is linked to an 
ultranationalist group in Turkey. To find a serial killer, two detectives Schiffer 
(Jean Reno) and  Nerteaux (Jocelyn Quivrin) go into the Turkish underworld, 
which is traced to Paris’s Turkish neighborhood named ‘Little Turkey’ in the film. 
While the film depicts the Turkish neighborhood as a dangerous world of drugs 
and crime, it also insults the Turkish cuisine which is, in fact, one of the reputable 
cuisines in the world. When detective Nerteaux is disgusted with Turkish food and 
refuses to eat it, detective Schiffer remarks: “To fight evil, you gotta taste it” 
(Burris, 2008; p.169). The filmmakers characterize Turks as ‘evil’ and also disdain 
Turkish food at the same time. The Turkish clubbers in the film are presented as 
nose-pierced, and tattooed, while the Turkish criminals have even more distasteful 
physical features. For example, the Turkish mob boss has a terrifying ugly body 
that was permanently deformed due to acid exposure. The psychotic killer, who 
has the habit of carving the image of a statue in the face of his unfortunate victims, 
is also Turkish. Therefore, by characterizing Turks as bloodthirsty murderers, 
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ruthless criminals and gruesome people, the film follows the pattern of vilifying 
Turks as it has been frequently done in Western discourse.  
 
On occasion, Turks may be seen as the evil in the form of an unearthly 
creature. In Black Sabbath (1963), an Italian-French horror film, the evil force is a 
vampire Turk. In one of the three storylines of the film, the father of a central 
European family sets out to confront Turkish vampire, but becomes a vampire 
himself too (Burris, 2005).  On the other hand, the Spanish-German vampire film, 
Vampyros Lesbos (1971), illustrates a human Turkish character who is even worse 
than the evil vampires. The villain of the film appears to be a female vampire who 
enslaves other women and manipulates them into a lesbian relationship by taking 
advantage of their repressed sexual fantasies. Yet, the film also presents a Turkish 
hotel porter named Mehmet whose wife is under the lesbian power of the female 
vampire. His frustration turns Mehmet into a sadistic killer, who lures women into 
the hotel wine cellar, tortures them in the most horrific ways and murders them. 
Therefore, the film characterizes Mehmet as a bloodthirsty sadistic murderer who 
is driven by his frustration and uncontrollable rage, whereas the actions of the 
vampire are perceived normal. The Spanish director of Vampyros Lesbos, Jesus 
Franco, directed another film named Venus in Furs (1969) that also features a 
psychopathic Turkish killer played by German actor Klaus Kinski. In the film, 
Ahmed (Kinski) is portrayed as a millionaire playboy who sadistically rapes and 
murders a young woman. Either as a vampire or as a sadistic killer who tortures 
and rapes women, Turks are depicted as ‘evil’ in all of these films. Also, rape and 
sexual aggression are shown as the main characteristic of Turkish male sexuality in 
both cases.   
 
Similar to Hollywood films, European cinema also offers examples of 
Turkish portraits who are drug dealers, drug addicts or members of drug related 
organized crime. The Dutch film, Godforsaken/Van God Los (2003), portrays a 
gang of drug using adolescents who commit small crimes and get away with them. 
They act as amateurs until they are hired by the Turkish mob boss Osman. After 
working for the Turkish mob, the adolescents start executing murders and become 
professional killers. The Italian film Mediterraneo (1991) that was previously 
mentioned as the winner of the Best Foreign Language Film Oscar is another 
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example of the European cinema where Turks are represented as drug dealers. As a 
reminder, the Turkish character in the film sells the Italian soldiers hashish and 
steals their belongings after they pass out due to the drug’s effect. 
 
Inspired by the prior image of ‘Lustful Turk’, some European films focus 
on Turkish sexuality and sensuality. In the Spanish film, The Turkish Passion/La 
Pasión Turca (1994), the Turkish male character embodies the characteristics of a 
lascivious and seductive Turk. As an adaptation from the popular 1993 novel by 
Antonio Gala, the film became one of the highest grossing films in Spain in the 
1990s. It also received twelve nominations for the prestigious Goya Awards in 
1994, which is the equivalent of Spanish Oscars. The film is about a married 
Spanish woman named Desi who is bored with her sexual life and has an affair 
with a handsome and passionate Turkish tour guide named Yaman during her trip 
to Turkey with her husband. For Desi, Yaman became the one man whom she 
finds sexual fulfillment and utmost gratification for the first time in her life. When 
Desi returns to Spain, she realizes that she is pregnant with Yaman’s child. After 
her baby dies due to illness, Desi leaves her husband, goes to Turkey and starts 
living with Yaman. Their sexual desire and passion continue but things begin to 
change when Desi gets pregnant again. From thereon, the film introduces the other 
side of Yaman, who can also be an immoral, debauched and nasty man. Despite 
Desi’s resistance, Yaman forces her to have an abortion which leaves Desi unable 
to have children anymore. Then, Yaman begins pressuring her to provide sexual 
favors for customers who come to the Turkish carpet store, the family business 
Yaman is running with his brother. Having been outraged with Yaman, Desi 
refuses his dirty dealings and goes back to Spain. However, she cannot stand being 
without him and returns to Turkey. Yaman beats her because she left him, but Desi 
does not care as she is under the sexual domination of Yaman, the overpowering 
and manipulative Turk. To make Yaman happy, she even begins pleasing the store 
customers and carpet dealers sexually. One day, when Desi finds Yaman having 
sex with a couple, she realizes that she cannot tolerate his homosexual relationship. 
Desi shoots Yaman and escapes back to Spain. The image of the ‘Lustful Turk’ 
becomes more apparent as Yaman is also characterized as a man who enjoys 
homosexual as well as heterosexual sexual conduct. In addition to the sexual 
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component, the film offers a glimpse of the ‘Terrible Turk’ image because it 
portrays Yaman as corrupt, immoral, and deceitful.  
 
The aforementioned selected films provide a sample of Turkish portraits 
that are representative of the corrupt, immoral, cruel, lustful and debauched Turk 
which has been common in the Western discourse. The representations of the 
Turks in these films are similar to those of Hollywood productions. However, 
unlike Hollywood, European cinema offers some nuanced and humanized 
portrayals of Turks at the same time. Some films primarily focus on immigration 
and explore the adversities that immigrants face in the host country. Other films 
shed a light on difficulties they face during their journey to a foreign land. For 
example, Journey of Hope (1990) tells the story of an underprivileged and poor 
Turkish family that tries to immigrate to Switzerland from Turkey to have a better 
life. Living in a small village of southeastern Turkey, Haydar and Meryem, played 
by the Turkish actors Necmettin Cobanoglu and Nur Surer respectively, sell their 
livestock and land to pay for their passage to Switzerland. They are stowed away to 
Italy and arrive at Genoa. From there, they are taken to the mountains by a sleazy 
bunch of smugglers and sent to the Swiss Alpines without any guidance in the 
snow and cold. Trying to find a passage to Switzerland, Meryem breaks her leg 
and Haydar is forced to leave her behind to get help with his son. They get caught 
in a blizzard and his son freezes to death by the time help arrives. Haydar gets 
arrested by the Swiss authorities on charges of negligence and the couple is 
detained awaiting deportation to Turkey.  
 
Journey of Hope (1990) won the Academy Award for Best Foreign 
Language Film in 1990. The film is a co-production of Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and Turkey, but it was submitted for the Academy Awards by 
Switzerland. The screenplay is written by both Feride Cicekoglu from Turkey and 
Xavier Koller from Switzerland, who also directed the film. The initial publicity 
for the film describes Haydar and his family as Turkish, but later, they were also 
identified as Kurdish given the fact that they come from the southeastern region of 
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Turkey where most of the inhabitants are Kurdish.
99
 However, there is nothing in 
the film that specifically identifies the family as Kurdish, as they all speak Turkish 
throughout the film. Regardless of their ethnicity, the film portrays the hardships 
and struggles of a migrant family that seeks a better life in a land of promise.  
 
Another touching immigrant story about Turks can be found in Dirty Pretty 
Things (2002) about a Turkish young woman named Senay (Audrey Tautou), who 
is an immigrant in UK. She works illegally as a cleaner at a hotel where the hotel 
manager, Juan, also runs an illegitimate business of swapping the kidneys of illegal 
immigrants for forged passports. The film evolves around Senay’s struggle to be 
able to stay in UK, after her illegal work status is discovered by the authorities. 
From thereon, she has to endure many adversities such as performing oral sex on 
her employer who threatens to report her and having sex with Juan who promises 
to give her a forged passport in return for her kidney. After all the hardships, she 
manages to get on a flight to New York to start a new life. Senay is portrayed as a 
Turkish immigrant who is economically and physically exploited due to the risk of 
deportation. Produced by BBC films and directed by British director Stephen 
Frears, Dirty Pretty Things (2002) characterizes a fair portrayal of a Turk as an 
immigrant. Similar to other films about immigrants, it deals with immigrant issues 
such as racism, cultural difference and exploitation and shows that the host society 
can be more hostile than hospitable in most cases. 
 
Although Journey of Hope and Dirty Pretty Things are not the only 
European films which manifest vulnerable, desperate and victimized Turks, the 
examples are sporadic. Some of the rare examples for this type of films are created 
by the Turkish immigrants themselves who live in Europe. These films also 
involve nuanced and multidimensional portrayals showing the human side of 
Turks. Particularly in Germany, which has the biggest Turkish immigrant 
population among the European countries, the Turkish-German diasporic cinema is 
enriched with such examples. Given that the main argument of this thesis is about 
the Western perception of Turks, Turkish-European diasporic cinema is not central 
to this thesis. It is also a tremendously broad topic which would be much more 
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suitable for a separate research project rather than being included in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, some of the well-known diasporic filmmakers will be mentioned 
briefly because the Turkish image they reflect in their films may still be relevant to 
this chapter.  
 
Turks are the biggest ethnic minority in Germany with a population of 3.5 
million.
100
 In the early 1960s, Turkish workers began arriving at West Germany as 
Gastarbeiter (guest workers) to help with the labor shortage during the post-World 
War II economic boom.
101
 With the economic downturn of the early 1970s, the 
West German government banned the recruitment of foreign labor, but permitted 
the Gastarbeiter to stay and bring their families into Germany, and thus the guest 
workers became ‘immigrants’.102 The Turkish community is one of the longest-
established and largest immigrant groups in Germany. Turkish immigrants in 
Germany not only created diasporic urban neighborhoods and self-sufficient 
suburbs, but also began making a mark on German cinema with films created by 
second or third generation of Turks. Some of these filmmakers include Fatih Akin, 
Thomas Arslan, and Yuksel Yavuz. During the 1990s, a new generation of 
Turkish-German cinema began to emerge in Germany by these young filmmakers 
of Turkish origin with films such as Brothers and Sisters/Geschwister (Arslan, 
1996), Dealer (Arslan, 1998), Short Sharp Shock/Kurz und Schmerzlos (Akin, 
1998), and April Children/Aprilkinder (Yavuz, 1998). Among these filmmakers, 
Fatih Akin stands out as the most recognized and successful Turkish-German 
filmmaker both critically and commercially with films such as Head On (2004), 
Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul (2005), The Edge of Heaven (2007), 
Soul Kitchen (2009), and The Cut (2014). He also wrote and directed a segment in 
the American film New York, I Love You (2008) with an ensemble cast such as 
Bradley Cooper, Ethan Hawke, Natalie Portman and Robin Wright. The recent 
Turkish-German ‘diasporic’ cinema has been viewed positively by critics and 
scholars as it focuses on cultural identity and hybridity rather than alterity. For 
example, Gokturk suggests that by resisting restrictive identity politics and 
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focusing on potential hybridity “filmmakers have begun to tackle migration and 
cultural clashes with a sense of humor and irony” (cited in Gallagher, 2013; p.180). 
Rather than representing the Turks as ‘victims’, the Turkish-German diasporic 
cinema characterizes them as immigrants, or children of immigrants, who are 
trying to establish their own identities while dealing with cultural hybridity. The 
cultural diversity in German filmmaking business helps the Turkish image improve 
and be more nuanced and multidimensional. Therefore, the representations of 
Turks in German cinema have been diversified compared to the other European 
countries. 
 
Another filmmaker of Turkish origin that is noteworthy is Ferzan Ozpetek, 
who moved to Italy to study in college, and later became an Italian citizen. Most of 
his films are screened in international film festivals such as Cannes, Venice, 
Toronto and Tribeca and received critical acclaim along with many awards. Some 
of these films include Hamam /Il Bagno Turco/Steam: The Turkish Bath (1997), 
Harem Suare (1999), Facing Windows/La Finestra di Fronte  (2003), Saturn in 
Opposition/Saturno Contro  (2007), and Loose Cannons/Mine Vaganti (2010). 
Despite his dual nationality, Ferzan Ozpetek is accused of providing an Orientalist 
view of Turks and Turkish culture in his films Hamam and Harem Suare (see 
Girelli, 2007; Mora, 2009). The film Hamam (1997) tells the story of an Italian 
couple, Francesco and Marta, who come to Turkey to sell the Turkish bath they 
inherit from a family member. Francesco begins having a homosexual relationship 
with Mehmet, the young handsome son of the Turkish family who runs the Turkish 
bath. In the film, Ferzan Ozpetek enhances the Turkish bath and Turkish culture 
with Orientalist stereotypical representations. Reminiscent of the Western 
representations in the Orientalist travel accounts, The Turkish bath is illustrated as 
a place of homosexuality and sensuality and  rather than a steam bath or sauna. In 
Harem Suare (1999), the story takes place in the Ottoman imperial harem where 
the Sultan’s favorite concubine has a love affair with the black eunuch and 
becomes the Sultan’s official wife engaging in imperial intrigues. In this film, 
Ozpetek also paints an Orientalist picture of harem where eroticism, sexual 
freedom, and sensuality co-exist with imperial plots and machinations. Except for 
these two films Ozpetek’s other films do not center around Turkey or Turkish 
culture, but rather involve minor Turkish representations or none at all. Without, 
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analyzing the films Hamam and Harem Suare any further, one may conclude that 
diasporic cinema offers a variety of Turkish representations as well as a dynamic 
Turkish image. The trans-nationality and the heritage of the diasporic Turkish 
filmmakers give them a unique advantage of exploring Turkishness in a different 
way in terms of both seeing the virtues and flaws of the Turkish culture while 
challenging the long-established stereotypical perceptions at the same time. As 
Girelli suggests: 
 
the transnational condition has been increasingly appraised through a series of 
assumptions: typically, displacement has been seen as a state of potentially higher 
perceptions, as a privileged viewpoint, the very instability or hybridity of which fosters the 
re-negotiations of established parameters (Girelli, 2007; p.24).  
 
Furthermore, trans-nationality also indicates that the stereotypes can be challenged 
so that more nuanced characterizations can emerge because of the cultural diversity 
in the film productions and film industry worldwide.    
 
Although the portrayals of Turks become increasingly multidimensional in 
European cinema due to a large number of Turkish immigrants living in Europe, 
these films remain relatively unnoticed compared to the popular Hollywood films 
produced and promoted with big budgets. Most of them may be categorized as 
independent films that are produced with small budgets and do not usually reach a 
wide audience worldwide. Therefore, these films do not have the necessary impact 
to alter the stereotypical image of Turks that became so common in mainstream 
entertainment media, particularly in Hollywood films. The analysis of selected 
films in this chapter demonstrates that the Turkish cinematic image is uniform and 
static despite some multidimensional and nuanced Turkish portraits in European 
films. Based on the cultural impact of the Hollywood films around the world, I still 
argue that the image of Turks in Western cinema is stereotypical. 
 
In conclusion, the image of Turks in Western cinema manifests a long-
standing stereotype that has been uniform and static. This image is inflated with 
the stereotypical features of cruelty, brutality, murderousness, immorality, sexual 
aggression, lustfulness and homosexuality inspired by the prior representations of 
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Turks. These characteristics originate from the long-standing Western images of 
‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ that have been predominant in Western discourse 
as being discussed so far. The stereotypical image of Turks is promoted and 
reinforced with the representations in films in the contemporary cinema and thus, 
permeates into popular culture. The historical image of Turks becomes a myth that 
has been bolstered by the cinematic image of Turks. The Turkish stereotype in 
popular Hollywood films such as Lawrence of Arabia and Midnight Express are 
the most significant films that fostered the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ and helped this 
image endure throughout the 21
st
 century. However, the image of Turks in the 
entertainment media will not be the only image that will be popularized in the 
future, as the social media platforms are becoming an important source of 
information for younger generations. Other than the entertainment media such as 
films and TV shows, the popular culture is also being influenced by the social 
media. Along with the popular culture, individual perceptions of other cultures, 
nations, and religions may also be affected by the social media. Therefore, the next 
chapter will attempt to explore the image of Turks in social media. It also seeks to 
answer the question whether social media may affect the Western perception and 
alter the Turkish stereotype in the future.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
WESTERN PERCEPTION OF TURKS IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have looked into the image of Turks in Western 
discourse, including historiography, Renaissance humanist discourse, Early 
Modern English drama, Orientalist travelogues, and Western contemporary 
cinema. My analysis of these prior discourses illustrates that the representations of 
Turks have often been negative and stereotypical. The same analysis also shows 
that the Western image of Turks has been perpetual, uniform and consistent, rather 
than variable. My analysis of the Turkish image relies on Western discourse in 
different epochs and various representational forms that are considered most 
influential and popular at the time. For instance, Orientalist travel accounts, 
English drama and Western contemporary cinema are all considered as influential 
and popular because the imagery conveyed in the texts or films continue to shape 
the perception towards Turks. Following the same pattern in this chapter, I will 
explore the social media platforms as the most popular media of the new 
millennium. Moving forward, I will look at the prospect of the Turkish image in 
the new millennium by examining the impact of the new media.  
 
As the consumption of new media increases over time, its significance and 
impact will grow simultaneously, especially for younger generations. I will 
primarily focus on the impact of social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook 
and YouTube, which have already been influential in many social movements and 
political events. I argue that social media platforms will be a significant influence 
on individuals both culturally and intellectually because of its global impact 
through networking via the Internet. However, at the moment, it is improbable to 
determine the effect of the social media networks on the Western perception of the 
‘Other’. This is an issue that will be investigated and examined further in the 
future, therefore, I will avoid making any predictions as a researcher. However, to 
the best of my ability, I will attempt to explore how new media may alter the 
Western perception of Turks in the new millennium. To achieve this goal, I will 
have a closer look at the social media platforms, particularly the social network 
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sites (SNSs) such as Twitter and Facebook. To better determine the effect of social 
media, first, I will have a closer look at how social media platforms work and how 
they integrate with the lives of SNS users. I will discuss the role of SNSs during 
the Arab Spring as it will serve as a means for realizing the significance of social 
media platforms in mobilizing individuals for common causes as well as changing 
the narrative. A closer look at the Arab Spring will also show that social media can 
have a huge impact on how traditional mainstream media cover the news, and thus, 
may change the perception towards other cultures. Second, I will also examine the 
Gezi Park Resistance that took place in Turkey during the summer of 2013, to 
assess the impact of social media on the image of Turks.       
    
The Impact of Social Media  
Every day, millions of people interact through social media sites by using 
their smartphones, tablets, laptops or desktops. As of January 2014, 74% of all 
Internet using adults are users of a social network site (SNS) of some kind.
103
 The 
ratio for the SNS users who are in 18-29 age group even goes higher to 89%. The 
availability of widespread wireless technology and the increasing convenience, 
easiness, and affordability of the smartphones have made ‘social networking’ just a 
finger tap away. According to PewResearch Internet Project, the data for April 
2012 shows that 40% of mobile phone owners use SNSs on their phones and 28% 
do so on a typical day.
104
 Among younger mobile phone users, between the age of 
18 and 29, the percentage is even higher at 67%. As of 2013, Facebook is the most 
popular SNS with a share of 71% of all online adult users.
105
 These numbers keep 
growing constantly, as more young people become online by gaining access to 
smartphones, tablets and laptops. The increasing number of SNS users generates 
more online interaction and sharing of the multimedia products. 
 
In the new social media platforms, the quantity, speed of production, 
transmission and exchange of expressions rise exponentially. As the quantity of 
multimedia users and of their creations increase, the variety of cultural expressions 
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also increases. According to Castells, “diversity of the cultural expressions” is the 
most important characteristic of multimedia. He suggests the following: 
 
 the most important feature of multimedia is that they capture within their domain most 
cultural expressions, in all their diversity [author’s italics]. Their advent is tantamount to 
ending the separation, and even the distinction, between audiovisual media and printed 
media, popular culture and learned culture, entertainment and information, education and 
persuasion. Every cultural expression from the worst to the best, from the most elitist to 
the most popular, comes together in this digital universe that links up in a giant, non-
historical hypertext, past, present, and future manifestations of the communicative mind. 
By so doing, they construct a new symbolic environment. They make virtuality our reality 
(Castells, 2000; p.403). 
 
Therefore, the social media platforms provide cultural diversity generated by 
various SNS users who come from different cultural, political, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. In such a network environment, information and knowledge can be 
shared openly without the interference of powerful institutional actors. As the 
sources of information exponentially rise, the cultural representations will be more 
diversified. In Configuring the Networked Self, Julie Cohen (2012) describes 
culture as emergent and dynamic rather than a fixed collection of texts and 
practices. She explains it as follows: 
 
culture is not a fixed collection of texts and practices, but rather an emergent, historically 
and materially contingent process through which understandings of self and society are 
formed and reformed. The process of culture is shaped by the self-interested actions of 
powerful institutional actors, by the everyday practices of individuals and communities, 
and by ways of understanding and describing the world that have complex histories of 
their own. The lack of fixity at the core of this conception of culture does not undermine 
its explanatory utility; to the contrary, it is the origin of culture’s power (Cohen, 2012; 
p.25). 
 
Therefore, in the social network platforms it is unlikely to find homogenization of 
cultural expressions created by a few central senders. SNSs rather provide 
diversification and versatility, enabling communication and interaction among a 
variety of users, and thus, allow inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of all 
cultural expressions.  
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It is not feasible to predict whether the diversity of cultural expressions and 
representations will reduce preconceived notions and prejudice over time or not. 
However, one can agree that social media and SNSs are becoming an important 
part of our daily lives. The social media platforms are changing the way we 
consume and engage with media messages. Thus, the question of how social media 
and SNSs may affect individual beliefs and conceptions depends on the 
trustworthiness of these messages. In other words, it is directly correlated with the 
way individuals perceive the social media. Kostiuchenko (2014) addresses the 
significance of embedding through social media platforms and the trustworthiness 
of social media as follows: 
 
Embedding through social media occurs in various dimensions, specifically in relational, 
cognitive and emotional, cultural and political, and spatial and geographical spheres of 
one’s life. It is highly connected with how people perceive social media trustworthiness 
and to what extent they are media literate (Kostiuchenko, 2014; p.462). 
 
The trustworthiness of social media and the oversight of the participants’ messages 
are becoming the biggest issues that need to be addressed within the new computer 
mediated communication environment. For instance, anyone can post a video on 
YouTube with few restrictions and make it available for users who can watch it 
anytime from anywhere. Although there is oversight regarding the limits of free 
expression on YouTube, particularly regarding copyright infringements and 
government censorship of political content in crisis situations (Castells, 2010; 
xxviii), the videos are all user-generated based on individual initiatives, interests, 
and desires, as well as individual propaganda.  
 
However, not every social media platform operates the same way, 
particularly not the ones that are based on social networking. Fonseca (2014) 
defines ‘social networking’ as a virtual community, where people share similar 
interests. He elaborates on social networking and its utilization as follows: 
 
Social networking is about people with similar interests building a virtual community, and 
its lynchpin is building trust that leads one to share what is valuable, engaging others to 
move from taking value to adding value by participating, thereby completing the cycle and 
creating true collaboration. Social networking can be used by agencies in a variety of 
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ways, ranging from creating cross-government coordination and knowledge management 
to recruitment activities and supporting event announcements to the public (Fonseca, 2014; 
p.534)   
 
For example, users of Facebook and other SNSs tend to build a network with 
individuals who share their tastes, values, and demographics; a characteristic that is 
referred to as homophily, which may limit opportunities for citizens to be exposed 
to competing ideas (Jacobson, 2014, p.489). Hence, the diversity of cultural 
expressions and media messages may not be as effective in a Facebook 
environment because individuals tend to pay attention to the messages or postings 
of those whom they consider familiar or credible. Nevertheless, Facebook is the 
most popular social network in the world, registering more than 1.11 billion users 
worldwide as of March 2013. Also, it ranked as the second most visited Web site 
behind Google.com (see Jacobson, 2014; p.489). Overall, users of Facebook may 
still be exposed to diversified cultural expressions and wide-ranging information 
due to the scope and size of the network. On the other side, Twitter has evolved 
from a social media platform where users simply share updates about their daily 
activities with their friends “into a complex information dissemination platform” 
(Fonseca 2014, p.534). Therefore, Twitter has become this unique social network 
where users can also publish real-time updates about current events. Recent 
political campaigns, social movements and revolutionary protests, such as Arab 
Spring, are examples of events during which Twitter and other social media 
platforms were used effectively. A closer look at the Arab Spring will help 
understand the significance of social media in mobilizing individuals in social 
movements, organizing protests and influencing mainstream media, along with the 
public opinion.  
 
Arab Spring 
 Social media platforms became the center of attention for media critics, 
scholars, and even for journalists during the ‘Arab Spring’ that began in December, 
2010. It has been suggested that Twitter, Facebook and YouTube facilitated the 
rapid collapse of the regimes in two Arab countries; Tunisia and Egypt. 
Particularly, Twitter was celebrated as the news source for the uprising and 
demonstrations in Egypt, as people all around the world followed the real-time 
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tweets, pictures and videos on their smartphones, tablets, and computers. These 
events have demonstrated that social media can be used to mobilize individuals for 
sociopolitical movements and activism. On the other hand, some scholars have 
argued that “the protest movement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
was initiated by the underlying sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions in the 
region” (Tindall & Groenewegen, 2014; p.7), not merely by the social media. Even 
though social media were not the only cause of the revolutionary movement in 
these countries, SNSs and other social media platforms undoubtedly enhanced the 
ability of citizens to mobilize and spread the movement so that they could gain 
support and participation to make a change in domestic politics of their countries. 
Furthermore, social media platforms helped draw attention to what is happening in 
the MENA countries and provided the world with the opportunity to follow these 
events when there was hardly any coverage about it by the Western news outlets 
and mainstream media. During these events, social media platforms, particularly 
Twitter, have been considered as the citizens’ empowerment to challenge 
mainstream media. Van Dijck (2013) emphasizes the quality of social media as a 
galvanizing and empowering tool during social movements: 
 
The Iranian uprising, in 2009, the Arab Spring in 2010, and the Occupy movement of 2011 
were all considered examples of users’ empowerment through social media – citizens 
taking hold of their own communication and propaganda channels to challenge the power 
of conventional gatekeepers such as governments and news organizations. The 2009 revolt 
in Iran was hailed as the “Twitter revolution,” stressing a view of social media as 
inherently liberating . . . Foreign media and government officials attributed major 
significance to social media platforms in the Arab Spring uprisings; they considered them 
neutral tools, which, in the hands of prodemocratic citizens, rendered them powerful as a 
collective  (Van Dijck, 2013; p.74-75). 
 
 As seen during the Iranian uprising and the Arab Spring, social media 
platforms and SNSs allow “protesters to circumvent the gatekeeping of traditional 
media and take control of the message they want presented publicly” (cited in 
Harlow & Johnson, 2011; p.1360). If it was not for the social media, the traditional 
media would be inclined either to frame the revolutionary protests in the MENA 
region as ‘marginal’ or to ignore them altogether. This is because of the tendency 
of Western media to portray protests in the Arab world either as ‘irrational’ and 
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‘aggressive,’ or as ‘apathetic’ and ‘dead’ (cited in Harlow & Johnson, 2011). 
According to Harlow and Johnson (2011), “protest paradigm” suggests that 
traditional media coverage of protests rely on official sources, and thus, tend to 
delegitimize, marginalize, and even demonize the protesters. However, in the case 
of Iranian uprisings and Arab Spring, the traditional news media shifted away from 
the ‘protest paradigm.’ The real-time news was disseminated to the world by the 
tweets of the local activists and journalists, with the updates of the local bloggers, 
and with the YouTube videos of the protesters. Therefore, the social media 
platforms led traditional media to cover the Arab Spring protests comprehensively 
and judiciously. As a result, the media audience and social media users got a 
glimpse of what will be the future of media culture: the convergence of traditional 
and social media. 
 
Convergence of Traditional Media and Social Media  
 The shift from traditional mass media to computer-mediated 
communication and digital multimedia has altered the information flow and thus, 
changed the nature of news coverage. For example, mainstream media outlets have 
adopted Twitter as a means of engaging with audiences, strengthening their reach 
and influence while also changing the way they use their news sources (Lotan, 
Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce & Boyd, 2011). During critical world events, 
such as the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, “mainstream media turn to Twitter, 
both to learn from on-the-ground sources, and to rapidly distribute updates” (Lotan 
et al., 2011; p.1376). In these revolutions, particularly in Tunisia, where few 
mainstream media organizations had a formal presence before the uprisings, social 
media were employed extensively by activists to organize the demonstrations and 
to disseminate the events both locally and globally. Twitter emerged as a key 
source for real-time logistical coordination, information, and discussion among 
people, both within MENA region and across the globe (Lotan et al. 2011). After 
the news started coming from the social media, particularly from Twitter, 
mainstream media outlets began using both old and new media while reporting and 
documenting the uprisings. For example, Al Jazeera covered the Egyptian 
Revolution with streaming video starting with the “Friday of Anger” on January 
28, 2011, whereas journalists from Western media organizations began reporting 
from Egypt at a later stage (Lotan et al. 2011).   
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The use of social media and its relationship with the mainstream media 
during the Arab Spring have been studied by many scholars. For example, Lotan et 
al. (2011) analyzed the Twitter information flow during the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprisings across different actor types, such as mainstream media organizations, 
individual journalists, influential regional and global actors. The findings show 
differences in information flow in Egypt and Tunisia, suggesting that each country 
behaved differently on Twitter as a media system. The study reveals that 
mainstream media, non-media groups and individual activists generated more 
responses in Egypt than in Tunisia, whereas bloggers in Tunisia had more 
information flow than those in Egypt. The journalists appeared to have equally 
large information flows in both countries (Lotan et al., 2011; p.1399).  Harlow and 
Johnson (2011) conducted a content analysis of New York Times (NYT) online 
coverage and a NYT reporter (Nick Kristof) Twitter feed about the Egyptian 
uprising, along with the Global Voices, which is a grassroots media site reporting 
from web blogs and citizen media from all around the world. Their analysis shows 
that NYT fell behind in competing with blogs and social media, because they had 
difficulty in maintaining credibility as their coverage tended to marginalize and 
undermine the protesters (Harlow & Johnson, 2011; p.1370). Iskander (2011) 
analyzed the connections between old and new media during the Egyptian 
uprising. She concluded that social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, 
helped activists spread information, organize, share videos and pictures, and thus, 
created a snowball effect during the protests. However, she suggests: “it was the 
relationship and interaction between social media and traditional media that was 
pivotal to creating the environment for renewed political activism” (Iskander, 
2011; p.1231). Aouragh and Alexander (2011) reached a similar conclusion after 
they interviewed Egyptian activists for their study. Based on their interviews, 
Aouragh and Alexander (2011) observed that the interaction between social media 
and the traditional media operated in different ways at different phases of the 
uprising. For example, Twitter provided a mechanism by which contacts could be 
made between activists and international journalists during the early stages. One of 
their interviewees, activist Amr Gharbeia, explains how they used Twitter to 
communicate with the international media: 
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During the sit-in in Tahrir, people from the international media often looked for hashtags 
[grouped messages], and got in touch with us through Twitter. This was how we got to 
speak on their shows. So some communication with the mainstream media internationally 
started on the social networks (cited in Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; p.1351). 
 
As seen during the Arab Spring, the effect of social media on the traditional 
media has been undeniable. The interaction, communication and information 
exchange between the activists and the international journalists through social 
media platforms facilitated broadcasting these events throughout the world. In his 
interview, the Egyptian activist, Hossam el-Hamalawy underscores the 
significance of the convergence of social media and traditional media. Aouragh & 
Alexander (2011) recount his remarks as follows: 
 
Hossam el-Hamalawy argues that the [real] strength of the Internet lies in the fact that 
traditional media themselves now use it as a source of information. Thus, when well-
known and respectable online journalists post something that is read by thousands of 
others, it almost certain that Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and the Guardian will mention it, as 
happened with the live feeds from Egypt in January and February (cited in Aouragh & 
Alexander, 2011; p.1351). 
 
Similar to the Arab Spring, the news about the Gezi Park protests in Turkey was 
also heard on Twitter and other social media platforms for the first time. The 
images of protesters, who were brutalized by the Turkish riot police, appeared on 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube and were spread globally in a very short time. 
After the news broke in the social media, the international mainstream media also 
got engaged and began reporting and broadcasting the events in real-time. The 
following section will focus on the Gezi Park Resistance in Turkey and its effect 
on the perception of Turks in the Western media. 
 
Social Media and Gezi Park Protests in Turkey 
The Gezi Park Resistance began on 28 May 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey, 
initially with a small group of activists who tried to defend a public park at Taksim 
against the government’s plans to build a shopping mall. When the police used 
excessive force against a small sit-in protest to evict the park, more protesters kept 
coming to show their support. Subsequently, other demonstrations were held 
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across Turkey for solidarity, in almost every city including the two next biggest 
cities Izmir and Ankara, the capital. The police responded brutally with tear gas, 
pepper spray, rubber bullets and water cannons to disperse the peaceful 
demonstrators, causing 11 deaths and more than 8,000 injuries, most of them 
critically.
106
 The violent reaction of the police sparked an outrage that gave rise to 
a huge revolutionary uprising on 1 June at Taksim square, Istanbul. After the riot 
police withdrew from the area, the peaceful demonstration was restored and turned 
into an Occupy-like resistance movement, where protesters put up tents at Gezi 
Park and Taksim square, organized food distribution, formed their own media, 
created a library and even a medical center. Evren (2013) describes the peaceful, 
vibrant, creative and expressive atmosphere of the resistance as follows: 
 
There was room for everyone’s creativity. People made jokes everywhere: on the walls, on 
upturned police vehicles, on signs; there were performances in every corner of the square, 
not all by artists but some by activists, even some by passers-by. Some helped to design a 
park library. People used a police car to make a wish tree, like Yoko Ono’s Wish Trees. 
There were concerts in various parts of the square, different types of music. Some groups 
marched and chanted, others worked on an indie radio station, organized painting 
workshops for children, or just shouted against the government (Evren, 2013; p.8). 
 
However, the protesters were dispersed by the police on 15 June and the police 
took over Taksim square and Gezi Park, putting an end to the Gezi resistance. 
Although there were other protests with smaller groups followed in Istanbul and in 
other big cities, they eventually faded due to the excessive force used by the 
Turkish police and the extreme measures taken afterwards against the protesters by 
the Turkish government, such as unofficial detentions, persecutions, 
unsubstantiated allegations for coup attempts, beatings, harassment and 
intimidation towards the protesters and their families.
107
  
 
 The Gezi Resistance was not merely an environmental protest or a 
revolutionary movement like in Egypt, but rather a grassroots resistance that 
emerged as a reaction to the police brutality and to the Islamist government led by 
Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan, who became more authoritarian recently. The 
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protests attracted people from every class, status, occupation and political view. 
Evren (2013) describes the fabric of the protesters and the nature of the resistance 
as follows:  
 
The Gezi Resistance included apolitical youth, precarious employees, workers, activists, 
anarchists, Marxists, Kemalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors, and most importantly many 
artists. This movement was initiated by a new generation of young activists but their 
mothers supported them too, conquering bread: giving food, helping youngsters to protect 
themselves against police brutality. For many it was the first political action they had taken 
part in. After the government inflicted a series of oppressive actions designed to transform 
Turkey into an Islamic authoritarian regime, people reacted (Evren, 2013; p.8). 
 
The Gezi resistance was truly an internet-based uprising as Twitter and Facebook 
played a significant role in bringing the crowds out on the street after the violent 
police response towards the peaceful sit-in protest by a small group of activists at 
the park. With the help of social media, particularly Twitter, the resistance 
attracted thousands of people who have never been involved in a demonstration 
before but wanted to show their dissident against the government’s 
authoritarianism. The social media helped many people from all walks of life to 
step out and voice their defiance. As Evren (2013) puts it, Gezi resistance is “the 
first completely grassroots Turkish social movement. There are no leaders, no 
parties dominating the movement. No initiations. This distinguished it from all 
previous revolutionary moments” (p.9). 
 
During the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, Twitter was acknowledged as an 
important platform for “knowledge sharing” and for the “circulation of the affects 
of outrage, disbelief and defiance” (Parikka, 2014; p.91). In contrast with the social 
media, the mainstream media in Turkey ignored the protests altogether and 
followed their regular programming. The news channel CNN-Turk was criticized 
for airing a documentary about penguins while the demonstrations and the police 
brutality against the protesters were taking place on the streets of Istanbul. On the 
day of the massive protests, Bloomberg’s Turkey Bureau Chief, Benjamin Harvey, 
tweeted: “Seriously, CNN-Turk is airing a show on penguins” to show his 
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frustration with the Turkish media.
108
 While the mainstream media in Turkey 
remained silent, “tweets from Gezi were distributing a whole different set of 
images about what was happening to public space in Turkey” (Parikka, 2014; 
p.91). The protesters at the Gezi resistance were using Twitter to disseminate the 
real-time news not only to the Turkish public but also to global news outlets. Both 
the New York Times (NYT)
109
 and The Guardian
110
 reported the news about the 
protests in their World News section on May 31, 2013. Soon enough, BBC in UK 
and CNN in USA began broadcasting the news from Turkey to the audience 
worldwide. In their study, Varol, Ferrara, Ogan, Menczer and Flammini (2014) 
found that the worldwide attention to the Gezi resistance was created with the 
presence of trending hashtags, #direngeziparki (resist Gezi Park) being the most 
popular that trended several times between May 31
st
 and June 2
nd
, 2013. The 
statistics on trending hashtags suggest that “the conversation acquired traction 
immediately, and exploded when the first on-the-ground events and police action 
occurred” (Varol et al., 2014). Although a significant amount of the tweets 
originated in Turkey, the global discussion about Gezi Park resistance began 
spreading with tweets produced particularly in United States, Brazil and Europe 
(Varol et al., 2014). Other hashtags include #DirenGezi (resist Gezi), 
#OccupyGezi, #OccupyTaksim, and #Tayyipistifa (resign Tayyip, invoking PM 
Erdogan’s resignation). Besides Turkish and English, hashtags related to the Gezi 
resistance also trended in a variety of other languages, Spanish, and Portuguese 
being the most popular (Varol et al., 2014).  
 
With the worldwide trending hashtags, Twitter enabled the news from 
Turkey to be distributed to the world immediately, allowing the global news media 
to follow the events and report them in a timely manner. The videos and pictures 
shared and broadcasted on other social media platforms such as Facebook and 
YouTube also documented the excessive police force used against the protesters 
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and the reaction of the Turkish public. Despite the size of the news both on social 
media and traditional media, it is not feasible to determine the effect of Gezi Park 
resistance on the Western perception of Turks. However, examining the 
representation of Turks and Turkey in Western media, before and after the Gezi 
Park resistance, may serve as a means to determine the effect of social media on 
the news coverage regarding Turkey, as well as the perception of Turks. Therefore, 
I will look into the changes of the representations of Turks and Turkey in Western 
media with regards to Gezi Park protests. My analysis will provide a better 
understanding about the effects of social media on the traditional mass media, and 
ultimately on the Western perception of Turks. Before beginning the analysis, it is 
critical to address the image of Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan and his 
Islamist Justice and Development Party (a.k.a. AKP with Turkish initials). Also, 
Turkey’s application for the membership of the European Union is relevant to the 
thesis moving forward because European public opinion and perception of Turks 
and Turkey may be a deciding factor for Turkey’s accession. Therefore, it will be 
one of the issues that will be examined in the analysis of media coverage.     
 
The Turkish Image in Western Media 
 Turkey has been a long-standing Western ally and a NATO member since 
1952. However, it has not been accepted as a member of the European Union (EU) 
despite its pending application for years. At the Helsinki summit of the European 
Council in 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full 
membership of EU, but its accession has never been granted despite Turkey’s 
continuous efforts in introducing reforms to comply with the Union’s standards. 
Turkey’s pending EU membership has been an issue frequently reported and 
discussed in Western media. At the same time, Turkey has attracted considerable 
attention with its democratically elected Islamist government led by PM Erdogan. 
Erdogan and his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been the 
focus of Western media since Erdogan’s landslide victory in the 2002 Turkish 
general election. He was re-elected both in 2007 and 2011 and remained the Prime 
Minister until 2014 when he became the first democratically elected President of 
Turkey, a position that had been appointed by the Turkish Parliament previously.  
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Since his first election in 2002, Western media have closely followed the 
undertakings and accomplishments of Erdogan and his government. In the rest of 
the chapter, I will examine the image of Turks in Western media since Erdogan 
became the PM of Turkey. Erdogan’s election represents a huge milestone for the 
Turkish political history because of his Islamist background and the Islamic roots 
of his political party, AKP. Before Erdogan’s election, Turkey had lacked the 
political stability that the Western world expected because democratically elected 
governments were being dismantled by military coups, the most recent taking 
place in 1980. The Turkish military had been the self-appointed watchdog of 
secularism in Turkey for several years, as well as the protector of political stability 
during the times of turbulent coalition governments. Therefore, Erdogan’s election 
offers a good starting point as the first democratically elected Islamist government 
with a big majority. 
 
 As discussed previously, the Gezi Park Resistance has been the biggest 
social movement in Turkey, which saw people from all walks of life oppose the 
authoritarianism of the Turkish government. As mentioned before, the Gezi Park 
protests occupied the social media platforms both domestically and internationally, 
sparking an outrage against the brutal response of the Turkish riot police. As a 
result, the mainstream media outlets began covering the events in Turkey in real 
time, which eventually made an impact on the Western perception of Turks, 
particularly of PM Erdogan and his government. For that reason, I will attempt to 
assess the effect of the Gezi Park Resistance on the perception of Turks by 
reviewing the Western media representations before and after the protests. I argue 
that Gezi resistance has changed the representation of Turks, particularly of PM 
Erdogan and his government. To better understand the impact of social media on 
the image of Turks, I will conduct a discourse analysis of the Western media 
coverage before and after the Gezi Park resistance. The discourse analysis will be 
based on a selection of reputable mainstream Western newspapers such as, the New 
York Times (NYT) and Wall Street Journal (WSJ) from the US, and The Guardian 
and Financial Times from UK. Due to the language barrier, it would be impractical 
and time consuming to review newspapers from non-native English speaking 
countries in Europe. However, because there has been very strong opposition to 
Turkey’s accession to EU in France, I do not want to overlook the French opinion. 
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Therefore, I have also selected the French newspaper, Le Monde, to examine the 
Turkish image in France, as it is relevant to this chapter. Despite the language 
obstacle, I will attempt to examine the articles in Le Monde with my limited 
French, along with the help of Google translation, to the best of my ability. Due to 
the extensive volume of the news coverage before and after the Gezi Park protests, 
I have limited the scope of my analysis with specific issues. Therefore, I will scan 
the newspapers based on these issues and review the articles that are relevant.     
The issues that I will concentrate on in my analysis are free speech, freedom of 
expression, the concern about the Islamic government in Turkey and Turkey’s EU 
membership. The news coverage that will be reviewed in my analysis is limited to 
these topics only.    
 
Before the Gezi Park Resistance 
During the several years before the Gezi Resistance, the Western media 
remained sympathetic both to the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who has an 
Islamic background, and to his ruling party, AKP, which is considered Islamist. 
Turkey has been viewed as a bridge between the Islamic World and the West, the 
sole Muslim democracy that could bring the two together. In his 2008 op-ed Roger 
Cohen elaborates on this viewpoint and Turkey’s unique stance between the 
Islamic East and The West. He has argued that Turkey is unsuitable for George W. 
Bush’s polarizing world because as a nation of nuances, Turkey does not fit in his 
binary representations of “us-or-them” “good-or evil” or “for-us-or-against-us.” 
Cohen goes on to characterize Turkey as follows: 
 
a nation of nuances, Muslim but not Islamist, religious in culture but secular in construct, 
of the Occident and the Orient, bordering the West's cradle in Greece and its crucible in 
Iraq. Here, in this bridging country, a NATO member long served the diet of mild bigotry 
that has held it not quite European enough for the European Union, a struggle is ongoing. 
It pits proud secularists in one corner against pious Muslims in another in a battle to 
establish the contours of state and mosque.
111
 
 
For that reason, the American and British media generally viewed Turkey’s 
membership to EU as a positive step because it would bring a Muslim democracy 
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closer to the West. They even praised Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan and his 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). In NYT, Sabrina Tavernise writes that 
Turkey’s new leaders were committed to the kind of “dynamic, pluralist society 
that Europeans might welcome into their club.”112 She acknowledges the success 
of Erdogan and his AKP government and continues as follows: 
 
In the last four years, as the dominant power in the national Parliament, it has drawn more 
Turks into the political process and adopted as its major goal membership in the European 
Union. It has passed more than 800 laws to make Turkish laws and standards match those 
in Europe. It has scrapped the death penalty. It has removed military representatives from 
several layers of Turkey’s civilian government.113 
 
Tavernise also quotes Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament, who 
celebrates the efforts of Erdogan and Islamist AKP government and suggests that 
“they opened up a system that had to be opened up to get into the EU.” Lagendijk 
also claims that if the parties of the secular elites “had remained in the government 
it would have been impossible to start EU negotiations.”114 In The Guardian, 
Adam Hug underscores the significance of Turkey’s accession to EU as follows: 
 
Failure to grant Turkish accession would be one of the greatest strategic mistakes the EU 
could inflict upon itself, one that would be hugely harmful to business and undermine 
European prosperity and security. The path to accession is challenging for both the EU and 
Turkey, but advocates of an open and progressive Europe need to stand up and make the 
case that it is a challenge that we must not fail to meet.
115
 
 
The Guardian not only emphasized the importance of Turkey for the EU, 
but also criticized the political parties who have been pushing for an increasingly 
narrow view of Europe and reinforcing the rejection of Turkey’s accession to EU. 
According to Tariq Ramadan, the underlying reason is ‘religion’. 
 
Political parties that call for an increasingly narrow view of Europe are gaining ground. 
These parties promote a strictly Judeo-Christian perspective of European history, mistrust 
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of Islam, repressive hardline immigration policies and reject a Turkey they claim is 
overpopulated and excessively Muslim.
116
 
 
Ramadan also suggests that Turkey’s historical and economic influence on Europe 
is undeniable because the Ottoman Empire had a huge impact on Europe for more 
than four centuries. He continues as follows: 
 
The arguments that locate Turkey outside European history and geography cannot 
withstand analysis. For more than four centuries the Ottoman Empire shared and shaped 
the political and strategic future of the continent. During the late 19th and early 20th 
century, it became the "sick man of Europe". Even today, Turkey's historical and economic 
influence continues to be substantial.
117
 
 
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) commented on Turkey’s membership to EU 
from the religion standpoint as well and assured its readers that Islam would not be 
a problem. For example, in his WSJ article, Hugh Pope claims that Europe does 
not need to fear Turkey and its modernized version of Islam. He suggests that the 
EU should grant full membership to Turkey because Europe needs a democratic 
Turkish state due to economic and geopolitical reasons. Pope also emphasizes that 
secularism in Turkey could not be endangered by the Islamist government. His 
remarks are as follows: 
 
There is no need for Europe to fear Turkey's membership goal . . . Nor is there cause to 
fear the Turks' mostly pragmatic take on Islam. The AKP's affable foreign minister, 
Abdullah Gul, almost certain to be elected president by parliament this month, has 
highlighted his vow to preserve the secularism of Turkey's political system . . . The 
secularist mass demonstrations this April and May showed that Turkey's still-powerful 
Kemalist establishment and vigilant society will be the first to block any real attempt to 
install a theocratic regime.
118
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The Financial Times, on the other hand, was more cautious than NYT, 
WSJ, and The Guardian when addressing Erdogan and his Islamist ruling party. 
For example, in his article, Christopher Caldwell offers a balanced evaluation of 
Erdogan and describes him as both a “democratic reformer” and an “Islamist” 
while praising his party for their efforts to make Turkey a part of the EU.  
 
The government of the EU's most important prospective candidate state is run by people 
who have long called themselves Islamists. Yet the same government has assembled a 
unanimous, almost dissent- free majority for that candidacy - not just in the Turkish 
political classes but also in the public at large.
119
 
 
At the same time, Caldwell calls attention to the dilemma Erdogan has as the PM 
of a democratic secular Turkey and as the leader of AKP, which was founded on 
the remains of two former Islamist political parties. 
 
Europeans confused about whether to view the AK party [AKP] as a problem at their 
doorstep or the latest, best model of moderate Islam may be relieved to know that Turks 
suffer the same confusion. Is Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, a pragmatist who 
has learnt to build coalitions with secular forces? Or is he distinguished from more 
worrisome Islamists merely by his patience and skill at dissembling? Is he the gentle, 
charismatic leader who tells reporters: "I am a democrat in my office and a Muslim in my 
household"? Or the firebrand who was - fairly or not - removed from his post as mayor of 
Istanbul and jailed for reading from a poem about minarets and bayonets?
120
 
 
The representation of Erdogan and his government in the French 
newspaper, Le Monde, strikes as the most cautious and restrained compared to the 
other publications reviewed so far. For example, in 2003, Daniel Vernet writes 
about the challenge Erdogan faces when he tries to implement the reforms 
demanded by the EU without agitating his Islamist party base and the Kemalist 
Turkish military.  
 
He [Erdogan] refused to call the Union a "Christian club" but he said he was determined to 
"take all universal values that Europe is: democracy, pluralism, human rights, secularism, 
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freedom of thought, conscience and initiative." It's probably not always easy to put his acts 
in accordance with his words when one is at the head of an Islamic party that the 
establishment traditional Kemalist Turkey, closely linked to the military, looks with 
suspicion.
121
  
 
In the same article Vernet also refers to Erdogan’s aggressive tone during an 
interview he gave before the meeting of the European Council. In his interview, 
Erdogan lashed out at the EU suggesting that Turkey’s Islamic culture should not 
be an issue for the membership process. 
 
In an interview with Le Monde and other European newspapers a few days before the 
European Council . . . deciding a possible start of negotiations on the accession of Turkey 
to the European Union, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister adopts a decidedly 
offensive tone. [He said] "It is out of question . . . that we accept a privileged partnership. .  
. . You do not change the rules along the way!" Erdogan said his country meets the 
conditions that were demanded. If the EU is not a Christian club, he adds, the Muslim 
character of the Turkish population should not be a problem.
122
 
 
Vernet continues to point out the negatives, as well as the positives, by stressing 
Mrs. Erdogan’s absence during a state dinner and questions if her avoidance from 
the spotlight is due to her headscarf she has been wearing as a symbol of her 
Muslim religion.   
 
It is not always simple, in public life and in private life. Mrs. Erdogan did not attend the 
state dinner in honor of her husband and José Maria Aznar. Shyness? Fear of being 
ostracized by ignorance of a foreign language? Fear of provoking a scandal - in Turkey 
more than in Spain - coming to the table with a headscarf? Mrs. Erdogan remained in her 
hotel room and, whatever the reason, people could not help thinking that the traditions 
caused a hard time.
123
  
 
While opinion editorials were supportive of Turkey’s accession to EU and 
favorable to Erdogan and his government, they were also criticizing France and 
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President Sarkozy for opposing Turkey’s inclusion in EU. For example, Philip 
Stephens in the Financial Times favors Turkey’s accession while criticizing 
Sarkozy’s opposition. Stephens suggests that it would be in Europe’s best interest 
to have a Western-facing Turkey and underscores the significance of Turkey’s 
inclusion into the EU during a time when the West loses its powers over the 
Middle East.  
 
But the west is losing its leverage. US power is being challenged across the Middle East; 
and Europe seems intent on irrelevance. Mr. Erdogan's Turkey still wants to be part of 
Europe. And on every challenge - from energy, from terrorism, drugs and migration to 
trade and investment - Europe has an immutable interest in nurturing a democratic, west-
facing Turkey. Its security is the west's security. But Mr. Sarkozy and his like want 
nothing more than to hold on to the past. Turkey speaks to the world as it is becoming.
124
 
 
In June 2007, Dan Bilefsky of the NYT writes that President Sarkozy of France 
blocked a key element for the negotiations of Turkey’s membership during the EU 
summit.
125
 According to Bilefsky, Sarkozy opposes the membership of Turkey on 
the grounds that “the country is neither culturally nor geographically part of 
Europe.”126 In April 2009, the NYT editorial even urges the recently elected US 
President Obama to convince France into admitting Turkey’s EU membership. 
 
Mr. Obama must persuade Mr. Sarkozy and others that admitting Turkey — a Muslim 
democracy — is in everyone’s interest. And he must persuade Ankara that the required 
reforms will strengthen Turkey’s democracy and provide more stability and growth.127 
 
In The Guardian, Tariq Ramadan also points out the same remarks by 
Sarkozy who suggested “Turkey is not European – geographically or culturally.”128 
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In his article, Ramadan criticizes the claims of geography and culture put forward 
by Sarkozy as criteria for Turkey’s accession to EU.  
 
No one is likely to be fooled by attempts to redraw the geographical boundaries of Europe 
for ideological or political purposes. If we were to apply the same criteria across the board, 
Cyprus would not be part of Europe. Such artificial distinctions ignore history, just as they 
ignore the realities of European society itself, where national origins, memories and 
cultures have long met and blended. Approximately 40% of Turkey's population is of 
European origin; millions of Turks have already acquired the nationality of a European 
country.
129
 
 
At the same time, The Guardian also focused on UK’s strong backing on the same 
issue. For example, in his article, Nicholas Watt describes UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s criticism of both France and Germany regarding their opposition 
to Turkey’s EU membership as:   
 
In a passionate defense of Turkey, whose EU ambitions have long been championed by 
Britain, the prime minister [Cameron] will accuse Paris and Berlin of double standards for 
expecting Ankara [Turkish Capital] to guard Europe's borders as a NATO member while 
closing the door to EU membership.
130
 
 
In the WSJ, Laurence Norman also writes about UK Prime Minister 
Cameron’s remarks criticizing the opposition to Turkey’s accession to EU and 
showing his support for Turkey’s membership as follows: 
 
It makes me angry that your progress can be frustrated in the way that it has been," 
Mr. Cameron said in a speech on a visit to Ankara. "My view is clear. I believe that it's just 
wrong to say that Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit inside the tent. I will 
remain your strongest possible advocate for EU membership and for greater influence at 
the top table of European diplomacy," Mr. Cameron said.
131
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Financial Times did not only recite Cameron’s aforementioned remarks, but also 
quoted his provocative jab at France, when comparing French obstructionism to De 
Gaulle’s veto of the British accession to EU as “We know what it is like to be shut 
out of the club.”132 While Turkey’s importance for the EU and Cameron’s 
supportive remarks were underscored frequently in the Financial Times, there was 
also criticism about the missteps of the Turkish government and the political 
rhetoric of PM Erdogan. In an editorial, the Financial Times commented on these 
missteps and warned PM Erdogan about diminishing Turkey’s chance in becoming 
a global power player. 
 
Mr. Cameron diplomatically and correctly indicated where Turkey is falling short. On 
Iran, Turkey's recent vote against United Nations sanctions was unfortunate, given the 
threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. On Israel, Turkey must end its rift with 
Benjamin Netanyahu's government, reverting to its role as a mediator between the Israelis 
and Syrians. Above all, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan must abandon his periodic 
outbursts over issues such as Cyprus and Gaza, which are driven by populism rather than 
diplomacy. Turkey has a big opportunity today to gain global influence. It must not be 
squandered.
133
 
 
Unlike the US and UK publications, there was not any noteworthy reporting in Le 
Monde about David Cameron’s visit to Turkey on July 27, 2010. Based on my 
review of Le Monde for the months of July and August of 2010, the time before 
and after PM David Cameron’s visit to Turkey, I have not come across any of 
Cameron’s remarks regarding UK’s support for Turkey’s accession to EU. Le 
Monde’s lack of reporting on David Cameron’s speech, which favors Turkey’s 
accession to EU, may indicate two things: Either the newspaper was overly 
cautious about the opposition of the French government to Turkey’s EU 
membership and the French public opinion, or Cameron’s visit was not considered 
noteworthy in France.   
 
My review so far shows that despite the cautionary reporting on PM 
Erdogan and his Islamist government, particularly by the Financial Times and Le 
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Monde, Western media was mostly sympathetic to his leadership style and the 
actions of his government before the Gezi Park resistance. In a NYT editorial of 
2004, Erdogan was celebrated as “an Islamic politician who favors democratic 
pluralism.”134 The same article claimed that under his leadership Turkey has been 
setting “a constructive example for the entire Muslim Middle East.” Furthermore, 
the NYT editorial urged the Turkish military not to interfere with Erdogan’s 
foreign policy decisions, particularly his Cyprus diplomacy, which would be a 
compromise for Turkey in order to continue its bid for the EU membership. 
 
Turkey's generals claim to be strong defenders of Turkey's pro-Western orientation. By 
standing behind Mr. Erdogan's Cyprus diplomacy, they can advance Turkey's E.U. 
candidacy. They should also give strong backing to Mr. Erdogan's efforts to move closer to 
Western-style democracy. America has a strong interest in Mr. Erdogan's success.
135
 
 
The Financial Times also commended the transformational leadership quality of 
PM Erdogan despite the Cyprus obstacle during the EU talks. In his article Vincent 
Boland writes;  
 
Mr. Erdogan insisted last week that, regardless of what effect the Cyprus impasse has 
on Turkey's EU accession, his government would continue to implement democratic, 
political and social reforms. He is clearly sincere when he says this: he is the most reform-
minded Turkish prime minister since Turgut Ozal in the 1980s.
136
 
 
The praise for Erdogan and his party AKP continued when they took on the issue 
of ‘free speech’ by weakening the law against insulting ‘Turkishness.’ The 
proposed amendment to the law was considered “a key measure of the democratic 
maturity of this Muslim country as it tries to gain acceptance to the European 
Union.”137 The law has been known as Article 301, which was used to prosecute 
Turkish intellectuals such as Orhan Pamuk, who won the Nobel Prize for literature. 
On April 30, 2008, “Turkish legislators approved a government-backed proposal to 
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amend Article 301, which prohibits the denigration of Turkish identity or 
institutions.”138 The NYT reported that the EU welcomed the legislative 
amendment and quoted the statement released by the EU presidency praising the 
decision.    
 
This is a constructive step forward in ensuring freedom of expression, and we look 
forward to its effective implementation. This step is both positive for Turkey and an 
indication of Turkey’s continuing commitment to the reform process.139 
 
The amendment of the infamous Turkish law that allowed the prosecution 
of citizens for insulting ‘Turkishness’ was also reported by Vincent Boland in 
Financial Times. In his article, Boland states that the European Commission 
welcomed the law amendment as a step forward but also claims that the critics did 
not see the amendment as an improvement in free speech. Boland also emphasizes 
the authoritarian nature of the AKP government despite the reforms in penal codes.  
 
Although the socially and religiously conservative government has introduced EU-minded 
political and social reforms, it accepts the authoritarian nature of the Turkish state and is 
ready to ensure it is legally protected.
140
 
 
On the other hand, The Guardian did not report the amendment for easing Article 
301 as individual news, but rather mentioned it several times in other articles in the 
months following the decision by the Turkish Parliament. The newspaper, instead, 
focused more on the news about the Turkish Parliament’s attempt to lift the long-
standing “headscarf ban.” In June 2008, Robert Tait reported that the 
Constitutional Court, the highest court in Turkey, ruled for the ‘headscarf ban’ to 
stay in effect. He wrote: 
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Turkey's highest court yesterday overturned a politically controversial law allowing 
women students to wear the Muslim headscarf at university, dealing a blow to the 
country's Islamist-leaning government and its chances of survival.
141
 
 
The news about the continuance of headscarf ban by the decision of Turkey’s 
highest court’s was also reported by the NYT in an article by Sabrina Tavernise, 
who wrote: 
 
The Constitutional Court said in a brief statement that the change, proposed by Mr. 
Erdogan’s party and passed by Parliament in February, violated principles of secularism 
set in Turkey’s Constitution. . . . The ruling sets the stage for a showdown between 
Turkey’s secular elite — its military, judiciary and secular political party — and Mr. 
Erdogan, an observant Muslim with an Islamist past.
142
 
 
The decision by the Turkish Constitutional court to uphold the headscarf 
ban in universities and government institutions was widely reported by the 
Financial Times, particularly from the standpoint of Erdogan’s political future as 
the PM of Turkey. The articles in the Financial Times focused on the political and 
economic risk of AKP’s pending closure case, due to its alleged efforts to 
dismantle secularism in Turkey. Because it was PM Erdogan and AKP that 
proposed the lift of the headscarf ban, the verdict of the Constitutional Court could 
embolden the secularists and jeopardize the political status of Erdogan as well as 
the economic stability of Turkey. 
 
The case against Mr. Erdogan – who appears to be the primary target of the closure case – 
is based in part on his headscarf initiative. It is part of the broader accusation that he and 
his fellow AKP leaders are trying to Islamise Turkey. They reject the charge out of hand. 
But the headscarf issue and the closure case show the extent to which the country's secular 
institutions – the courts, the military, the media and others – are determined to cut the AKP 
down to size. . . . Investors are worried by this development. Uncertainties surrounding it 
make it difficult to judge what impact it may have on financial markets.
143
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In WSJ, although there was no commentary regarding the ‘headscarf ban’ during 
the months of June and July of 2008, there was a lot of attention regarding the 
pending case of closure of PM Erdogan’s ruling party, AKP. In her article, Farnaz 
Fassihi focused on the political risks and economic risks that Turkey might face if 
the popular AKP is shut down by the court decision. She also commented on the 
implications of the AKP’s closure for the West as follows: 
 
Beyond its own fate, Turkey's political stability is important to the U.S. As a member of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a nation of Muslims under democratic rule, 
Turkey offers the U.S. a bulwark against Islamist extremism in the region. Recently, 
Turkey has played an important role as a mediator between Israel and Syria and between 
Iran and the U.S., and its booming economy attracts billions of dollars in foreign 
investment each year.
144
 
  
In June 2008, except for a short news report through Reuters, there was not any 
commentary in Le Monde regarding headscarf ban. The only commentary was 
written by Guillaume Perrier, who suggests that headscarf is not the only issue of 
‘freedom of expression’ in Turkey. Perrier also questions the urgency of the 
‘headscarf’ and asks why PM Erdogan is in a rush concerning such a sensitive 
issue. 
 
The Prime Minister also says it plans to include this reform in the proposed new 
constitution being drafted and should be presented to Parliament during the winter. . . . The 
announcement took political commentators by surprise. While Erdogan was expected to 
tackle the issue of ‘freedom of expression’, such as the reform of Article 301 of the 
Criminal Code, he preferred to put the headscarf issue back on top of his priority list.
145
 
 
With the amendment of Article 301 penal code and an attempt to lift the 
ban on headscarf, Turkish PM Erdogan and his AKP government worked hard to 
improve the laws about freedom of expression to gain EU’s stamp of approval. On 
the other side, Erdogan’s attitude towards the Turkish media was becoming 
increasingly authoritarian, indicating that the new reforms regarding “free speech” 
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did not extend to Turkish media at all. After the election of President Obama, in a 
NYT editorial about the prospective relationship between the new US President 
and Turkey, NYT harshly criticized the recent attempt of PM Erdogan’s 
intimidation of a major media company, owned by Aydin Dogan. The remarks 
from the editorial are as follows: 
 
We are concerned about Mr. Erdogan’s increasingly autocratic tendencies. His 
government’s decision to slap the media mogul Aydin Dogan with a $500 million tax bill 
smacks of retaliation against an independent press that has successfully exposed 
government corruption.
146
  
 
In the same year, the tax fine was raised to $2.5 billion, which would possibly put 
Dogan Yayin out of business as a media company. The NYT published another 
editorial focusing specifically on this issue. The editorial called attention to 
Erdogan and his government’s persecution towards the Turkish journalists and 
media companies. The editorial details Erdogan’s intimidation of the media group, 
Dogan Yayin, which also owns CNN-Turk (Turkish-language version of CNN), 
and pans the tax penalty demanded from one of the biggest media corporations in 
Turkey.  
 
Now Turkey has provided a particularly chilling example of another way to shut down 
independent voices — a fine of $2.5 billion that appears to be designed to put a major 
media company out of business. As the committee’s [Committee to Protect Journalists] 
executive director, Joel Simon, said, “A hefty fine is often an effective cloak for 
repression.” . . . Dogan journalists have not shied away from stories that the government of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s iron-willed prime minister, does not like. And Aydin 
Dogan, an owner of the media group’s parent company, is one of Mr. Erdogan’s most 
vocal critics. That makes it all the more suspicious that the Erdogan government levied a 
tax penalty on the Dogan group that is almost as much as the value of the entire 
company.
147
 
 
The NYT editorial was a critical warning as Turkey has been struggling with 
ensuing the reforms to align itself with EU and the rest of the Western world. The 
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article suggests that these types of actions undermine that process and endanger 
Turkey’s accession to EU. 
 
Executives of the European Union, which has been considering the addition of Turkey to 
its powerful group, quickly noted their concern. “When the sanction is of such magnitude 
that it threatens the very existence of an entire press group, like in this case, then freedom 
of the press is at stake,” a spokesman said.148 
 
WSJ also covered the news extensively about the tax penalty imposed on 
Dogan media group by the Turkish government. In his article, Marc Champion 
comments on Europe’s reaction to the increasing impediment towards the press 
freedom in Turkey. 
   
The tax case against Dogan Yayin Holding AS -- which owns roughly half the television 
and newspaper market in Turkey -- has drawn concern at home and abroad. Days after a 
$2.5 billion fine was announced last month, the European Commission in Brussels 
expressed "serious concerns" over the implications for press freedom in Turkey and said it 
would include the incident in its report later this month on progress in Turkey's talks to 
join the European Union. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also 
has expressed concern.
149
  
 
The Financial Times also widely reported the Turkish government’s attack 
on Aydin Dogan and his media corporation and indicated that the media mogul 
was intimidated by PM Erdogan for writing about the corruption scandals 
involving Erdogan and his government.  
 
A record $2.5bn (€1.7bn, £1.6bn) tax fine imposed on the Dogan media group has shocked 
the business elite, stoked European Union concerns over press freedom . . . [PM] 
Mr. Erdogan has often lashed out at Mr. Dogan, whose publications have portrayed his 
government as a threat to Turkey's secular order, reported aggressively on corruption 
scandals and, in 2007, raised little protest when the military attempted to block his 
nomination of colleague Abdullah Gul to the presidency. . . . But journalists writing for 
non-Dogan papers, in a country where many have previously faced prosecution or 
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harassment for speaking out, openly deride the suggestion that Dogan is suffering 
martyrdom for championing free speech.
150
 
 
French newspaper Le Monde also reported the news and called the action 
taken against the major media group in Turkey ‘intimidation of the press’. 
Furthermore, in his article, Perrier detailed the rivalry between the Turkish PM 
Erdogan and media mogul Aydin Dogan, the owner of the fined media group. 
 
The rivalry between PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an Islamist-conservative, and Aydin 
Dogan, a secularist close to the Kemalist establishment and the army, did not begin 
yesterday. The two men clash regularly with blows of trials and threats. In September 
2008, Erdogan had publicly called on supporters to boycott Dogan newspapers, including 
some of the most read in the country.
151
 
 
Despite the alarming NYT editorial, and the detailed commentaries in WSJ, 
Financial Times and Le Monde, surprisingly, The Guardian did not cover the story 
in its world news section. Also, based on my review of the news coverage during 
2009, I have yet to come across either an editorial or a news article in The 
Guardian regarding the fine Dogan media group was subjected to. The only news 
was in the form of a short article, buried among other news about media companies 
around the world, in the Media News section by Roy Greenslade
152
 The article 
dated October 21, 2009 was originally published in the Financial Times. The 
reasons for the lack of coverage of this news in The Guardian are unknown. My 
personal opinion is that the underlying reason might be related to UK’s strong 
support for Turkey’s EU membership. Therefore, The Guardian may be concerned 
that news about ‘press intimidation’ and about restrictions on ‘freedom of press’ in 
Turkey might influence the public opinion in UK negatively towards Turkey’s 
accession in EU.  
 
I argue that the perception of the Western media towards PM Erdogan and 
his Islamist government has changed after the Gezi Park protests erupted. I suggest 
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that the perception of Erdogan as a ‘transformational leader’ may be affected due 
to the strong opposition that the Turkish public demonstrated during the protests 
against his decisions and authoritarianism. It is also likely that the social media 
images of the Gezi Park protests, showing Turkish students, doctors, teachers and 
civil organization members being brutalized by the police, may alter the Western 
perception of Turks as a nation. Therefore, it is crucial to look at the 
representations of PM Erdogan and Turkey in the Western media after the Gezi 
resistance. To make a fair comparison, I will examine the same newspapers to 
determine whether the massive protests and the brutal police response have had an 
effect on the image of Erdogan and his government. In the following section, I will 
attempt to assess how the dominance of Gezi resistance news on social media 
changed the Turkish image in NYT, WSJ, Financial Times, The Guardian and Le 
Monde.  
 
After the Gezi Park Resistance 
 Before the Gezi Park resistance, both PM Erdogan and his Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) were praised in the US and UK media for their efforts 
to reform Turkey and bring the country closer to Western democratic values. 
Erdogan and his government were also accused of intimidating the journalists and 
the media companies. On the other hand, their representation in the French 
newspaper Le Monde was rather balanced, offering both the negatives and 
positives of PM Erdogan and his AKP government. In Le Monde, Erdogan was 
also criticized for being aggressive and authoritarian at times. Erdogan’s 
authoritarian decisions were also cautiously criticized by the NYT, and sometimes 
by the WSJ and Financial Times, which mostly focused on the economic risks 
awaiting Turkey unless the PM Erdogan’s government stays in power.  
 
The Gezi Park resistance became a turning point for the Western media to 
pay more attention to what is really going on in Turkey, not only politically or 
economically, but socially as well. When the Gezi demonstrations erupted, after a 
brutal police raid towards the peaceful sit-in protesters, both Twitter and other 
social media became the news source for the global news outlets. As discussed 
previously, Twitter prompted the news coverage of the Gezi protests by the 
Western media. In a NYT op-ed titled “Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn”, Seyla 
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Benhabib writes about the increasingly authoritarian attitude of PM Erdogan and 
his government to Turkish citizens. She pointed out the anxiety of the secular 
population in Turkey regarding the possible threat imposed on the secular 
principles of the Turkish republic.    
 
But the protests are not just about protecting urban greenery; they reflect a much deeper 
resistance to the political path being taken by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, and his increasingly Islamist Justice and Development Party, known by its 
Turkish initials, A.K.P. Mr. Erdogan was re-elected for a third term in 2011 and he has 
used the mandate to pursue an authoritarian agenda that many see as an assault on the 
secular republic that emerged after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
153
   
 
Benhabib also observes how PM Erdogan was interfering with the private lives of 
individuals by bringing new restrictions on alcohol sales and on abortion rights, as 
well as by asking Turkish women to have at least three children. Her critique of 
Erdogan and of his dictatorial style is as follows: 
 
This moral micromanagement of people’s private lives comes amid an increasingly 
strident government assault on political and civil liberties. Turkey’s record on journalistic 
and artistic freedoms is abysmal; rights of assembly and protest are also increasingly 
restricted. . . . So far Mr. Erdogan has arrogantly dismissed his critics. If he continues to 
ignore their voices, the danger is that Turkey will descend further into violence and see its 
much-trumpeted experiment in Islamic democracy fail.
154
 
 
In another NYT op-ed, Dan Bilefsky comments about the implications of 
the Gezi protests and the brutal response of the Turkish riot police on Turkey’s 
accession to EU as follows: 
 
Now influential ministers from Germany and France, and European analysts are warning 
that the bloody crackdown in Taksim Square threatens to undermine frayed relations while 
reinforcing doubts that Turkey has the democratic credentials to join the club. . . . The 
clampdown on the protesters has undermined Turkish attempts to cultivate an international 
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image as a predominantly Muslim country that cleaves to secular European ideals and can 
serve as a model for the region.
155
   
 
In the same article, Bilefsky cites the German foreign minister, Guido Westerwell, 
who called the images from the Taksim Square ‘disturbing’ and said that the 
Turkish government’s reaction to the crisis was sending the wrong signal at home 
and abroad. Bilefsky also quotes the French EU affairs minister, Thierry Repentin, 
who said: “No democracy can be built on the repression of people who try to express 
themselves in the street. The right to protest, to oppose the government, must be 
respected.”156 
  
 Following the Gezi protests, Peter Beaumont of The Guardian reported that 
PM Erdogan was not happy about the criticisms by the European Parliament, which 
voted to condemn the use of “harsh measures” by the Turkish police and urged 
Erdogan to take a more unifying and conciliatory stance. In the same article, 
Beaumont quotes Erdogan’s response to the European Parliament: "I won't 
recognize the decision that the European Union parliament is going to take about 
us . . . Who do you think you are by taking such a decision?”157 Beaumont’s piece 
shows that The Guardian’s view of Erdogan has shifted dramatically, as the 
newspaper particularly emphasizes his combative and defiant attitude towards EU. 
Another article in The Guardian by Luke Harding cites the reaction by the EU 
members regarding the handling of the Gezi protests and its consequences. 
According to Harding, Stefan Fule, EU’s enlargement commissioner, described the 
protests in Taksim Square as “legitimate” in a democratic society. Fule’s 
comments, as cited in The Guardian, are as follows:  
 
[Fule] hinted that Turkey would only be allowed to join the EU if it truly embraced 
European values. He also criticized Turkey's pro-Erdogan media, which initially censored 
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the uprising. Fule said: "There should be freedom to report on what is happening as it is 
happening." . . . Fule urged a "swift and transparent" investigation into the behaviour of 
riot police who used teargas and water cannons against peaceful demonstrators. He said: 
"The duty of all of us, European Union members as much as those countries that wish to 
become one, is to aspire to the highest possible democratic standards and practices. "These 
include the freedom to express one's opinion, the freedom to assemble peacefully," he 
pointed out.
158
 
 
In his article, Beaumont of The Guardian also points out the consequences of the 
handling of the Gezi protests for Turkey’s international reputation and EU 
membership prospects. 
 
On the international stage too, the past two weeks have damaged Turkey's reputation, 
crucially in Europe, where a group of countries led by Germany have put further brakes on 
the glacial EU accession talks because of the violence used against the protesters.
159
 
 
The reporting of the disapproving reaction of the EU members indicates a 
significant change in The Guardian’s coverage of PM Erdogan and Turkey’s 
accession to EU. The representation of Erdogan in The Guardian has shifted from 
favorable to unfavorable as PM Erdogan continues to confront the responses 
coming from the members of the EU. In the following article, Luke Harding 
blames Erdogan for the damage done to Turkey’s international image: 
 
Since the crisis began, the worst of his leadership, Erdogan has lashed out at numerous 
enemies, most of them fictive. Actually, Erdoğan only has himself to blame for the 
damage done to Turkey's international image. Hubristic, peevish, and not a little paranoid, 
only he has the power to reverse this.
160
 
 
In the Financial Times editorial “Mr. Erdogan’s Authoritarian Creep”, 
Erdogan is accused of authoritarianism and criticized for his persecution of 
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journalists, citizens and corporations, who happen to report about Gezi resistance 
or support the protesters in any way. The editorial of the Financial Times states: 
   
Journalists whose coverage of Gezi did not square with the government's view have been 
sacked or silenced. Financial regulators have launched an intrusive probe against currency 
traders. The Koc group, which owns a hotel in which Gezi Park protesters were given 
shelter and medical attention, has been targeted by a tax investigation: an echo of the 
Dogan media group's heavy fines for alleged tax fraud in 2009. Mourners at the funeral of 
a protester shot dead by police face prison charges similar to those sought against the 
police officer who killed him.
161
 
 
The same editorial also emphasizes that the perception of Turkey as a country that 
is striving for a mature democratic system of ‘checks and balances’ has been false 
all along. The article goes on to suggest that Turkey is going backwards and 
drifting away from the reformation process. The article asserts: 
 
The perception that Turkey was steadily advancing toward a mature system of checks and 
balances was always ahead of reality. The reality is Turkey is now going backwards. A 
new law aims to clip the autonomy of the architects' and engineers' professional 
association, which was involved in the protests. This is a reversal of the early Erdogan 
years, in which a still-promising rapprochement with the EU led to the adoption of 
European governing standards.
162
 
 
The WSJ repeatedly reported about the Gezi Park resistance right after the protests 
erupted, detailing the brutal police response against the peaceful demonstrators. 
The news coverage described how the Turkish police used tear gas, pepper spray, 
plastic bullets, and water cannons, and how protesters, including women and 
children, got injured as a result of it. Furthermore, WSJ took an extra step and 
published an op-ed article written by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is the leader of 
CHP, the main opposition party in Turkey. In his article, Kilicdaroglu presented a 
grim picture of Turkish democracy which, he claimed, was under attack by the 
dictatorial leadership of PM Erdogan and his Islamist government. In his article 
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“The Threat to Turkish Freedom”, Kilicdaroglu accuses Erdogan of 
authoritarianism and continues as follows: 
 
In a Muslim setting, this [Turkish] democracy has owed its longevity to its secular 
underpinnings--the separation of state and religion. Today, though, this system faces its 
most serious challenge yet from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its 
leadership. Our country is quickly drifting away from a functioning democratic regime 
toward a manifestly authoritarian and intrusive one built around the whims of a single 
individual in power.
163
 
 
Kilicdaroglu also slams Erdogan and his government’s actions for curtailing the 
civil liberties in Turkey and condemns the police brutality towards the peaceful 
demonstrators. 
 
Freedoms of speech, of assembly and of the press no longer apply in Turkey. My country 
has one of the highest numbers of imprisoned journalists in the world; Reporters without 
Borders ranks Turkey 154th out of 179 countries in terms of press freedom. Peaceful 
demonstrators invariably encounter police violence. Extensive wiretapping is a fact of 
life.
164
 
 
If it were not for the Gezi Park protest, it would be unlikely to see the critique by 
Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition party in Turkey, be published in the 
main opinion page of the WSJ. One may conclude that the overwhelming reaction 
to the Gezi Resistance in the social media has had an impact on the WSJ’s 
perception towards PM Erdogan and his Islamist AKP government. 
 
 French newspaper Le Monde also reported frequently about the Gezi 
protests, the violent police attacks against the protesters and PM Erdogan’s 
authoritarian tactics. Similar to the WSJ, Le Monde too, gave an opportunity for 
the voice of an opposition group to be heard. This time the Alevis (Turkish 
followers of Shia Islam) living in France published an editorial condemning 
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Erdogan and his ‘Islamist-conservative government’ (Le Monde’s words). The 
article “A New Ottoman Empire for Mr. Erdogan” was written by Ali Karababa, 
one of the board members of The Association of Alevis in France, FUAF 
(Fédération Union des Alévis en France). Karababa claims that Alevis in Turkey 
are oppressed by Erdogan’s Sunni Islamist government. He continues:    
 
Nationally, the Prime Minister [Erdogan] undertakes projects that are extraordinary 
examples of his ego. In terms of secularism, he hardens his tone and stance against Alevis. 
He maintains compulsory [Sunni] religious classes in primary and secondary school, 
refuses recognition of Alevi places of worship. He will even name the third Bosphorus 
bridge as, "Yavuz Sultan Selim", the name of the Sultan who slaughtered more than 
40,000 Alevis. The perpetrators of the fire of July 2, 1993 with the death of 33 Alevis were 
released because of the limitation period. The permission for headscarf in universities, 
even the hijab in religious schools transforms the way of life of all citizens. The lipstick 
wear ban for the stewardesses of the Turkish Airlines, kissing in subways and control of 
the alcohol sale are all indication of Islamization via the assimilation of the entire 
population.
165
 
 
Therefore, with this article Le Monde not only criticizes the authoritarianism of PM 
Erdogan and his Islamist-conservative government, but also condemns his 
oppression of Alevis, the minority Muslim religious group in Turkey. It 
underscores PM Erdogan’s dictatorial treatment of the people who do not agree 
with him or who do not have the same religion as him in Turkey.   
 
As a result, the Gezi Park resistance has altered PM Erdogan’s image 
negatively and changed the perception of the Western media. The review of the 
media coverage shows that the Western newspapers began characterizing Erdogan 
as ‘authoritarian’, ‘dictatorial’ and ‘defiant’ in contrast with their previous 
descriptions of him as ‘democratic’, ‘pluralistic’ and ‘transformational’. His image 
has shifted from the “great reformer” to an “arrogant despot”, which is more 
visible in an op-ed published in The Guardian by Fiachra Gibbons. In the article, 
Gibbons describes the striking transformation of Erdogan’s image on the political 
arena as a result of the Gezi Park protests: 
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Until three weeks ago Erdogan was destined to go down as one of the greatest reformers in 
Turkish history alongside Ataturk and Suleiman the Magnificent, despite all the bullying 
and the backsliding of the past three years.
166
 
 
The article refers to the past few years of Erdogan’s rule during when he 
completely revoked the political power of the Turkish military and prevented the 
generals from interfering with the democratic process. Gibbons argues that 
Erdogan has turned into the same kind of despotic authority which he tried to 
dispose of:  
 
Yet the power he concentrated to defeat the generals – by foul means as well as fair – and 
the paranoia of that battle, has undone him. In a matter of days Erdogan has become the 
personification of all the corrupt despotism and violence of the old Kemalist Turkey he 
was elected to sweep away.
167
 
 
Luke Harding of The Guardian even compared Erdogan to Russian 
President Vladimir Putin because of his authoritarian governing style and his 
response to public protests. His remarks are as follows: 
 
Faced with a choice between engaging with this new, vibrant civil society movement or 
crushing it, Erdogan has picked the latter course. Indeed, his reaction to the nationwide 
citizens' revolt reveals ominous parallels with another autocratic leader who has recently 
found himself in a tight spot: Vladimir Putin.
168
 
 
Following the footsteps of Putin, Erdogan also banned the use of Twitter in 
Turkey, which he viewed as the reason for protests against him and his 
government.  
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Twitter Ban in Turkey 
After the Gezi protests, Erdogan described Twitter as the “worst menace to 
society”, which was mocked by the social media, as well as the international 
media. Furthermore, he offered conspiracy theories about the reasons behind the 
Gezi protests, such as blaming foreign provocateurs, international interest lobby, 
and the usual suspect, Twitter. In The Guardian, Constanze Letsch cites Erdogan’s 
remarks while Luke Harding discusses his actions:  
 
“There is now a menace which is called Twitter," Erdogan said. "The best examples of lies 
can be found there. To me, social media is the worst menace to society."
169
 
Erdogan's polarizing tactics might have come straight from the Putin playbook. Instead of 
talking to the demonstrators – a diverse and previously non-political bunch – he has 
blamed the protests on a murky foreign conspiracy. Many critical journalists are already in 
jail and on Tuesday Erdogan denounced the international media. His ruling Islamist-rooted 
Justice and Development party (AKP) has made menacing noises about banning Twitter, 
one of the main conduits for anti-Erdogan mockery, and dubbed a menace by the PM.
170
 
 
After the decision to ban Twitter in Turkey, there was a huge uproar from the 
Turkish citizens, expressed particularly in the social media. The ban was protested 
on Twitter using hashtags, designed specifically to protest the Twitter ban in 
Turkey, which became popular and began trending globally in a short period of 
time. The NYT reports the reaction as follows: 
 
Nonetheless the ban appeared to backfire, fomenting a loud and raucous backlash on 
Twitter, with the hashtags #TwitterisblockedinTurkey, #occupytwitter, 
#turkeyblockedtwitter, and #dictatorerdogan quickly becoming popular trending topics 
globally.
171
 
 
In NYT, the Turkish government’s Twitter ban was likened to a “digital 
coup” while Turkey was compared to China or North Korea. NYT also reported 
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the harsh criticism of the European Commission made via Twitter, calling the ban 
“censorship.” 
 
While Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country of 79 million people, has long sought to 
portray itself as a model of democracy in a restive region, critics both inside and out 
outside the country denounced the government’s ban as a “digital coup” more  befitting 
China or North Korea. They, too, of course, did so over Twitter. Echoing outrage from 
across the world, Neelie Kroes, vice president of the European Commission, the European 
Union’s executive body, wrote on Twitter that “The Twitter ban in #Turkey is groundless, 
pointless, cowardly. Turkish people and intl community will see this as censorship. It 
is.”172 
 
The same article also quotes PM Erdogan who brushed the critics aside in a defiant 
tone. Erdogan’s remarks are as follows: 
 
Twitter, mwitter!” (the rough equivalent of “Twitter, schmitter!”) Mr. Erdogan said. “We 
will root out all. They say, ‘Sir, the international community can say this, can say that.’ I 
don’t care at all. Everyone will see how powerful the state of the Republic of Turkey is 
[author’s parentheses].173 
 
 The Gezi Park resistance was not the only reason behind the Twitter ban. 
There were also leaked audio tapes online revealing corruption within the 
Erdogan’s inner circle, as well as his government. Besides blocking Twitter, 
Erdogan also urged his government to shut down the access to Facebook and 
YouTube which shared the leaked audio tapes on their sites. In a WSJ article, it is 
argued that the way Turkish government blocks Twitter and other social media 
platforms may encourage other countries and set an example to censor social 
media. 
 
Mr. Erdogan's shake-up, a rapid-fire response to a power struggle with political enemies, 
has left Internet companies and government officials from Washington to Brussels worried 
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that Turkey could become a template for other countries where leaders want to rein in the 
Internet without cracking down with as much force as China or Iran.
174
 
 
After the Constitutional Court ruled to reject the Twitter ban, access to Twitter was 
reinstated. Since then, despite other attempts to block Twitter, as well as Facebook 
and YouTube, there is currently access to all of these social media platforms in 
Turkey. However, the Turkish parliament, which is controlled by Erdogan’s 
Islamist party, AKP, passed a law to increase the government oversight on social 
media. The law allows the Turkish government to demand, without a court order, 
any data deemed threatening to national security such as Web browsing activity, 
email and text messages, also Facebook and Twitter accounts. The actions taken by 
the Turkish government indicates that social media platforms have been influential 
in changing the political discourse, mobilizing individuals, and facilitating 
grassroots opposition movements and protests in Turkey. PM Erdogan’s desire to 
ban the social media is a precautionary step to discourage the opposing voices and 
prevent future protests and demonstrations. It also indicates that he is concerned 
about his image on the international political arena. Therefore, one may conclude 
that social media have been effective in altering the Western perception of Turks 
and Turkey. 
 
The review of the selected Western newspapers shows that before the Gezi 
Park protests, the image of Turkey in Western media was rather positive, despite 
some ambivalence at times. After so many decades of volatility in Turkey due to 
military coups, coalition governments and economic crises, PM Erdogan and his 
Islamist government were perceived as the new leadership that brought stability, 
economic growth and democracy. The Western media viewed Erdogan and his 
government as ‘democratic’, ‘reformist’ and ‘pluralistic’. However, after the Gezi 
Park events, there has been a shift in the representation of Erdogan and his party in 
the international media. The selected newspapers began characterizing him as 
‘authoritarian’, ‘combative’, ‘aggressive’, and ‘despotic’. These descriptions are 
much more aligned with the longstanding image of Turks, which has been seen in 
Western discourse for centuries and discussed in the previous chapters. However, 
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the representation of Turks in Western newspapers also shows that there is a 
distinction between the Turks as a nation and the Turkish government, which was 
absent in the prior Western discourse examined in this thesis. My discourse 
analysis of the Western writings until the end of the 19
th 
century demonstrates that 
Europeans’ perception of Turks as a race and as a nation is obscured with their 
apprehension towards the Ottoman Empire. During the Gezi protests, social media 
provided an opportunity for both the Western public and media to see the Turks in 
a different way. The international mainstream media sympathized with the Turkish 
public while criticizing PM Erdogan and his government for being authoritarian. 
Western newspapers were more sympathetic towards the Turkish protesters as they 
were being brutalized by the Turkish police and mistreated by Erdogan and his 
government. Also, viewers of the mainstream news networks witnessed the violent 
reaction of the Turkish police towards a diverse group of Turkish protesters, 
including people from all walks of life. The news media also scrutinized the 
underlying reasons for the protests and questioned the wrongdoings of the Turkish 
government. Therefore, unlike the prior discourses discussed in this thesis so far, 
the representation of Turks was not stereotypical. Simply, the Western perception 
of the Turkish government and of the Turkish citizens was not the same, and their 
images were not lumped in together. After the images and news of the Gezi 
protests appeared on social media and triggered the real-time coverage of the 
Western media, the representation of Turks has become more impartial, balanced 
and nuanced. Consequently, one may conclude that social media may have an 
impact on the Western perception of Turks in the future too and may improve the 
stereotypical Turkish image, as the representations become more multifaceted over 
time.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
The discourse analysis that has been conducted in this thesis reveals that 
the Western image of Turks has been uniform, constant, and consistent. Beginning 
with the First Crusade in the 11
th
 century, Turks were defined as the Muslim 
‘Other’ by the Christian Europe. This image was bolstered during the rise of the 
Ottoman Empire and Turks were characterized as the ‘enemy of Christianity,’ ‘evil 
Muslim’ and ‘wicked Other’ and became the epicenter of the Crusade propaganda 
until the middle of the 15th century. When the Ottoman Turks captured 
Constantinople in 1453, they were demonized as ‘bloodthirsty savages’ and 
became known for their ‘cruelty.’ During the Renaissance, European humanists 
branded the Ottoman Turks as ‘barbarians’, which highlighted their status as the 
enemy of Western civilization and Christendom. During the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, 
the fear and anxiety that European Christians had because of the Ottoman military 
advances solidified the image of Turks as ‘cruel’ people. Around the same time, 
the stereotypical image of ‘terrible Turk’ emerged and later became predominant. 
Christian Europeans also showed admiration and envy towards the Ottoman 
Empire during that period and praised the Turks because of their strong military, 
efficient political organization and religious unity. In contrast, Christian Europeans 
suffered from a religious divide and at the same time lacked a formidable, unified 
and organized military. However, my analysis has also showed that the praise for 
the Ottoman military and administration in some Western writings was not 
sufficient to overcome the stereotype of ‘terrible Turk.’ Therefore, the European 
image of Turks as ‘cruel, immoral and barbarous’ remained, and the ‘terrible Turk’ 
stereotype endured.  
     
During the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, the notion of ‘Turk’ became central to 
the definition of Europe’s self. Both the internal and external threats to the unity 
and existence of Christendom created the need to define the ‘Turk’ in such terms 
that the image of Turk may either be justifiable or demeaning, depending on the 
political, religious, or ideological allegiance. The Ottoman military aggression and 
political domination in Europe was uncontrollable and unstoppable. The Ottoman 
peril inspired the English playwrights and the Turks became the epicenter of the 
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popular English plays, which bolstered the image of the ‘terrible Turk’ even more. 
The history books and treatises written during the same period also promoted this 
image by describing the Turks as ‘the present terror of the world,’ a phrase coined 
by historian Richard Knolles. The fear of being dominated by the Turks and the 
religion of Islam produced the term ‘turning Turk’ which embodies all the negative 
stereotypical features of Turks. Although the British Empire was not in imminent 
threat due to its geographic location, and was rather at friendly terms with the 
Turks compared to the other European monarchies, the British imperial envy 
towards the Ottomans was undeniable. This was also reflected in Early Modern 
English drama, and the image of Turks as ‘cruel’ was reinforced with demonizing 
representations, particularly of the Ottoman Sultans, for the purpose of alterizing 
the Turks. The invention of printing machine enabled these texts to reach 
increasing number of readers, and thus popularized and cemented the stereotypical 
image of Turks even more. The image of ‘cruel Turk’ encapsulated the threat to 
European ‘self’ and motivated both England and the rest of Europe to strive for 
more opportunities, explore other lands, and become superior. Towards the end of 
the 17
th
 century, European monarchs began capitalizing on their efforts and 
spreading to other lands.  
 
In the 18
th
 century, the balance of power between Christian Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire shifted. Due to Enlightenment and colonialism, Europeans 
progressed both culturally and economically as opposed to the Ottomans. The 
incompetence and decadence of the Ottoman Sultans and the vulnerability of a 
weakening military caused the decline of the Ottoman Empire. During this period, 
Western travelers, who were often biased because of the European positional 
superiority, characterized Ottomans as ‘indolent, backward, ignorant, despotic, 
sensual and lustful’ in their travel accounts. My brief review of the Orientalist 
discourse demonstrates that Western travel accounts were embellished with 
European fantasy and imagination about Imperial harem stories, Turkish 
promiscuity, sensuality, homosexuality and sodomy. These representations 
produced the stereotype of ‘lustful Turk.’ However, the ‘cruelty’ of Turks did not 
fade from the Western discourse, as it has continued to exist on the movie screens 
of Western contemporary cinema.       
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The depictions of Turks in Western films are frequently stereotypical, 
which indicates a continuity of the Crusade rhetoric, Renaissance humanist 
discourse, Early Modern English drama and Orientalist travelogue that have been 
reviewed in this thesis. My analysis of selected American and European films 
maintains this continuity as the Turkish portrayals are often reminiscent of the 
‘terrible Turk’ image of the prior discourses. The cinematic image of the Turks is 
inflated with the stereotypical features of cruelty, brutality, murderousness, 
immorality, sexual aggression, lustfulness and homosexuality inspired by the prior 
representations of Turks. The analysis also reveals that the Turkish image in 
Hollywood films has been uniform and consistent. Unlike Arab portraits, Turkish 
characters are not nuanced and multifaceted. On the other hand, the representations 
of Turks in European films are varied and involve both stereotypical and 
multidimensional characters. However, as discussed previously, these films are not 
as influential as the big Hollywood productions which are available for a 
worldwide audience. Taking into account the influential and popular films, my 
findings illustrate that the stereotypical features of Turks are homogeneous and 
prevalent in contemporary Western films. Therefore, one may conclude that the 
stereotypical features of Turks in Western films originate from the long-standing 
Western images of ‘Terrible Turk’ and ‘Lustful Turk’ that have been predominant 
in Western discourse. These stereotypes are further propagated and promoted by 
the popular films and permeate into Western popular culture. Therefore, I conclude 
that these images become a myth and they transcend time.  
 
Among the people who have watched Lawrence of Arabia, quite a few of 
them must have been convinced that Lawrence, the blonde, blue-eyed, English 
hero, was brutally beaten and raped by the sadistic Turkish soldiers. Most people 
know what ‘Turkish prison’ stands for even though they have not seen Midnight 
Express. At the end of The Usual Suspects, when the brutal killer, Kayser Soze, is 
introduced as a Turk, the audience must have been convinced of his crimes as 
Turks are perceived to be murderers and criminals anyway. Such depictions of 
Turks are convincing due to the predominant stereotype of Turks as ‘cruel’ and 
thus, Turkish portrayals such as Kayser Soze become believable. In Chapter 5, I 
have addressed the associations between these stereotypical images in cinema and 
the mythical image of Turks, but my examination of Western films is still limited. 
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Also, it is implausible to measure the direct effect of these films on the audience 
due to the extensive material available and the time constraints of this thesis. 
Furthermore, some European films have diverse or nuanced Turkish portrayals, but 
these films are not widespread. They are mostly the products of Turkish diasporic 
cinema. Nevertheless, my analysis of Western contemporary cinema shows that the 
Turkish stereotype in films is uniform and consistent as well as predominant. This 
indicates that popular films such as Lawrence of Arabia and Midnight Express help 
promote the myth of ‘terrible Turk’ as well as ‘lustful Turk’ and enable these 
images to survive throughout the 21
st
 century. 
 
Overall, the findings of my discourse analysis support my argument that the 
images of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ have become myths. These images 
originate from the historical discourse and Orientalist discourse that have 
disparaged the Turks. These stereotypical images have continued to exist in the 
Western contemporary cinema preserving their uniformity and consistency. 
Therefore, they become trans-historical and transformed into myths. At the end of 
my thesis, I attempted to answer the question of how these myths could be altered. 
This question urged me to look at other popular media and explore how the image 
of Turks can be transformed in the future. For that reason, I have sought to 
determine the effects of social media in the last chapter of the thesis, as social 
media can have significant influence on people’s perceptions of other cultures. I 
was motivated to find out the possible impact of social media on the prospective 
image of Turks. To achieve this, I explored the possible effects of social media 
platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, due to their popularity 
especially among younger generations and demonstrated that social media could be 
influential in mobilizing people during public protests. Also, I attempted to 
establish the link between the social media and traditional news media by looking 
at the Arab Spring and the Gezi Park resistance in Turkey. To determine the effect 
of social media on the Turkish image, I reviewed a selected group of Western 
newspapers and analyzed the news coverage about Turkey before and after the 
Gezi Park protests. Based on the results of my analysis of the selected American 
and European newspapers, I have concluded that social media have been a 
significant factor for the changes in the representations of Turks. 
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My analysis also illustrates that the actions of the political governments do 
not necessarily reflect the beliefs and characteristics of the nations they represent. 
As discussed previously, European Christians alterized the Turks based on their 
ethnicity and religion. Turks were stereotyped as ‘cruel’ and vilified as a whole 
ethnic group during the time when the Ottoman Empire was attacking Europe and 
conquering European territories. Even during the Early Modern era, when Europe 
had cultural and commercial interactions with the Turks, European Christians 
continued to demonize them because of the looming Ottoman aggression. This 
indicates that European Christians were not able to distinguish the Turkish people 
from their monarchy and their religion, as the Turks were always associated with 
the might of the Ottoman Empire and Islam. Following European colonialism, 
Western travelers had the opportunity see the Turks first-hand, but their perception 
was biased with the Orientalist viewpoint as discussed earlier. Social media 
provided an opportunity for the Turkish public to be judged independently during 
the Gezi Park resistance. Therefore, during the Gezi Park protests, social media 
were effective in altering the Western representations of Turks.  
 
In the last chapter, my analysis of social media and newspaper coverage has 
demonstrated that Turkish governments do not necessarily reflect the beliefs, 
principles and values of the Turkish people. In contrast with social media, popular 
films such as Midnight Express do not differentiate between the Turkish public and 
Turkish government. The lead character in Midnight Express falsely accuses the 
entire Turkish nation of being oppressive and cruel, while insulting all the Turks at 
the same time. During the Gezi Park resistance, social media users had the 
opportunity to see the Turks separately from their government as they witnessed 
Turkish protesters being brutalized by the Turkish police. With the possible impact 
of social media, one may assume that it is unlikely for the Turks to be branded by 
the actions of their government in the future. Although it is not possible to measure 
the direct impact of social media due to the limited amount of academic research 
available at the moment, my analysis of social media poses important questions for 
future research. For example, examining whether the West perceives the Turks 
differently from the Turkish government would be a valuable contribution to the 
existing academic research. I think that looking into the representation of both 
Turks and Turkish government on social media offers a good opportunity to assess 
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the impact of social media. How social media platforms affect the images of 
national identities or alter the perceptions of other cultures are major questions that 
need to be investigated in the future. For future research, I intend to explore 
whether social media can help change the image of Turks and alter the deeply 
rooted stereotypes of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk.’ 
 
My research in this thesis upholds the argument that the images of ‘terrible 
Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ come from the previous discourses and continue to appear 
in entertainment media. They have become myths that are so entrenched in the 
Western discourse that they permeate into popular culture. However, these two 
stereotypes are not the only images of Turks that Western people encounter in the 
media. There are so many accomplished and well-known Turkish people who 
represent Turks and Turkey worldwide. Some of these people are artists, writers, 
musicians, athletes, doctors, scientists, scholars and businessmen, who reach a 
worldwide audience with their films, TV shows, books and art, who do pioneering 
research and teach young minds at universities, or who manage corporations and 
sell popular products all around the world. For example, Dr. Mehmet Oz is a 
successful Turkish-American cardiac surgeon who is also a very popular TV 
personality and an author. Orhan Pamuk is a highly acclaimed Turkish writer and 
academic who is the 2006 recipient of the Nobel Prize in literature. Elif Safak is 
another award-winning Turkish author and academic who is also known for her 
articles in The Guardian. Nuri Bilge Ceylan is an acclaimed Turkish screenwriter 
and film director who won the top prize at the Cannes Film Festival in 2014 for his 
film Winter Sleep. In sports, Mehmet Okur and Hidayet ‘Hedo’ Turkoglu are two 
popular Turkish former basketball players who played in the NBA for several 
seasons. In corporate world, Muhtar Kent is a successful Turkish-American 
business executive who is the chairman and CEO of the Coca Cola Company. 
Another accomplished Turkish-American businessman is Hamdi Ulukaya, who is 
the founder, chairman and CEO of Chobani, the number one selling yogurt brand 
in the United States. Last but not least, Dr. Aziz Sancar, who is a Turkish-
American scientist, made the headlines when he was awarded with the Nobel Prize 
in 2015 for his groundbreaking research in DNA repair. 
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All these distinguished Turkish figures and countless others have 
represented the Turks and Turkey worldwide with their achievements and have 
been celebrated for their success. The Western mass media have reported about 
their accomplishments and covered them in their newscasts. However, whether the 
cinematic portrayals of Turks in Western cinema reflect the achievements of such 
distinguished Turkish people is debatable. It is highly unlikely to see a Turkish 
character in films, who is a pioneering scientist or an acclaimed artist. Despite the 
successes of business executives such as Hamdi Ulukaya or Muhtar Kent, the 
Turkish businessmen in films are often portrayed as illegitimate people who either 
run a shady corporation or have connections with crime organizations. Although 
there is a significant number of renowned Turks living both in Turkey and other 
countries, United States and major European countries in particular, it is almost 
impossible to see a sophisticated Turk in films. Both the Turks in diaspora and in 
Turkey are culturally and intellectually diverse, but the Turkish portraits in films 
are not. However, there are two recent exceptions where the filmmakers have 
deserted the common stereotypical characteristics of Turks and portray them as 
human, sophisticated and even heroic at times. These films are: The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist (2012) directed by Mira Nair and The Water Diviner (2014), 
Russel Crowe’s directorial debut. These films are not Hollywood productions, but 
distributed by the American companies. The nuanced and distinct portrayals of the 
Turks in these films require a closer look and an in-depth analysis to determine 
whether the representation of Turks may improve in cinema. Accordingly, they 
will be examined closely and discussed in my future research. So far, my analysis 
of the selected films in this thesis shows that the stereotypical cinematic image of 
Turks reflects a myth which is a product of the past discourses. Therefore, the 
findings of my analysis uphold my argument. 
 
Surely, Turks are not the only ethnic group that is demonized in the 
Western discourse and contemporary cinema. In history, many people were 
disparaged because of their ethnicity, religion or color, such as Jews and Blacks. In 
Western discourse, there is ample amount of literature that shows the negative 
representations, sufferings and vilification of these people. One may also find 
abundance of stereotypical depictions in Western cinema that demonize Blacks, 
Hispanics, Chinese, Russians and particularly, Arabs. As discussed earlier, the 
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portrayals of these ethnic groups, including Arabs, are not always stereotypical as 
their depictions can be multidimensional and nuanced. For example, award 
winning films Syriana (2005) and Babel (2006) show the human side of Arabs and 
portray them heroes or victims. One may see black actors such as Denzel 
Washington, Samuel L. Jackson, Morgan Freeman, Will Smith and Idris Elba play 
heroic, multidimensional or emotional roles in films all the time. However, it is 
unlikely to single out a Turkish character in a Hollywood film that is someone 
other than a criminal, murderer, drug dealer or rapist. As discussed previously in 
Chapter 5, the stereotypical characterization of Turks in films shows that the myth 
of ‘terrible Turk’ is trans-historical. 
 
Based on the findings, this thesis has made a significant contribution to the 
academic discussion about the Western image of Turks. As my main focus in this 
thesis has been the Western perception of Turks, I have not looked into how the 
Turks or other Muslims see the West. For the purposes of my thesis, the counter 
narratives such as Occidentalism are deemed inessential. The aim of this thesis is 
to demonstrate that the image of ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’ are myths 
created and bolstered by the Western discourse. For further research, exploring the 
counter narratives will enrich the knowledge about the Turks and also provide a 
better understanding of the Middle Eastern standpoint. This thesis has also 
demonstrated that social media can have an impact on the perception of other 
cultures. It will be critical to investigate whether social media can improve the 
Western image of Turks. These issues will be my future research topics. 
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